Verbal Contract in UK Law

What is clear from these cases is that there is not, so to speak, a limit to the amount of red ink or verbal rearrangement or correction which the court is allowed. All that is required is that it should be clear that something has gone wrong with the language and that it should be clear what a reasonable person would have understood the parties to have meant. In my opinion, both of these requirements are satisfied.

No implication can be made against a party of a term which was unknown to him. If previous dealings show that a man knew of and agreed to a term on ninety-nine occasions, there is a basis for saying that it can be imported into the hundredth contract without an express statement. It may or may not be sufficient to justify the importation,—that depends on the circumstances; but at least by proving knowledge the essential beginning is made.

But they are seeking to establish an oral contract by a course of dealing which always insisted on a written contract. It is the consistency of a course of conduct which gives rise to the implication that in similar circumstances a similar contractual result will follow. When the conduct is not consistent, there is no reason why it should still produce an invariable contractual result. The Pursuer's agent duly paid the freight for which he was asked and accepted the oral contract thus offered.

The entry of a Caution casts a dark shadow on the property. These Courts are masters of their own procedure and can do what is right even though it is not contained in the Rules. If it is drawn to the attention of the Court, by affidavit or otherwise, that a Caution has been entered when it ought not to be, then the Court can order it to bevacated forthwith.

Apart from authority I would have thought that a memorandum signed by the party to be charged stating terms which the other party asserted w-re the terms of an oral agreement would not, in the absence of something in the memorandum at least pointing to the existence of a contract made upon the stated terms, satisfy the requirements of the section. It would not be a note or memorandum of the contract sued upon but merely of the terms which the party charged is alleged to have agreed.

For in seeking to show inducement or encouragement Actionstrength can rely on nothing beyond the oral agreement of St-Gobain which, in the absence of writing, is rendered unenforceable by section 4. There was no respresentation by St-Gobain that it would honour the agreement despite the absence of writing, or that it was not a contract of guarantee, or that it would confirm the agreement in writing.

The only assurance given to Actionstrength was the promise itself. In order to be estopped from invoking the statute there must be something more, such as some additional encouragement, inducement or assurance. But there is no suggestion made that St-Gobain said or did anything to lead Actionstrength to assume that St-Gobain would not stand on its rights.