Adaptation, State Survival and System Endurance: A Simulation Study
| DOI | 10.1177/019251219001100208 |
| Published date | 01 April 1990 |
| Author | Richard J. Stoll,Thomas R. Cusack |
| Date | 01 April 1990 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
261
Adaptation,
State
Survival
and
System
Endurance:
A
Simulation
Study
THOMAS
R.
CUSACK
AND
RICHARD J.
STOLL
ABSTRACT.
This
paper
reports
on
a
study
using
the
EARTH
(Exploring
Alternative
Realpolitik
Theses)
Simulation
Model.
The
model
is
an
abstract
representation
of
an
anarchic
multistate
system
wherein
states
employ
Realists’
principles
in
guiding
their
choices
on
questions
dealing
with
war
and
peace.
The
present
study
examines
the
systemic
and
state
level
consequences
that
arise
in
the
presence
or
absence
of
the
ability
of
states
to
adapt
or
change
the
fundamental
decision
rules
that
they
employ.
Introduction
This
paper
extends
some
of
our
earlier
work
that
has
dealt
with
the
practice
of
Realpolitik
within
a
multistate
system
and
in
particular
on
the
effects
of
alternative
decision-making
processes.
The
focus
here
is
on
the
state
and
systemic
level
consequences
that
derive
from
introducing
the
assumption
that
states
have
the
ability
to
adapt
their
decision-making
procedures.
We
represent
adaptation
as
a
higher
level
organizational
process,
one
that
might
appropriately
be
called
learning,
and
we
will
limit
our
inquiries
here
to
two
fundamental
questions:
( 1 )
does
learning
(adaptation)
significantly
enhance
the
survival
chances
of
states
embedded
in
an
anarchic
system?;
and
(2)
does
learning
(adaptation)
affect
the
overall
functioning
of
the
system
by
improving
upon
the
chances
of
preventing
a
hegemon
from
absorbing
the
entire
system
of
states?
Our
research
agenda
has
combined
two
related
elements:
first,
we
have
attempted
to
formalize
many
of
the
principal
theses
of
realism
within
a
model
and,
second,
we
have
sought
to
assess
the
logical
implications
of
the
theses
through
experimental
analyses
conducted
with
a
computer
simulation
model.
Two
broad
concerns
have
shaped
the
writings
and
arguments
of
the
Realists,
the
survival
of
individual
states
and
the
maintenance
of
pluralism
within
the
system.
These
two
have
also
guided
our
research
efforts.
For
example,
Stoll
(1986)
examined
the
consequences
of
geographi-
cal
position,
relative
power,
and
power
assessment
abilities
on
the
survival
of
individual
states,
and
in
a
later
study,
Stoll
(1987)
went
on
to
examine
the
potential
for
power
balancing
behavior
to
emerge
in
a
Realist
system
and
to
assess
the
implications
of
this
for
the
maintenance
of
system
pluralism.
Cusack
and
Zimmer
(1989)
examined
the
effects
of
a
variety
of
structural
262
conditions
and
policy propensities
on
the
potential
for
multistate
system
endurance,
and
Cusack
(1987,
1989)
also
examined
the
implications
for
both
state
survival
and
system
endurance
of
the
use
of
alternative
power
management
styles,
as
well
as
the
effects
of
the
cost
of
empire
maintenance
and
resource
allocation
priorities
on
system
endurance.
Finally,
Cusack
and
Stoll
(1988)
and
Cusack
(1987)
studied
the
implications
of
the
use
of
rational
or
expected
utility
decision
logics
on
the
survival
chances
of
states
and
system
endurance.
This
paper
continues
our
concern
with
the
implications
of
alternative
decision-
making
logics.
We
attempt
to
broaden
that
focus
by
positing
the
potential
existence
of
adaptation
on
the
part
of
states.
Adaptation
is
represented
as
the
occurrence
of
shifts
between
two
different
decision-making
processes.
It
is
based
on
two
factors:
(1)
observed
differences
in
the
relative
success
that
derives
from
the
use
of
each
process
within
the
system,
and
(2)
state
level
capacities
to
affect
such
a
transition.
In
the
next
section
we
address
the
theoretical
importance
of
adaptation.
Following
that,
we
outline
the
basic
structure
of
the
model
used
in
the
analysis
of
this
question
and
specify
the
structural
changes
that
have
been
implemented
in
order
to
conduct
this
study.
The
fourth
section
lays
out
the
experimental
design
of
the
study
and
provides
an
overview
of
the
results
generated
by
our
experiments
with
the
model.
The
last
section
provides
a
summary
of the
principal
findings
that
have
emerged
from
this
study.
Adaptation
and
the
Balance
of
Power
System
The
analogy
of
the
market
is
often
applied
by
students
of
world
politics
to
the
international
system.
Both
are
seen
as
predatory
environments
and,
in
both,
a
process
of
natural
selection
is
thought
to
be
one
of
the
principal
mechanisms
that
govern
the
character
of the
system
and
the
survival
chances
of
its
inhabitants.
For
some,
rational
choice
is
a
sine
qua
non
for
survival.
Indeed,
one
of
the
main
prescriptions
that
flow
from
Realist
writing
is
the
need
for
cool
and
rational
calculation
on
the
part
of statesmen.
However,
we
have
reasons
to
believe
that
in
a
competitive
environment,
rationality
is
not
always
the
superior
strategy
of
decision
making.2
2
Indeed,
organizational
theory
suggests
that
the
application
of
other
principles
may
at
times
prove
superior.
But
even
more
critical
for
understanding
the
bases
of
individual
success
and
system
maintenance,
is
the
role
of
flexibility
in
organization:
i.e.,
flexibility
in
technique
and
in
the
criteria
employed
in
decision
making.
One
of the
principal
arguments
in
the
behavioral
theory
of
the
firm
is
that
organizations
are
in
the
short
term
fixed
in
their
ways
and
prone
to
handle
decisions
on
the
same
basis
as
they
have
in
the
past
(Cyert
and
March,
1963).
However,
organizational
form
and
functioning
can
change.
They
do
so
through
a
process
whereby
significant
failure,
detected
by
generating
assessments
in
terms
of absolute
standards
or
comparisons
with
the
performance
of
competitors,
is
signalled.
Taking
this
point
further,
Nelson
and
Winter
(1982)
have
argued
that
the
dynamics
of
the
marketplace,
its
tendencies
toward
or
away
from
concentration,
and,
at
the
micro
level,
the
success
of
individual
firms,
can
best
be
understood
by
dispensing
with
orthodox
economic
theory’s
assumption
of
fixed
choice
sets
and
known
consequences
of
choice,
and
instead
employing
an
evolutionary
perspective
which
assumes
that
&dquo;no
choice
is
clearly
the
best
ex
ante,&dquo;
and
that
through
selection
and
conscious
adaptation,
good
practices
are
rewarded
and
bad
ones
suppressed.
In
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