An Ecological Model for the Analysis of Power

AuthorIb Damgaard Petersen
Published date01 March 1968
Date01 March 1968
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/001083676800300107
Subject MatterArticles
An
Ecological
Model
for
the
Analysis
of
Power
Ib
Damgaard
Petersen
Introduction
In
evaluating
the
decision
process
as
a
sci-
entific
way
of
approaching
the
study
of
international
politics,
it
would
seem
to
be
an
important
task
to
establish
variables
that
can
be
applied
at
all
levels
from
the
inter-
national
system
as
a
whole
down
to
the
micro-level,
i.e.
the
decision
unit
itself
If
we
can
establish
such
variables
it
will
be-
come
possible
to
integrate
results
attained
at
all
levels,
so
that
international
politics
can
be
described
as
the
interplay
between
a
num-
ber
of decision
systems.
Apropos
of this
I
have
confronted
the
sets
of
variables
specula-
tively
arrived
at
by
Herbert
Kelman
and
Morton
Kaplan
with
the
empirical
mate-
rial
to
be
found
in
two
studies
by
Bernhard
C.
Cohen
and
Erling
Bjø1.2
The
results
seem
to
allow
a
reduction
of
the
number
of
classifying
variables
to
two,
value
and
ca-
pacity,
which
can
be
considered
analyti-
cally
to
derive
from
one
basic
variable:
interaction.
In
conclusion
I
have
seen
it
as
an
urgent
task for
research
to
add
to
the
the-
ory
of
decision-making
a
more
systematic
analysis
of
the
power
problem.
Only
to
a
very
limited
extent
has
power
been
in-
corporated
into
the
theory
in
its
application
within
international
politics
and
political
science.
In
the
following
I
shall
attempt
to
sketch
a
theoretical
solution
of
this
prob-
lem.
The
analysis
of
power
relations
is
one
of
the
most
complicated
problems
in
political
science
and
in
economics,
sociology
and
psychology
as
well.
In
the
following
I
shall:
r.
discuss
some
current
views
of
power
relations
2.
point
to
the
importance
of
incentives
to
enter
into
a
power
game,
3.
introduce
a
simplification
of
the
power
concept
regarding
power
as
an
intrinsic
element
of
social
action
in
general,
and
4.
establish
a
principle
for
the
distribu-
tion
of values
in
a
social
context
based
on
the
possibilities
of
alternative
ac-
tion
for
the
participants
in
the
power
game.
By
way
of
introduction
the
present
ar-
ticle
presents
an
analysis
of
the
concept
of
power
in
simple
situations
involving
few
actors.
But
the
purpose
of
the
investigation
will
be
to
try
to
make
a
generalization
ap-
plicable
to
more
complex
relations,
using
an
ecological
model.
Two
attempts
at
surveying
our
knowl-
edge
of
the
concepts
of
power
and
infiu-
ence
in
relation
to
situations
of decision
have
recently
been
made
by
Dorwin
Cart-
wright
(1965)
and
Edmund
Dahlstr6m
(1966).
Cartwright’s
article
contains
a
survey
of
132
various
methods
of
treating
these
problems
employed
within
numerous
branches
of
knowledge
and
includes
a
critical
evalua-
tion
of
these
methods
in
an
attempt
to
pin-
point
properties
that
might
form
the
core
of
a
more
comprehensive
theory
of
power.
Cartwright’s
general
conclusions
show
how
vital
it
is
that
power
and
influence
are
considered
elements
in
an
interaction
pro-
cess.
This
is
corroborated
by
Dahlstr6m
and
supported
by
many
writers.
Dahl-
str6m’s
analysis,
however,
is
limited
by
his
use
of
power
in
a
very
narrow
sense.
Dahl-
strom’s
analysis
will
be
treated
rather
fully
in
the
following,
its
various
aspects
being
concurrently
discussed.3
3
Dahlstr6m’s
Concept
of Power
In
scientific
literature
’power’
has
been
used
in
widely
varying
senses;
this
is
also
the
case
with
the
concept
’influence’.
’Power’
may
be
applied
in
a
broad
sense,
comprising
the
use
of
all
power
resources,
such
as
coercive
power,
legitimate
power,
power
to
reward
or
power
to
arouse
affection,
expert
power,
etc.
Dahlstr6m’s
definition
of power,
which
is
based
on
a
narrow,
or
limited,
use
of
the
word,
is
inspired
by
Robert
Dahl.
It
pre-
supposes
that
B,
who
is
subjected
to
power,
does
not
naturally
want
to
do
what
A,
who
exerts
influence,
wants
him
to
do.
The
use
of
’external’
rewards
or
sanctions
implies
its
limitation.
Robert
Dahl
defines
power
in
the
following
way:
’A
has
power
over
B,
if
he
can
make
B
do
something
he
would
not
otherwise
have
done’.
In
a
broader
appli-
cation
of
the
term,
power
also
denotes
a
modification
of
action
motivated
by
’in-
ternal’
reasons.
For
instance
B
may
behave
as
A
wants
him
to
because
his
conscience
compels
him,
or
because
he
agrees
with
A’s
outlook,
values
or
intentions.
4
The
difference
between
the
narrow
and
broad
concepts
of
power
is
even
more
clear
in
its
consequences
when
emphasis
is
placed
on
motivation
based
on
internalized
values.
Parsons’
concept
of
culture,
for
instance,
takes
internalized
values
as
its
starting-
point.5
Here,
the
concept
of
power
is
viewed
in
a
wider
sense
as
being
especially
linked
with
the
regulating
functions
in
integrated
societies
that
have
widely
shared
cultural
patterns.
It
is
commonly
agreed
that
law
is
based
chiefly
on
the
civic
sense
of
justice,
and
not
on
the
means
of
coercion
available
to
the
state.
Coercive
power,
or
the
use
of
power
in
the
narrow
sense,
we
usually
expect
to
find
in
interplay
between
less
integrated
units
which
are
characterized
by
Parsons
as
having
differing
cultural
pat-
terns.
The
relations
between
states,
or
be-
tween
a
slum
area
and
its
surroundings,
etc.,
are
often
regulated
by
means
of
power
in
the
narrow
sense.
An
idea
such
as
’tacit
agreement’,
used
by
both
American
and
French
writers
about
certain
kinds
of
rela-
tions
in
international
politics
motivated
by
clearly
perceived
mutual
interests,
may
be
the
germ
of
this
kind
of
common
cultural
pattern
based
on
shared
values.
(It
is
typical
that
the
use
of
such
’tacit
agreements’
has
manifested
itself
in
a
reduction
of
the
amount
of
coercive
power
involved.)
At
times
certain
brakes
on
the
armament
race
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
United
States
may
have
been
put
to
use
by
such
tacit
agreement.6
This
polarization
of
the
narrow
and
the
broad
senses
of
the
power
concept
does
not
preclude,
however,
that
power
in
the
restricted
sense
may
be
found
within
more
integrated
societies.
Accord-
ing
to
Parsons
such
use
of
power
will
be
restricted
to
a
certain
extent
by
the
equi-
librium
of
the
system.
For
example
we
may
pay
an
individual
to
perform
a
certain
job,
but
not
threaten
him
to
do
it
if
the
sanction
entails
violence
to
his
person.

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