Accounting for National and Sectoral Variance in the Implementation of European Social Partner ‘Soft’ Law: The Cases of the Implementation of the Telework and Work‐Related Stress Agreements

Published date01 June 2015
Date01 June 2015
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12036
AuthorThomas Prosser
Accounting for National and Sectoral
Variance in the Implementation of
European Social Partner ‘Soft’ Law:
The Cases of the Implementation
of the Telework and Work-Related
Stress Agreements
Thomas Prosser
Abstract
This article investigates the factors that explicate the implementation of Euro-
pean social partner ‘soft’ framework agreements. The implementation of two
such agreements, the Telework and Work-Related Stress Agreements, in four
countries and two sectors is investigated. Seven hypotheses, primarily derived
from the study of generic European ‘soft’ law, about the factors that explain the
implementation of European social partner ‘soft’ law are tested. The article
concludes that European social partner ‘soft’ law is distinctive from generic
European ‘soft’ law in that its successful implementation is contingent upon the
extent the industrial relations system in which it is implemented is centralized
and co-ordinated.
1. Introduction
The differing lower-level effects of European collective agreements represent
a major puzzle for industrial relations scholars. Despite their common origin,
researchers have after all long observed a divergence in the national and
sectoral effects of European collective agreements that is as significant as the
discrepancies noted in the implementation of generic European regulation
(Larsen and Andersen 2007). This puzzle is particularly pronounced in the
‘soft’ collective agreements increasingly prevalent at the European level of
industrial relations. Agreements such as the Telework and Work-Related
Stress Agreements are after all non-legally binding, and quite additionally to
Thomas Prosser is at Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University.
© John Wiley & Sons Ltd/London School of Economics 2013. Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd,
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
British Journal of Industrial Relations
53:2 June 2015 0007–1080 pp. 254–277 doi: 10.1111/bjir.12036
the questions raised over the efficacy of such agreements’ implementation
(Welz 2008: 411), the concern has been expressed that implementation out-
comes will radically differ among countries and sectors (Keller 2003: 415–16).
Despite such concerns, limited attention has thus far been paid to the factors
that explicate discrete national and sectoral implementation outcomes.
This represents a gap in the literature, for aside from the light that study of
this topic sheds on the continuing development of the European social dia-
logue, it is likely that the factors that predict European social partner ‘soft’
law implementation outcomes differ from those that predict the implemen-
tation of generic European regulation. The factors that account for the
implementation of European regulation, and specifically forms of European
‘soft’ law such as the open method of co-ordination (OMC) mode of Euro-
pean governance, have indeed been the subject of an extensive literature in
the previous decade. Scholars have identified factors such as the degree of
prior regulation on the policy topic (Heidenreich and Bischoff 2008: 520), the
levels of political opposition to the goals of the OMC (Heidenreich and
Bischoff 2008: 518–25), the ‘culture of compliance’ with European policy that
exists in member-states (Falkner et al. 2005) and prior national experience in
a given policy field (Lopez-Santana 2006: 495) as being crucial in explaining
variance in implementation outcomes.
Underpinning discussions about European ‘soft’ law have been separate
theoretical perceptions of its nature. One school, writing in the tradition
of rationalist international relations theorists who emphasize the tendency of
states to act rationally to protect their interests, emphasizes the importance of
factors related to domestic policy preferences and national governance struc-
tures in predicting European ‘soft’ law implementation outcomes (Trubek
et al. 2005: 8–9). Another school, who have written in the social construc-
tionist and sociological institutionalist traditions, emphasizes the importance
of the discursive and learning processes associated with European ‘soft’ law
in transforming national actors’ preferences (Jacobsson 2004). This literature
is extensive and involves various theoretical debates then, yet the relevance of
its findings to European social partner ‘soft’ law has yet to be comprehen-
sively examined. Undertaking such an endeavour will consequently afford us
new insights into European social partner ‘soft’ law, and allow us to move
towards a typological understanding of subcategories of European ‘soft’ law.
Although we have published previous work on the Telework and Work-
Related Stress Agreements (Prosser 2011), this article goes beyond our exist-
ing work in two main ways. First, the current article’s concern is the specific
factors that explain varying implementation outcomes. Our previous work
merely sought to appraise the efficacy of implementation; this article looks
deeper and attempts to comprehend the socio-political dynamics underpin-
ning the implementation of European social partner ‘soft’ law. This repre-
sents a new direction in research on European social partner ‘soft’ law and
will help develop scholarly comprehension of its evolving relationship with
national systems of industrial relations. Second, the current article seeks to
analytically root the implementation of European social partner ‘soft’ law in
© John Wiley & Sons Ltd/London School of Economics 2013.
Variance in Social Partner ‘Soft’ Law 255

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