Road Traffic Accident in UK Law

The whole purpose of introducing Section II of Part 45 was to impose a somewhat rough and ready system in a limited class of cases because the commercial interests behind the parties, who bear the burden of large numbers of such cases, considered that, taken overall, it was fair and saved both time and money. If the appellants' argument were correct, the acceptance of a Part 36 offer would always result in an order for costs on the standard basis in low-value road traffic accident cases.

A road traffic accident is one of the commoner cases, for such events are only too often the result of a combination of acts or omissions on the part of two or more persons. It must, however, be a cause which is more than de minimis, more than minimal: see R v Hennigan (1971) 1 All ER 133.

If it is voidable, then it may be capable of being set aside at the suit of a beneficiary, but this would be subject to equitable defences and to the court's discretion. The trustees' duty to take relevant matters into account is a fiduciary duty, so an act done as a result of a breach of that duty is voidable. Fiscal considerations will often be among the relevant matters which ought to be taken into account.

It is easy enough to take the view that justice requires a short extension of time to be granted even where the reason for the failure to serve is the incompetence of the claimant's solicitor, especially if the claim is substantial. Moreover, the claim form does not have to contain full details of the claim. All that is required is a concise statement of the nature of the claim: see CPR 16.2(1) (a) .

It seems to me that, in the exercise of the discretion, the basic question to be asked is whether it is fair and just in all the circumstances to expect the defendant to meet this claim on the merits, notwithstanding the delay in commencement. Thus, there may be some unfairness to the defendant due to the delay in issue but the delay may have arisen for so excusable a reason, that, looking at the matter in the round, on balance, it is fair and just that the action should proceed.

It is for the jury to decide whether the risk created by the manner in which the vehicle was being driven was both obvious and serious and, in deciding this, they may apply the standard of the ordinary prudent motorist as represented by themselves.

If satisfied that an obvious and serious risk was created by the manner of the defendant's driving, the jury are entitled to infer that he was in one or other of the states of mind required to constitute the offence and will probably do so; but regard must be given to any explanation he gives as to his state of mind which may displace the inference.