Sale of Land in UK Law

No doubt such tenants in common are interested in the land in the general sense, as was remarked by Lord Justice Russell in re Kempthorne, 1930 (1) Ch. at p. 292 But that is not the same thing as their being owners of equitable interests in the realty. The whole purpose of the trust for sale is to make sure, by shifting theequitable interests away from the land and into the proceeds of sale, that a purchaser of the land takes froe from the equitable interests.

Neither the seller nor the buyer has unqualified beneficial ownership. Beneficial ownership of the land is in a sense split between the seller and buyer on the provisional assumptions that specific performance is available and that the contract will in due course be completed, if necessary by the Court ordering specific performance.

That decision is entirely consistent both with the nature of a deposit and with the general approach of the law to repudiation and renunciation of contracts. Since the payment of a deposit at the executory stage of the contract is an earnest (or guarantee) of further performance, it is no surprise that a failure to pay the deposit on time is taken to demonstrate that the buyer is unwilling to perform the contract as a whole.

Whereas an oral contract was allowed and enforceable provided that it was evidenced in writing and the memorandum or note thereof was signed by or on behalf of the party against whom it was sought to be enforced, oral contracts are now of no effect and all contracts must be signed by or on behalf of all the parties.

Since the statutory fusion of law and equity in 1875 it has been enacted (Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, Section 25 (7) now re-enacted in slightly different language in the Law of Property Act 1925, Section 41) that stipulations of a contract, as to time or otherwise, which according to rules of equity are not deemed to be orto have become of the essence of the contract are also to be construed and have effect at law in accordance with the same rules, The third parties rely on Section 41 on the point of construction.

Had they intended the Law of Property Act 1925, section 63, to have a different kind of operation from that which the Conveyancing Act 1881, section 63, had been designed to achieve, I would certainly have expected some indication of this fact in section 63 Instead, section 63 of 1881 was left intact by the amending Act (Law of Property Act 1922) and was consolidated without any change in its language into the Act of 1925.