Road Traffic Offences in UK Law

In the context of a statutory regime for road traffic offences that envisages the causing of death as a factor leading to an enhanced statutory sentencing bracket, and in a context in which, where such offences are considered, the courts regard additional deaths as an aggravating factor ( Boswell (supra), R v Toombs [1997] 2 Cr App R (S) 217) we find the concept of a road traffic offence in which the sentencing court is obliged to disregard the fact that a death has been caused as wholly anomalous.

Krawec was clearly valid in its context and at its time, but we do not see it as of assistance to sentencing courts in the different context of today. Whilst culpability or criminality remains the primary consideration this Court has concluded that Judge McNicholl was entitled to bear in mind that he was dealing with an offence that had led to death.

In our judgment the unforeseen and unexpected results of the carelessness are not in themselves relevant to penalty. The primary considerations are the quality of the driving, the extent to which the appellant on the particular occasion fell below the standard of the reasonably competent driver; in other words, the degree of carelessness and culpability. The unforeseen consequences may sometimes be relevant to those considerations.

It is designed to protect road users in the future from an offender who had shown himself to be a real risk on the roads. The Panel suggests the risk represented by the offender is reflected in the level of culpability which attaches to his driving so that matters relevant to fixing the length of the driving disqualification for the offence of causing death by dangerous driving will be much the same as those factors we have listed already.

The Road Traffic Act 1991 created two new offences by way of amendment of the Road Traffic Act 1988. Section 1 of the 1991 Act substituted for sections 1 and 2 of the 1988 Act the new offence of causing death by dangerous driving, thereby replacing the offence of causing death by reckless driving. At one time earlier in the somewhat chequered history of road traffic offences there had been an offence of causing death by dangerous driving.

The jurisprudence of the European Court very clearly establishes that while the overall fairness of a criminal trial cannot be compromised, the constituent rights comprised, whether expressly or implicitly, within article 6 are not themselves absolute.

First, the offence of driving while over the legal limit is not an offence which requires the court to ascertain the intent of the accused at all. Conviction follows after a scientific test which is intended to be as exact as possible. Thirdly, it is the accused himself who, by drinking after the event, defeats the aim of the legislature by doing something which makes the scientific test potentially unreliable.