Transferred Intent in UK Law

Mrs Plevin entered into a CFA with her original solicitors, Miller Gardner, on 19 June 2008. Subsequently there were two technical changes of solicitor. They were technical because they both arose out of organisational changes within the same firm. In July 2009, the partners of Miller Gardner reconstituted themselves as an LLP.

It is right to add that even if the argument were sound, it would lead nowhere. Shortly after each transfer, on 30 July 2009 and 30 April 2012, the new firm wrote to Mrs Plevin informing her about the change, referring to the CFA and saying that they would "continue to represent you on the same terms and conditions as previously." Mrs Plevin plainly assented to that by continuing to instruct them.

In considering that wider question the matters to which a judge will invariably have to have regard to include (1) the extent to which the offender needs treatment for the mental disorder from which the offender suffers, (2) the extent to which the offending is attributable to the mental disorder, (3) the extent to which punishment is required and (4) the protection of the public including the regime for deciding release and the regime after release.

The courts have always firmly resisted attempts to obtain the answer to academic questions, however useful this might appear to be. The peculiarity of a reference under the Act of 1972 is that it is not a step in a dispute, so that in one sense the questions referred are invariably academic.

It was still contended that the Claimant has been detained in breach of Article 5(1) and 5(4), but as an illustration of the alleged incompatibility of section 73(2) and/or (7) of the Act with Article 5(1) and (4) of the Convention.

There can in principle be no distinction between the case where the donor declares himself to be sole trustee for a donee or a purpose and the case where he declares himself to be one of the Trustees for that donee or purpose. In both cases his conscience is affected and it would be unconscionable and contrary to the principles of equity to allow such a donor to resile from his gift.

There is, in effect, statutory annexation of the benefit of the covenant to "the land intended to be benefited by the covenant". The words which I have emphasised, which are incorporated by Lord Justice Brightman in the passage which I have just cited, are derived, of course, from section 78(1): "For the purposes of this subsection … 'successors in title' shall be deemed to include the owners and occupiers for the time being of the land of the covenantee intended to be benefited."