Right to Vote in UK Law

I agree with Mr Subiotto that what is effectively a suspension of the right to vote of those British citizens who voluntarily choose to reside in another Member State for more than 15 years can be characterised as a "disadvantage." It does not follow, however, that every disadvantage of non-residence in the UK is a restriction on or deterrent to free movement.

That question obviously does not have to be answered in terms of statistical evidence or specific evidence of actual cases of deterrence. In practice the claimant's assertion about the potential effect of the 15 year rule on free movement is very difficult to demonstrate by any means, because it does not square with ordinary human experience.

The European Commission on Human Rights and the Strasbourg Court have repeatedly held in decisions on admissibility that article 10 did not protect the right to vote or other rights already secured by A3P1 as the lex specialis. See, for example, Liberal Party v United Kingdom (1980) 4 EHRR 106, paras 14–16, and the other cases to which the Lord Ordinary referred at para 37 of his opinion.

Thus the history of the legislation is one of an increasing availability of information regarding the financial affairs of the company to those having an interest in its progress and stability.

On September 2, 2009, the claimant applied to Wandsworth Borough Council, the first defendant, to be registered to vote in UK elections. By letter received on December 15, 2009, the first defendant rejected the claimant's application, by reason of the application of the 15 year rule.

They have a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere, but it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Protocol No.1 have been complied with; it has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate.

Here the trustees of CIFF bound CIFF in relinquishing their discretion to the court, and the court order will bind CIFF in deciding that the Grant should be made. The member does not have a free vote in this case because he is bound by the fiduciary duties I have described and is subject to the court's inherent jurisdiction over the administration of charities.