Garrett v London Borough of Camden

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeLORD JUSTICE TUCKEY,LORD JUSTICE MANCE,LORD JUSTICE SIMON BROWN
Judgment Date16 March 2001
Neutral Citation[2001] EWCA Civ 395
CourtCourt of Appeal (Civil Division)
Docket NumberB/2001/6036
Date16 March 2001
Between:
Warren Garrett
Claimant/Applicant
and
London Borough of Camden
Defendant/Respondent

[2001] EWCA Civ 395

Before:

Lord Justice Simon Brown

(Vice President of the Court of Appeal, Civil Division)

Lord Justice Tuckey

Lord Justice Mance

B/2001/6036

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATUR

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)

ON APPEAL FROM THE CENTRAL LONDON COUNTY COURT

(His Honour Judge Butter)

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand

London WC2

The Applicant appeared on his own behalf

MR JEFFRIES QC (Instructed by the London Borough of Camden) appeared on behalf of the Respondent

Friday 16th March 2001

LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY
1

: This is an appeal by Warren Garrett ("the appellant") from a judgment of Judge Butter QC given in the Central London County Court on 5 August 1996 in which he dismissed the appellant's negligence claim for damages for work-related stress against his employers, London Borough of Camden ("Camden").

2

Camden employed the appellant as a financial development officer in their Economic Development Unit ("EDU") in June 1991. He started these proceedings in February 1995 and was retired on medical grounds in September 1996. Put shortly, his particulars of claim alleged that the psychiatric injury which he had suffered as a result of stress was caused by the fact that between 1992 and 1994 he had to work under confused and conflicting lines of management during which time the role of the EDU and his role within it were systematically undermined and he was harassed, intimidated and assaulted.

3

The appellant represented himself at the trial, which lasted eleven days. It was common ground that Camden owed the appellant a duty of care and that he suffered psychiatric injury caused by stress. However, foreseeability, breach of duty and causation were in issue. At the end of his judgment, the judge summarised his conclusions as follows:

"Clearly there were unattractive disputes between personnel which contributed to stress on the plaintiff as well, no doubt, as to other personnel involved, and there may have been mistakes in management, but I do not find that there was harassment of the plaintiff. I consider, and I mean no discourtesy, that the plaintiff is to a large extent his own worst enemy, and one whose evidence I have to treat with some reserve because of his apparent inability in relation to the defendants to see any point of view other than his own.

I do not consider on the facts as I find them that a reasonable employer ought to have foreseen that the plaintiff would suffer injury from the workload or conditions or circumstances in which he was expected to carry out this work. I hold that the plaintiff has failed to establish breach of duty on the part of the defendants and, even if he had established breach of duty, he would have failed on the question as to what was reasonably foreseeable. In my judgment such injury to the plaintiff's health as has occurred has arisen in substance from the vulnerable personality of the plaintiff himself, and for these reasons it follows that the plaintiff's claim fails and must be dismissed."

4

The appellant now contends that what happened to him can be explained by the fact that he was victimised for whistle-blowing. To this end his appeal has been mounted on a broad front. First, the appellant contends that the trial was unfair because Camden failed to disclose documents which would have revealed the real reason why they treated him as they did and the judge refused to adjourn the hearing to await the result of an inquiry by the anti-fraud unit of the European Commission ("UCLAF") (about which more later) and prevented him from properly putting his case. Secondly, the appellant asked for permission to put in further evidence (five volumes of it) which he says, among other things, would have led the judge to reject the evidence of a number of senior Camden officials whose evidence he accepted. Thirdly and in any event, he says that the judge misapplied the law and reached the wrong conclusion on the facts.

5

The appellant has represented himself on this appeal. We have found him (as did the judge) both courteous and competent and we are grateful to him for the helpful way in which he made his submissions and responded to questions from the court.

