All Politics is Local
| Date | 01 September 2008 |
| Author | Ben Lombardi |
| Published date | 01 September 2008 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070200806300310 |
| Subject Matter | Canada-Germany RelationEssays in Honour of Robert Spencer |
Ben Lombardi is a senior analyst with Defence Research and Development Canada’s centre
for operational research and analysis (DRDC-CORA) where he specializes in European se-
curity affairs. The opinions and assessments in this article are his alone and do not represent
the views of the Department of National Defence or DRDC-CORA. In researching this topic,
he is grateful to a number of officials in Berlin who, as a result of promises given, must re-
main anonymous.
Given the debates over the current NATO mission in Afghanistan, it might
be assumed that German interest in that country is unprecedented. Yet his-
tory holds a different record, for an earlier generation of German leaders also
paid considerable attention to Afghanistan. In 1915, Germany (aided by its
Ottoman ally) hoped to ignite Islamic fervour throughout the Middle East
and, in particular, persuade the Afghan emir to invade India with his army
and deal a deathblow to the British empire. “Kaiser Wilhelm Mohammed,”
a caricature created by Berlin’s propagandists, would then advance the Mus-
lim cause elsewhere to the detriment of Germany’s Russian and British en-
emies. However, such heady dreams of conquest remained just that. Despite
the enormous courage of the small military expedition to Kabul, the emir
could not be moved and Germany’s Afghanistan strategy collapsed.
| International Journal | Summer 2008 | 587 |
Ben Lombardi
All politics is local
Germany, the Bundeswehr, and Afghanistan
1 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “Die neuen Fragen der Außenpolitik,”
Die Zeit
, 2005, 41.
Nine decades later, German military personnel are again in Afghanistan.
This time, however, Berlin’s policy is far removed from fomenting jihad. In-
stead, the German contingent of approximately 3500 troops is part of the
40,000-strong NATO-led international security assistance force (ISAF), of
which the German component is the third largest after those of the United
States and Great Britain. As in 1915, a direct link has been asserted between
the fate of that distant central Asian country and more immediate national
interests. Shortly after the initial deployment of
Bundeswehr
troops, then-De-
fence Minister Peter Struck asserted, in an oft-cited phrase, that a military
contribution to the ongoing allied effort was necessary because Germany’s
front line of defence ran along the Hindu-Kush. Despite important differ-
ences in foreign policy, the past two governments, the Red-Green coalition
(1998-2005) composed of the Green party and Social Democratic party led
by Gerhard Schröder and the current grand coalition of Chancellor Angela
Merkel, have publicly endorsed that perspective.
Nevertheless, German leaders often seem reluctant to voice this view.
Merkel has been criticized for not leading from the front on Afghanistan,
despite a willingness to do so on other foreign policy issues, such as Russia,
China, and transatlantic relations. In a speech entitled “The new questions
of foreign policy” delivered only two days after the September 2005 general
election, Frank-Walter Steinmeier (now foreign minister) failed to mention
Afghanistan at all.1And the coalition agreement (November 2005) that estab-
lished guidelines for the current government (composed of the Christian
Democratic Union—CDU, Christian Socialist Union—CSU, and the Social
Democratic party—SPD), is hardly more vocal. The stabilization of the west-
ern Balkans is declared a “vital interest,” but Afghanistan is only very briefly
touched upon in a short passage about “nation-building.” Such reticence
highlights the caution that has been adopted toward the Afghan missions.
THE DIMENSIONS OF A CONTROVERSIAL COMMITMENT
Germany’s latest involvement in Afghanistan began in response to the events
of 11 September. Shortly after, Gerhard Schröder pledged “unqualified soli-
darity” with the US, and a month later promised a military contribution to
the coming campaign in Afghanistan. That pledge was quickly tested when
the Bush administration formally requested assistance and, on 6 November,
| 588 | International Journal | Summer 2008 |
| Ben Lombardi |
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