The “No Profit from Another's Fraud” Rule and the “Knowing Receipt” Muddle

Date01 January 2013
Pages37-62
DOI10.3366/elr.2013.0138
Published date01 January 2013
AuthorNiall R Whitty
THE <italic>COMMONWEALTH OIL</italic> CASE

In Commonwealth Oil and Gas Co Ltd v Baxter,1

[2009] CSIH 75, 2010 SC 156, affirming [2007] CSOH 198 (noted by D J Carr, “Equity rising?” (2010) 14 EdinLR 273 and R Evans-Jones [2010] RLR 173).

the doctrine of English Equity known as “knowing receipt” was applied by a Scottish court for the first time as if it were a branch of Scots law. The first defender, Baxter, a director of the pursuer oil company, in breach of his fiduciary obligation qua director owed to the pursuer, brought the chance of making a commercial profit from oil-field exploration to another oil company Eurasia Energy Ltd, the second defender. Eurasia was alleged to have “knowingly received” the opportunity. The First Division held that the rule on liability for knowing receipt required receipt of an asset and that the chance of making a commercial profit was not an asset within the scope of the rule. Eurasia was therefore absolved from liability. The actual decision seems correct. The difficulty arises from the First Division's acceptance of “knowing receipt” as a branch of Scots law
OUTLINE OF ARGUMENT AND SCOPE OF ESSAY

In this essay Sections C and D below argue that:

the doctrine of “knowing receipt” has never been part of Scots law;

it is doubtful whether there is any juridical space for it, as its task in Scotland is already adequately performed by the principle of “no profit from another's fraud or breach of trust or fiduciary duty”; and

as it so happens, in at least one major respect the “no profit” principle is better than “knowing receipt” as it gives a remedy against good faith gratuitous recipients (i.e. innocent donees) who have been unjustifiably enriched. In England and the Commonwealth2

For brevity the term “the Commonwealth” is used to denote the legal systems of the Commonwealth which follow English law and does not include mixed systems within the Commonwealth such as South Africa and Quebec.

it is acknowledged that “knowing receipt” does not extend thus far and its reform is a matter of great controversy.
The no profit rule applies to money. Section E examines the legal basis of a similar rule complementing the “no profit” rule (called here the “author's fraud” rule) under which the owner of property (other than money), who has been fraudulently induced to transfer it to a fraudster, may obtain restitution of it from the fraudster's mala fide or gratuitous singular successor on setting aside his or her voidable title. If “knowing receipt” extends to property other than money, the author's fraud rule leaves no juridical space for that in Scots law either. The legal basis of the “restitutionary” and accessory liability of the mala fide remote recipient is not free from doubt and that is explored in Sections E and F. Section G notes that the underlying policy of balancing property rights against the stability of commerce is established by comparative law and affirmed in Scottish case law

The main focus of the essay is on cases where a rogue B fraudulently induces A to part with money which money or its traceable substitute he then transfers to C. A sues C for recovery. If C no longer retains the money or its traceable substitute, he or she may be personally liable as a constructive trustee for “knowing receipt” in English law. This essay is not concerned with C's liability to the imposition of a constructive trust on property if C retains the property. That is a hybrid form of semi-personal remedy, called in England a restitutionary, proprietary remedy, and belongs to a different (though related) chapter of law.3

Which in Scotland, while more fully established than “knowing receipt”, is nevertheless not as deeply embedded as sometimes supposed and its reception is also highly controversial. For magisterial and highly critical treatments, see G L Gretton, “Constructive trusts” (1997) 1 EdinLR 281; G L Gretton, “Constructive trusts and insolvency” (2000) 3 ERPL 463; G Gretton, “Proprietary issues”, in D Johnston and R Zimmermann (eds), Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective (2002) 571. See also G L Gretton, “Scotland”, in W Swadling (ed), The Quistclose Trust: Critical Essays (2004) 169.

THE PURPORTED RECEPTION OF “KNOWING RECEIPT” IN SCOTS LAW The <italic>Commonwealth Oil</italic> case and the late-coming of <italic>Barnes v Addy</italic>

In the First Division Lord President Hamilton and Lord Nimmo Smith gave separate opinions (with which Lady Paton concurred) but were in substantial agreement. They first sought to show that the English doctrine of “knowing receipt” had been received in Scots law. Lord Nimmo Smith cited a key passage from the foundational opinion of the Earl of Selborne LC in Barnes v Addy, the kernel of which is that:4

(1874) 9 LR Ch App 244 at 251-252 (bracketed numbers added). Lord Nimmo Smith at para [85] referred to Lord Selborne's opinion as a “speech” as if the forum in which it was delivered was the House of Lords; in fact it was the Court of Appeal in Chancery.

strangers are not to be made constructive trustees merely because they act as the agents of trustees in transactions within their legal powers… unless [1] those agents receive and become chargeable with some part of the trust property, or unless [2] they assist with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustees.

