2012-05-01
Author | Aileen McHarg,Elspeth Reid,Fiona Leverick,Francis Lyall,Martin Hogg,Paul Reid,Stephen Bogle,Greg Gordon |
Date | 01 May 2012 |
DOI | 10.3366/elr.2012.0105 |
Pages | 224-260 |
Published date | 01 May 2012 |
In [2007] UKHL 39, [2008] AC 281.
By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, there were two grounds of challenge: A third ground, based on article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, was rejected at first instance and not renewed on appeal.
Although the insurers were not directly affected by the 2009 Act, the Supreme Court accepted that there had been an “interference” with their possessions in terms of A1P1, since it was they who would bear most of the costs of meeting successful damages claims. The key issue, then, was whether the interference was justified. In making this assessment, the Strasbourg court accords a wide margin of appreciation to states: legislative judgments about when property rights must yield to the public interest will be respected unless they are “manifestly without reasonable foundation”.
However, the Supreme Court was more troubled by the legislation's retrospective nature than the lower courts had been. Lord Reed's judgment in particular contains a useful survey of the Strasbourg court's treatment of retrospectivity, as regards both the lawfulness and the proportionality of interferences with Convention rights.
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