6

At the beginning of the hearing, the appellant applied for extensive specific discovery on the basis that if we made such an order the appeal would be adjourned. We refused this application. Much of it was directed to the court service to discover court documents surrounding the making of various interlocutory orders in the county court and the fact that before a full transcript of the trial was requested in 1999 the court's tapes had been destroyed. Any such documents would have been of no value whatsoever to the appellant on this appeal. He also applied for further discovery from Camden. We did not think that this would advance the appellant's case either. There were eleven trial bundles, and we agreed to look at the further evidence to see what light it shed on the events with which the appellant's claim was concerned without formally ruling on its admissibility. This is more than enough documentation in a case of this kind. Any further orders for discovery at this stage would have been entirely disproportionate. Furthermore, the documents requested, if they exist, relate to what happened after the proceedings were started.

7

Before considering the appellant's grounds of appeal further, I must deal in some detail with the history of the matter as found by the judge or revealed by the documents which we have considered.

8

The appellant joined Camden after working for the London Borough of Waltham Forest for five years in a comparable position. He came with favourable references, including one which said that he had always impressed by his reliability and capacity to cope with a heavy workload. However, disclosure of his medical and work records for this period for the purpose of the trial led the judge to note that there were disconcerting resemblances between some of the problems which involved the appellant at Waltham Forest and subsequently at Camden. None of those medical or work records had been disclosed to Camden before they employed the appellant. This and the medical evidence which he heard from two consultant psychiatrists at the trial led the judge to conclude that the appellant was a person who was substantially more vulnerable than most to sustaining psychiatric injury, although Camden did not know this. It was not the appellant's case either that he was a vulnerable person or that the nature of his job was particularly stressful.

9

The EDU was a small specialist unit. When the appellant joined it in 1991 it enjoyed a fair amount of autonomy under its manager, Miss Kingsley. The trouble started in 1992 when the EDU was transferred into a new division of the Environment Department, whose director was Mr Pike. His assistant director, Miss McDonald, became Miss Kingsley's line manager. This transfer was opposed by Miss Kingsley and others, including the appellant. There followed two years of turmoil in which Miss McDonald attempt to establish management control over the EDU. She was supported by Mr Pike and a number of the EDU staff but Miss Kingsley, supported by others including the appellant, resisted and resented what she was trying to do.

10

Over this time complaints and counter-complaints were made by and against those involved which invoked the council's grievance procedures and led to two internal inquiries. On the advice of their union the appellant and Miss Kingsley refused to cooperate with the first inquiry, which reported in November 1994. The second inquiry, conducted by Mr Carmichael, reported in December 1995.

11

The general complaint made by the appellant, which was supported by the evidence of Miss Kingsley and others in their camp, was that Miss McDonald, with Mr Pike's support, was attempting to undermine the EDU. They contended that a restructuring and an audit review were designed to eliminate the unit and/or to unsettle them. In the process, they were harassed and intimidated. Mr Pike and Miss McDonald's response was that they were only trying to establish management control over the EDU so as to get a satisfactory understanding of what was going on, and yet they were obstructed at every turn.

12

The judge described the evidence of Mr Pike and Miss McDonald as "impressive". Having reviewed their evidence and the evidence of the appellant and those who were called to support his case, he said:

"What I think is clear, however, is that whether because of a clash of personalities, or because of the attitudes of employees at different levels, there was at times a substantial amount of friction."

13

However, he concluded that the restructuring and audit review had been for legitimate reasons.

14

The judge also dealt with a number of specific incidents involving friction. The first related to a complaint by the appellant that he had been prevented from attending a meeting and assaulted by Mr Connor (about whom more later) in May 1993. The judge found that there had been no physical assault. The incident was unpleasant, he said, but it had been blown up out of all proportion. Mr Connor was transferred out of the EDU at his own request in September 1993. The judge then dealt with another incident in 1993, about which he accepted the evidence of a councillor that after a meeting at which some criticism had been made of the EDU's work, the appellant suddenly erupted and shouted "Why don't you leave us alone?"

15

The appellant contended that he first became involved in the events which led to his whistle-blowing in...

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