The first “limb” of the test at [1] is treated in English law as the source of the doctrine of “knowing receipt” (sometimes nowadays called “unconscionable receipt”).5

Following BCCI v Akindele [2001] Ch 437.

The second limb at [2] known formerly as “knowing assistance”, but invariably now as “dishonest assistance”,6

Following Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378.

was relied on in the Outer House in Commonwealth Oil but not the Inner House, and lies outside this essay. In the Outer House Lord Reed noted that Lord Selborne's dictum was “quoted, as a statement of Scots law, in Menzies on Trustees”,7

[2007] CSOH 198 at para [193], citing A J P Menzies, The Law of Scotland Affecting Trustees, 2nd edn (1913) para 1286.

a work well known for its strong anglicising tendency,8

See C.2 below.

but no other authority for the reception of the test in Scots law was cited, a small yield for over 130 years of legal development. Yet on appeal, referring to Lord Selborne's dictum, Lord Nimmo Smith observed that it “is not in doubt that this passage may be treated as an authoritative statement of the law of Scotland as well as that of England”.9

At para [85].

The Lord President remarked “[a]uthority in Scotland on the requisites of liability for knowing receipt is sparse”.10

At para [16]. He continued: “It is, however, clear that its foundation lies in the law of trusts, under which a stranger to a trust may in certain circumstances become liable to the trustees (or the beneficiaries) in respect of trust property”.

That is certainly true but the reason for that is plain: the doctrine of knowing receipt has never until now been regarded as part of Scots law

The English law concept of liability as a constructive trustee for knowing receipt is confusing (especially but not only for Scots lawyers) inter alia because the defendant is a constructive trustee who does not hold property in trust,11

L Smith, “Constructive trusts and constructive trustees” [1999] CLJ 294.

a thing hitherto unknown in Scots law. Some explanation is needed. Under English law what is imposed under the doctrine of “knowing receipt” is not a constructive trust (or equitable charge or lien) on the property received by the defendant but “liability as a constructive trustee” which is a special purely personal type of liability in Equity for wrongdoing. The scheme of the English law is that the intermeddling stranger to a trust may be liable to a proprietary remedy such as a constructive trust or equitable lien on the trust property which he received but only if he or she still retains it and it is traceable. If the intermeddling stranger no longer retains it or it is no longer traceable in his or her ownership, he or she becomes subject to a personal liability “as a constructive trustee”. This “liability as a constructive trustee” is therefore “nothing more than a formula for equitable relief”,12

Bank of Scotland v MacLeod Paxton Woolard & Co 1998 SLT 258 at 274, citing M Hapgood (ed), Paget's Law of Banking, 10th edn (1989) which at 232 n 6 attributes the phrase to Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Craddock (No 3) [1968] 1 WLR 1555 at 1097 per Ungoed-Thomas J.

a mere cipher for personal “equitable” liability, a concept which predicates the Equity/Law dualism of English law. It is Equity's equivalent of the English action for money had and received at Common Law.

Its content is somewhat obscure. As Sir Robert Megarry has said, “constructive” “seems to mean ‘It isn't, but has to be treated as if it were’ and the less there is of this in the law the better”.13

See R Megarry, “Historical development” in Special Lectures of The Law Society of Upper Canada 1990: Fiduciary Duties (1991) 1 at 5, quoted by Smith (n 11).

While English lawyers cannot dispense with constructive trusts because they are not really constructive at all, they probably could and should stop talking about “liability to account as a constructive trustee”.14

Smith (n 11) at p 301. He continues: “The phrase is only required so long as we wish to preserve the pretence that beneficiaries can only sue their trustees. Once we discard that pretence, we can dispense with the phrase and concern ourselves with identifying those instances where a defendant is liable to a beneficiary even though the defendant is not a trustee.”

So for example in the Dubai Aluminium case in 2003, with reference to certain cases of constructive trust triggering personal but not proprietary liability, Lord Millett said that “the expressions ‘constructive trust’ and ‘constructive trustee’ create a trap”, that they are “nothing more than a formula for
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