Summary Summons in UK Law

I accordingly reach the conclusion that the language of Order 59 rule 10(2) which excludes the admission of further evidence on appeal to the Court of Appeal except on special grounds is, in its ordinary meaning, applicable to appeals against summary judgments given for plaintiffs under Order 14 or Order 86.

It may well be that the standard of diligence required of a defendant preparing his case in opposition to a summons for summary judgment, especially if under pressure of time, will not be so high as that required in preparing for trial.

It seems to me that the jurisdiction of the Court over family assets under Section 17 is entirely discretionary. Its discretion transcends all rights, legal or equitable, and enables the Court to make such order as it thinks fit. This means, as I understand it, that the Court is entitled to make such order as appears to be fair and just in all the circumstances of the case.

In my view it would be wrong and undesirable to attempt to define in the abstract what are the relevant factors. By way of example, a relevant factor telling in favour of a defendant might well be the fact that the civil action or some step in it, would be likely to obtain such publicity as might sensibly be expected to reach, and to influence, parsons who would or might be jurors in criminal proceedings.

In my experience, it is well recognised, both in the domestic and the international jurisdictions, that in the context of domestic violence, the position of the child is vitally affected by the position of the child's mother. If the effect on the mother of the father's conduct is severe it is, in my judgment, no hindrance to the success of an Article 13 (b) defence that no specific abuse has been perpetrated by the father on the child.

In the present case the undertakings which were offered and accepted to preserve the assets in this country clearly fell within the concept of interlocutory proceedings to protect what would be the fruits of victory in the main suit if not the property which was the subject matter of the action itself. I think that here lies the crucial distinction between interlocutory and final proceedings.

So that, in the absence of all evidence, if a husband puts property into his wife's name he intends it to be a gift to her but if he puts it into joint names then (in the absence of all other evidence) the presumption is the same as a joint beneficial tenancy.