Abandonment vs. Entrapment: Denmark and Military Integration in Europe 1948-1951
| Date | 01 September 1986 |
| DOI | 10.1177/001083678602100303 |
| Author | Nikolaj Petersen |
| Published date | 01 September 1986 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Abandonment vs. Entrapment: Denmark and Military
Integration in Europe 1948-1951
NIKOLAJ PETERSEN
Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus
Petersen, N. Abandonment vs. Entrapment: Denmark and Military Integration in
Europe 1948-1951. Cooperation and Conflict, XXI, 1986, 169-186.
The article analyses Danish attitudes towards NATO integration in the early years of
the alliance in a perspective derived from alliance theory. In particular, Glenn Snyder’s
hypotheses on the motivations which drive the ’alliance game’, i.e. intra-alliance
relations, are utilized in analysing the Danish Government’s reaction to the US
proposal of September 1950 to create a joint, integrated force including German
contingents for the defence of Western Europe. It is shown that both fears of
’entrapment’ in the alliance and fears of ’abandonment’ by the Allies played a significant
role in the deliberations of Danish decision-makers, but that the fear of abandonment
or, expressed positively, the demand for security outweighed both fears of losing
freedom of action and fears of a German rearmament. The article highlights especially
the role which Denmark’s practically undefended border to the south played in the
formulation of security policy in the 1950s.
I. INTRODUCTION
In his memoirs Dean Acheson relates
When
Denmark joined the North Atlantic
his impression of Gustav Rasmussen when
Treaty she did so reluctantly and only
he arrived in Washington on a fact-finding
after a dedicated attempt to create a
tour in mid-March 1949:
Scandinavian Defence Union had failed.
He brought irresistibly to mind a phrase in
When Foreign Minister Gustav Ras-
a letter from Abbe
Bernard to Louis VII of
mussen signed the Treaty, neither he nor
France during the second crusade: ’Like a
officials of his ministry had participated in
sparrow with careful watchfulness, avoid
the detailed negotiations which preceded
the snares of the fowler’. Rasmussen moved
the alliance. On the contrary, in order
’like a sparrow with careful watchfulness’;
to concentrate all efforts on promoting a
he had to, dependent as he was on a
Scandinavian solution the Social Demo-
coalition government at home and an
unstable
cratic Government led
environment abroad.3
3
by Hans Hedtoft
had deliberately kept away from contacts
As Dean Acheson had predicted, the
with the Western Powers over the treaty
Danes would overcome their fears of
negotiations.’
1
In contrast to the Nor-
being ensnared and join the Alliance -
wegian Government, whose foreign min-
but primarily out of another fear, namely
ister Halvard Lange had kept a close eye
that of being abandoned and isolated in
on the treaty negotiations, the Danish
an insecure world. Both these fears con-
Government had only a broad idea of the
tinued to play a conspicuous role in Dan-
concepts underlying the North Atlantic
ish security policy even after Denmark
Treaty when it finally decided to join in
joined the Alliance and were not allayed
March 1949.~
2
until the early 1960s. This theme is
170
explored here in an analysis of Danish
’Entrapment means being dragged into
alliance deliberations 1948-49 and of
a conflict over an ally’s interests that one
Danish attitudes towards military inte-
does not share, or shares only partially.&dquo;
5
gration in the early years of the Alliance
In an extended sense, ’entrapment’ means
which culminated in the American pro-
losing control and getting involved in ven-
posal of September 1950 to create a joint,
tures one would have preferred to stay
integrated force including German con-
out of, i.e. losing freedom of action in
tingents for the defence of Western
international politics. The principal ’good’
Europe.
on this dimension is therefore freedom of
action.
The two pairs of ’goods’ and ’bads’ fur-
thermore tend to vary inversely. It is nor-
II. THE ’WATCHFUL SPARROW’
mally not possible to have a perfect
AND THE BENEFITS AND PERILS
alliance guarantee and at the same time
OF ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP
to enjoy complete freedom of action; the
Glenn Snyder has recently made an inter-
guarantee will usually be predicated on a
esting contribution to alliance theory
counter-guarantee, which in itself reduces
which is highly pertinent to this prob-
the freedom of maneuvre in a crisis,
lematique. On the basis of a logic derived
including the freedom to ’defect’, i.e. to
from game theory, Snyder analyses the
abandon the ally. On the positive side,
determinants of national strategies in
’abandonment’ and ’entrapment’ do not
what is termed the ’alliance game’, i.e.
