Witness Summons in UK Law

Rule 34.2 does not contain any provision comparable to section 2(4) of the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975, but Lord Fraser's observations are nonetheless helpful because they provide an example of the ways in which, without describing them individually, it may be possible to identify the documents to be produced with sufficient certainty to leave no real doubt in the mind of the person to whom the summons is addressed about what he is required to do.

Given these facts, it was appropriate to admit this res gestae evidence notwithstanding, in a strict sense, Ms Gibb was available as a witness, for instance if the court had issued a witness summons.

The law, as it now stands, does not enable the Court to refuse to issue a witness summons (or subpoena) for the production of documents upon due application. The remedy available to the person served is to move to set the summons aside. Further, even if the document sought be relevant and not otherwise privileged from production, the Court has a residual discretion in certain circumstances to protect the document and set the summons aside.

It is a fundamental condition on which the administration of justice as a whole rests. It is a fundamental condition on which the administration of justice as a whole rests. Legal professional privilege is thus much more than an ordinary rule of evidence, limited in its application to the facts of a particular case. Legal professional privilege is thus much more than an ordinary rule of evidence, limited in its application to the facts of a particular case.

In my judgment, procedural fairness in the light of Article 8 undoubtedly required in the present case that TB should have been given notice of the application for the witness summons, and given the opportunity to make representations before the order was made. Since the rules did not require this of the person applying for the summons, the requirement was on the court as a public authority, not on W, the defendant.

At the first hearing on 27 th November 2002 the chairman directed that Shirley Langhorne should attend "if possible" at the adjourned hearing on 20 th December 2002. That direction was addressed to the Secretary of State, as is clear from the Parole Board letter of 11 thDecember 2002, but if a witness summons was going to be required it is doubtful if the time scale was realistic.

However, by 19 th December 2002 it was clear to everyone involved —the Secretary of State, the claimant's solicitors and no doubt the Parole Board panel, that Shirley Langhorne did not propose to attend on the following day. That had certain advantages so far as the claimant was concerned, and his solicitor had the opportunity overnight to consider the situation.