An Assessment of the Reasons for the Removal of the French Veto To U.K. Membership of the European Economic Community
| DOI | 10.1177/004711787200400603 |
| Published date | 01 December 1972 |
| Date | 01 December 1972 |
| Author | D. Rudnick |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
658
AN
ASSESSMENT
OF
THE
REASONS
FOR
THE
REMOVAL
OF
THE
FRENCH
VETO
TO
U.K.
MEMBERSHIP
OF
THE
EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY
D.
RUDNICK
In
July,
1961
a
British
government
first
submitted
an
applica-
tion
for
membership
of
the
European
Economic
Community;
eighteen
months
later
(January,
1963)
that
application
was
abruptly
vetoed
by
the
French
president.
Four
years
and
four
months
later
another
British
government
tabled
another
application
for
member-
ship
of
the
Community;
this
met
with
the
same
fate
as
the
first,
although
this
time
the
negotiations
were
never
allowed
even
to
start,
and
the
French
president
acted
a
mere
six
months
after
the
application
had
been
presented.
Yet
between
that
date
(November,
1967)
and
May,
1971
events
took
place
which
so
transformed
the
previous
situation
that
membership
of
the
E.E.C.
was
for
Britain
practically
an
accomplished
fact,
at
least
as
far
as
external
con-
straints
were
concerned.
Why
did
France,
contrary
to
her
previous
policy,
allow
Britain
to
enter
the
Community;
what
was
the
sig-
nificance
of
this
radical
change
of
front,
and
why
did
it
occur
when
it
did?
The
latter
question
is
the
most
difficult
of
all
to
answer,
if
only
because
there
is
no
clear
cut
landmark
in
tne
period
under
review
(November.
1967 -
May,
I971 )
to
provide
anything
like
a
precise
date
for
the
crucial
decision.
The
timing
of
the
fundamental
French
acceptance,
rather
than
rejection
of
Britain
as
an
E.E.C.
partner
is
then
open
to
extreme
variations
of
conjecture,
and
is
intimately
bound
up
with
the
ultimate
question
as
to
the
motivation
that
lay
behind
France’s
change
of
policy.
Be-
cause
of
this,
it
may
be
relevant
to
state
the
two
extreme
theories
of
the
timing
of
the
French
shift,
before
analysing,
in
the
light
of
the
issues
involved,
the
reasons
for
the
shift.
At
one
extreme,
there
is
(what
Kitzinger
calls)
the
&dquo;hard&dquo;
theory;
according
to
this
the
decision
to
accept
Britain
was
not
taken
until
as
late
as
spring,
1971
after
thoroughly
genuine
and
strenuous
French
efforts
to
resist
Britain’s
entry.
On
this
reading,
the
French
acceptance
was
&dquo;faute
de
mieux&dquo;,
an
unpleasant
fact
forced
on
them
by
the
lack
of
any
viable
alternative.
Mainly
pressure
from
the
other
five
E.E.C.
partners,
it
is
argued,
forced
Pompidou
to
give
way
by
threatening
him
with
retaliation
that
could
potentially
have
involved
the
break-up
of
the
Community,.
But
since
the
E.E.C.
was
vital
for
France
and
her
national
interests
would
then
have been
more
hurt
by
excluding
Britain
than
by
accepting
her,
Pompidou
bowed
to
the
inevitable,
agreed
to
bilateral
talks
with
the
British
Prime
Minister,
and
sought
to
reap
what
credit
he
could
from
his
Community
partners
and
the
applicant
states.
At
the
other
extreme
(Kitzinger’s
&dquo;soft&dquo;
theory)
the
process.
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