An Argument for Social Insurance Based on Personal Identity
| Author | Mikael Dubois |
| Published date | 01 March 2015 |
| Date | 01 March 2015 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/138826271501700104 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
84 Intersentia
AN ARGUMENT FOR SOCIAL INSURANCE
BASED ON PERSONAL IDENTITY
M D*
Abstract
is ar ticle presents an argument for compulsory insurance that compensate s for loss of
income in the event of sickness or unemployment. e argument is based on a concern
for the protection of our identity according to what is called a ‘thick’ conception of the
person, as developed by communitar ians such as Michael Sandel, which holds that our
identities as separate persons are constitute d by our ends and ideals. Brie y, the proposed
argument is that since we typically require a reasonably steady income to protect and
maintain our identity as separate persons, and since most of us are exposed to the risk
of loss of income because of sickness or unemployment, we have reason to endorse
social insurance in the form of insurance against loss of income for those reasons. It is
also argued that, contrary to what has been claimed by opponents of social insurance,
such insurance need not lead to exploitation by bene tting those whom insurers would
consider as bad ri sks at the expense of those whom insurers would con sider as good risks
or be in head-on con ict w ith individual freedom.
Keywords: compulsion; justi cation; risk pooling; Socia l Insurance; welfare state
1. INTRODUCTION
Social insur ance in the form of compulsory insurance a gainst loss of income because
of sickness or unemployment is an essential part of many welfare states. Despite
this, such insur ance remains controversial. Contrary to market insurance, soc ial
insurance is compulsor y and non-actuarial, in t he sense that people who market
insurers would consider ‘good’ risks carry part of t he costs of insuring those who
insurers would consider ‘bad ’ risks. For these reasons, soc ial insurance is a ta rget of
the general criticism of compu lsory redistribution of income. Robert Nozick has, for
example, argued that taxation of earnings for redistributive purposes is equivalent to
* Division of Philo sophy, Department of Philos ophy and History of Technolog y, Royal Institute
of Technology (Kungliga Tekn iska Högskolan), Sweden. Addr ess: Brinellväge n 32, 4tr, 100 44
Stockholm; phone: + 46 (0)739541326; e-mail: mikael.du bois@abe.kth. se.
An Argument for S ocial Insurance B ased on Personal Identity
European Jour nal of Social Sec urity, Volume 17 (2015), No. 1 85
forced labour (Nozick 1974, 169) a nd Milton Friedman has argued that red istribution
through ta xes directly undermines ind ividual freedom (Friedman 2002, 174).
In this ar ticle I present an argument for social i nsurance in the form of compulsor y
insurance. e proposed arg ument, which I call the argu ment from identity, is based
on arguments perta ining to the importa nce of safeguarding one’s living st andards and
social position, which have frequently been adva nced in debates on social insu rance
(cf. Barr 1992: 746; Baldwin 1990: 296; Goodin et al., 1999: 32f; Good in 1995: 184). I
attempt to show that the argument from identit y can handle both the r st objection
that compulsory socia l insurance allows t he bad risks to exploit the good risks and t he
second one, that it direct ly undermines individual freedom.
In Section 2, I explore the relat ions between social posit ion, living stand ards and
what social psychologists c all social identity. In section 3, I present the a rgument from
identity, beginning wit h a discussion of the notion of social identity, which I relate
to Michael Sandel’s ‘thick ’ conception of the person, as he presents it in his critique
of John Rawls’ liberalism . In section 4, I argue t hat the proposed argument provides
rea sons to a ccep t ri sk-po oli ng ev en i f we we re to nd ourselves among the ‘good’ risks.
In section 5. I argue t hat we, at least prima facie, have reasons to endorse compulsory
insurance. My conclusions are presented in Se ction 6.
2. LIVING STANDARDS AND SOCIAL IDENTITY
Di erent explanations for the emergence of social i nsurance can be found in the
literature. Historia ns have explained the emergence of social i nsurance in terms of
industriali sation and the interests of groups and class es in ensuring socia l stability
or in promoting their own interests in s ocial security i n a market economy (cf.
Baldwin 1990; Esping-Andersen 1990). Economists have explained and justi ed
social insura nce in relation to the functioning of the marke t economy and the labour
market, for example as an economic sta biliser through its potentia l for upholding
consumption (in particu lar during times of high unemployment) or as a response to
the failures of market i nsurance to provide those who need it with income security
in the event of sickness, u nemployment or old age because of di erent kinds of
information asy mmetries (cf. Atkinson 1991; Barr 1992).
Although such arg uments are importa nt in an overall expla nation of the emergence
of di erent kinds of social i nsurance systems, t he aim of this ar ticle is to set out a
normative argument for socia l insurance based on considerations t hat have a more
direct beari ng on people’s lives. One frequently-made argument for social insura nce
in debates on the welfare state is t hat social insurance is required to ensure that we
are able to sustain our l iving standards and social p osition in the event of sickness or
unemployment. For example, in 1944 the Swedish So cial Welfare Committee, which
laid the foundations of the Swedish social insurance sy stem, argued that ‘[f]rom a
social point of view it is not desir able that sickness shall have any signi cant e ects on
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