normally occur simultaneously, either.
intra-alliance politics, and the ’adversary
Rather it is ’security’ and ’entrapment’
game’, i.e.
inter-alliance
relations,
which go together, and ’abandonment’
respectively. In his view, such strategies
and ’freedom of action’. A ’C’ strategy
are interrelated in ways which involve
(for ’cooperation’) of alliance commit-
highly complicated evaluations of the pros
ment
may reduce the risk of abandonment
and cons of various strategies within the
(by increasing the alliance guarantee), but
two games - or ’goods’ and ’bads’, as he
at the cost of reduced freedom of action,
terms them. 4
i.e. a degree of entrapment. Conversely, a
In the alliance game the principal bads
’D’ strategy (for ’defection’) may increase
are
’abandonment’ on one side and
freedom of action by reducing the risk of
’entrapment’ on the other, while the prin-
entrapment, but at the potential cost of a
cipal good of alliance participation is the
weakened alliance guarantee and hence
possibility of reducing these risks. ’Aban-
less security.
donment’ in Snyder’s terminology means
In sum, alliance politics involve difficult
’defection’ by the ally and can take a var-
choices between often mutually con-
iety of specific forms from abrogation of
flicting or even exclusive goals. Such
the alliance contract to a loosening or
choices are further complicated by the fact
questioning of the alliance guarantee. The
that the ’alliance game’ and the ’advers-
concept is thus related to the guarantee
ary game’ are interrelated. Strategies
aspect of an alliance and captures the
designed for the manipulation of the
ever-present nervousness of allies as
adversary game may very well have unin-
regards the credibility of the alliance
tended effects in intra-alliance politics; in
guarantee. The principal good at the other
the same way, strategies which are pri-
end of the spectrum from abandonment
marily designed for the alliance game, e.g.
is therefore security based on a firm and
aimed at strengthening alliance cohesion,
credible commitment by the allies.
will normally have repercussions for the
171
adversary game, e.g. by increasing the
further involved in military integration,
adversary’s threat perception.
perhaps combined with a more pro-
The issue of military integration which
nounced
’C’
(cooperative) strategy
was brought up by the United States in
towards the East in order to reduce ten-
NATO in mid-1950, affected most of the
sion in the Baltic and Nordic region. This
potential goods and bads of both the
might, of course, have increased the risk
alliance and the adversary games. The US
of abandonment by the alliance, but on
proposal of 15 September to create a joint
the other hand American strategic inter-
European force (including a German con-
ests might be sufficiently strong to guaran-
tribution) was motivated by a sharply
tee a response in the case of Soviet
heightened perception of the Soviet threat
aggression, irrespective of Denmark’s
after the Soviet A-bomb and especially
alliance behaviour.
after Korea; its primary goal was to
As a matter of fact, however, Denmark
increase the West’s deterrent posture
chose a ’C’ strategy in the alliance game,
vis-a-vis the Soviets in the adversary
went along with NATO integration
game.
despite certain misgivings about German
But the proposal also had an important
rearmament, and relegated the potential
intra-alliance goal, namely to reassure the
negative effects in the adversary game to
Europeans of the American commitment
the background.
to their defence through the symbol of
At least four factors impinged directly
an American supreme commander and a
or indirectly on this choice of strategies:
firmer US commitment of ground combat
-
the traditionally reticent Danish atti-
forces to the defence of Western Europe.
tude towards involvement in interna-
The United States voluntarily offered to
tional
be ’entrapped’
power politics, of which the
-
much to the chagrin of
’watchful sparrow’ is a very apt
some of her political and military lead-
ers-but
metaphor;
on
condition that the Europeans
-
the acute
should let themselves be
feeling of insecurity which
similarly en-
lay behind the Danish efforts since the
trapped in a joint force. What was offered
spring of 1948 to secure external
to the Europeans, then, was increased
security, but
guarantees and which were not suf-
at the cost of military and
political ’entrapment’ in NATO and
ficiently stilled by membership in the
a ’D’
Atlantic Pact in 1949;
strategy of firmness towards the Soviet
-
the German trauma in Danish
Union. To this
politics
was added the separate
which stems from the 19th
question of German participation in West-
century (the
loss of Schleswig in 1864) and which
ern defence, where rational arguments
was
about the necessity
significantly reinforced during the
to tap the economic
German
and
occupation from 1940 to 1945;
manpower...
To continue reading
Request your trial