Without Prejudice Correspondence in UK Law

The rule applies to exclude all negotiations genuinely aimed at settlement whether oral or in writing from being given in evidence.

These cases show that the rule is not absolute and resort may be had to the without prejudice material for a variety of reasons when the justice of the case requires it. I regard this as an exceptional case and it should not be allowed to whittle down the protection given to the parties to speak freely about all issues in the litigation both factual and legal when seeking compromise and, for the purpose of establishing a basis of compromise, admitting certain facts.

It is that parties should be encouraged so far as possible to settle their disputes without resort to litigation and should not be discouraged by the knowledge that anything that is said in the course of such negotiations (and that includes, of course, as much the failure to reply to an offer as an actual reply) may be used to their prejudice in the course of the proceedings.

Similarly, in the case of a settlement made in without prejudice correspondence, the correspondence, although privileged when sent and received, is admissible in the event of a dispute as to the terms and meaning of the settlement, on the same basis that any correspondence in which a contract is made is admissible.

The main considerations of public policy in favour of the general rule excluding the reference to without prejudice correspondence, on which Mr. Grime so strongly relies, seem to me to have little or no application in the present context, seeing that I do not think the parties' willingness to talk frankly about the strengths and weaknesses of their case, and to make provisional offers or admissions for the purposes of negotiation only, will be to any significant extent inhibited by the knowledge that the negotiations may be referred to in this very narrow field, not for the purpose of showing that such provisional offers or admissions were made, but solely for the purpose of explaining delay and the conduct of the parties at any relevant period.

They show that the protection of admissions against interest is the most important practical effect of the rule. But to dissect out identifiable admissions and withhold protection from the rest of without prejudice communications (except for a special reason) would not only create huge practical difficulties but would be contrary to the underlying objective of giving protection to the parties (in the words of Lord Griffiths in Rush & Tompkins at p.1300)

That justification, as Oliver LJ observed in Cutts v Head (see para 62 above) "essentially rests on the desirability of preventing statements or offers made in the course of negotiations for settlement being brought before the court of trial as admissions on the question of liability". No "statements or offers" were made here with a view to settling a dispute. As Mr Fenwick QC aptly put it in argument, Mr Rashid was simply asking for a concession; he was not giving one.