Sexual Abuse in UK Law

However, I agree that, given the seriousness of matters involved, at least some reference to the heightened civil standard would usually be necessary: In re H (Minors)(Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] AC 563, 586D-H, per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead. But in my view pragmatism dictates that the task of magistrates should be made more straightforward by ruling that they must in all cases under section 1 apply the criminal standard.

There will be occasions when one local authority will have the duty to pass on information about abuse and abusers to other local authorities. An example would be when children from one area who are at risk move to another local authority area. The local authority may also need to respond to enquiries from another authority who are conducting enquiries about a possible abuser. Nothing in this judgment is intended to inhibit the necessary exchange of relevant information between agencies.

It must reflect a conscious decision that disclosure of information should be regarded as exceptional in cases of this nature.

Secondly, through the combined effects of Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd and departing from Stubbings v Webb, a substantially greater number of allegations (not all of which will be true) are now likely to be made many years after the abuse complained of. Whether or not it will be possible for defendants to investigate these sufficiently for there to be a reasonable prospect of a fair trial will depend upon a number of factors, not least when the complaint was first made and with what effect.

Did the authority's conduct in this case amount to a breach of this implied term? The conduct must be such as to destroy or seriously damage the relationship. The conduct in this case was not only to suspend the claimant, but to do so by means of a letter which stated that 'the issue to be investigated is an allegation of sexual abuse made by a young person in our care.' The question is therefore whether there was 'reasonable and proper cause' to do this.

To our minds there can be only one answer to this question, namely the same answer as that given by the majority in Re H (supra). The Court must reach a conclusion based on facts, not on suspicion or mere doubts.

In my view the Court of Appeal reached the right conclusion on the issue arising in the present cases. Ultimately the factor which persuades me that, at common law, interference with family life does not justify according a suspected parent a higher level of protection than other suspected perpetrators is the factor conveniently labelled 'conflict of interest'. A doctor is obliged to act in the best interests of his patient.