Perverting the Course of Justice in UK Law

It is the experience of the court, confirmed by counsel appearing today for the appellant from his experience, that counts for perverting the course of justice appear with increasing frequency in indictments along with counts for the principal offence or offences. It seems to us that in many cases these counts are quite unnecessary and only serve to complicate the sentencing process.

The Criminal Law Act 1967 has created certain statutory offences of acting to impede the apprehension or prosecution of an offender (section 4) and of concealing offences or giving false information (section 5): but, though it has abolished the crime of compounding an offence (other than treason), it is silent as to the common law offence of perverting or obstructing the course of justice.

In our view the natural and ordinary meaning of section 328(1) is that the arrangement to which it refers must be one which relates to property which is criminal property at the time when the arrangement begins to operate on it. To say that it extends to property which was originally legitimate but became criminal only as a result of carrying out the arrangement is to stretch the language of the section beyond its proper limits.

My Lords, although criminal contempts of court may take a variety of forms they all share a common characteristic: they involve an interference with the due administration of justice either in a particular case or more generally as a continuing process. It is justice itself that is flouted by contempt of court not the individual court or judge who is attempting to administer it.

He was the leader and had an involvement in each of the transactions. He had a previous conviction for perverting the course of justice in 2002 for which he received a sentence of 3 months imprisonment. He was described by the judge as a "family man", in the light of the testimonials provided which spoke of the guidance he had given others and the help he had given to his family who looked up to him.

In my view, there is nothing in principle which prevents opportunity from amounting to reasonable grounds for suspicion. Where a small number of people can be clearly identified as the only ones capable of having committed the offence, I see no reason why that cannot afford reasonable grounds for suspecting each of them of having committed that offence, in the absence of any information which could or should enable the police to reduce the number further.

Lord Coleridge at page 366 says this: "The first count of the indictment in substance "charges the defendant with the misdemeanour of attempting, by the manufacture of false evidence, to mislead a judicial tribunal which might come into existence. If the act itself of the defendant was completed, I cannot doubt that to manufacture false evidence for the purpose of misleading a judicial tribunal is a misdemeanour".