An Empirical Analysis of Mergers: Efficiency Gains and Impact on Consumer Prices

DOI10.1093/joclec/nhaa001
Date28 March 2020
Pages1-35
Year2020
Published ByOxford University Press
Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 16(1),1–35
doi: 10.1093/joclec/nhaa001
Advance Access publication 28 March 2020
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MERGERS:
EFFICIENCY GAINS AND IMPACT ON
CONSUMER PRICES
Céline Bonnet∗& Jan Philip Schain†
ABSTRACT
In this article, we extend the literature on merger simulation models by incorpo-
rating its potential synergy gains into structural econometric analysis. Wepresent
an integrated approach. We estimate a structural demand and supply model
dealing with two-part tariff contracts between manufacturers and retailers as in
Bonnet and Dubois (2010). This model allows us to recover the marginal cost
of each differentiated product. Then we estimate potential efciency gains using
the data envelopment analysis approach of Bogetoft and Wang (2005), and some
assumptions about exogenous cost shifters. In the last step, we simulatethe new
price equilibrium post-merger by taking into account synergy gains, and derive
price and welfare effects. We use a home scan data set of dairy dessert purchases
in France, and show that synergy gains could offset the upwardpressure on pr ices
post. Moreover, in this market,the increase in industr y prot due to the merger
is more driven by its induced synergy gains than by the market power increase.
I. INTRODUCTION
The merger of rms plays an important role in an economy and are addressed
by public policy. Annually, the Federal Trade Commission and the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) reviews mergers valued at over one trillion U.S. dollars
in total. During 2000 and 2010, the DOJ triggered around 1,700 investigations
for merger cases, in order to assess possible anti-competitive effects (Farrell
and Shapiro, 2010). However,most merger sare r uled as being unproblematic,
which suggests that most mergers are neutral or pro-competitive and only
a small fraction are revised. The competition authorities rst use market
concentration tests, such as the Herndahl–Hirschman index (HHI), to gauge
whether or not prospective mergers would produce a rm of such magnitude
that it would adversely impact social welfare. The advantage of this test is
that data on market shares can be observed, and the HHI and its change
post-merger can be easily computed. The merger guidelines of the European
Commission state that mergers in markets with a post-merger HHI below
1,000 are generally unproblematic. Mergers with a post-merger HHI between
∗Toulouse School of Economics, INRAE, University of Toulouse Capitole, France;
celine.bonnet@tse-fr.eu
†Dusseldorf Institute for Competition Economics, Germany
© The Author [2020]. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For
Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
2Journal of Competition Law & Economics
1,000 and 2,000, and a change in concentration below 250, are also considered
to be unproblematic. When the post-merger HHI is higher than 2,000, the
threshold for the critical change is 150. However,the HHI index is a very cr ude
measure for likely competitive effects post-merger and does not capture other
important factors that may increase or decrease consumer welfare. Among
other factors, the particular focus of this paper is the strategic reaction of all
rms in the industry and the synergy gains induced by a merger.
In the case of horizontal mergers, there are two opposing forces in terms of
price. The higher market concentration exerts an upward pressure on prices
as the merged rm has more market power. This in turn allows competitors
outside the merger to increase their prices, such that in equilibrium the whole
industry raises their prices. On the other hand, synergy gains in the form of
lower marginal costs lead to a downward pressure on prices after a merger. The
question is what is the net effect of these two forces? In Farrell and Shapiro
(1990), one of the main results is that mergers without synergies always lead
to price increases and consumers are worse off.
Since the mid 90s, merger simulation models based on the New Empirical
Industrial Organization literature have been increasingly used in antitrust cases
in the U.S. and Europe as a complementary tool, in addition to classical
methods that are based on market concentration. These simulations consist of
describing consumer behavior in the market in terms of substitution patterns
and the strategic behavior of rms, and then taking into account the strategic
behavior of all competitors in the industry. Björnstedt and Verboven (2016)
show that simulations based on structural industry modeling can predict price
changes fairly well. Nevo (2000) estimates a random coefcient logit model in
order to analyze merger effects in the ready-to-eat cereal industry. Ivaldi and
Verboven (2005) use a nested logit model to represent customers’ preferences
in the trucking industry and assess the effects of the merger between Volvo and
Scania. In their study, they compare the merger effects without synerg ies and
with a hypothetical 5 percent decrease in marginal costs. Bonnet and Dubois
(2010) conduct a counterfactual analysis of a de-merger between Nestlé and
Perrier in a structural model of vertical relationships between bottled water
manufacturers and retail chains. Fan (2013) assesses the merger effects in
the newspaper market allowing for adjustments in product characteristics as
well as prices. Mazzeo et al. (2014) also look at merger effects when rms
can reposition their products post-merger. Earlier work on merger analysis is
given, for example, by Baker and Bresnahan (1985),Berr y and Pakes (1993),
Hausman and Leonard (2005),Werden and Froeb (1994) and Werden and
Froeb (1996). Even though the development of simulation models is in its
infancy, their importance is likely to grow in the future as computational power
and the availability of data steadily increases. However, these models assume
that either the cost structure does not change post-merger and then there is no
synergy effect, or ad hoc synergy gains as a 5 percent decrease in marginal cost.
Without synergies, we only capture the force that exerts the upward pressure
An Empirical Analysis of Mergers 3
on prices due to a higher concentration, which implies that the results can
be interpreted as a maximal benchmark in this case (Budzinski and Ruhmer,
2009). Ashenfelter et al. (2015) show empirical evidence that synergies can
offset price increases, which supports our ndings. They nd that a merger in
the beer industry actually produced enough synergy gains to offset the effect
due to increased market concentration. They show that prices increase by 2
percent without synergies and that synergy countered this effect on average.
There is only a small body of literature on estimating cost efciencies for
counterfactual horizontal merger s. Jeziorski (2014) analyzes the merger wave
in the U.S.radio market and presents a method to estimate x cost efciencies
for mergers. Another approach is presented in Mazzeo et al. (2014),who
also analyze potential x cost efciencies of mergers. Both papers involve
product repositioning post-merger and savings are realized through x costs.
We propose a new approach to extend the merger simulation literature,where
we take into account the marginal costs savings as a source of synergy gains.1
The method is computationally inexpensive and can be applied to any market
where mergers are likely to reduce marginal costs. This approach consists of
several steps. First, we develop an integrated structural econometric model of
demand and supply as in Berto Villas-Boas (2007) and Bonnet and Dubois
(2010), which consider the consumer substitution patterns and the strategic
reaction of rms in the market considered.2We are then able to recover
marginal costs for each product sold in the market. Using exogenous cost
shifters, we estimate the impact of some inputs on the marginal costs and then
assess the quantity of inputs needed to produce one additional unit of product.
The next step uses the data envelopment analysis (DEA) method to estimate
the potential efciency gains of mergers, following Bogetoft and Wang(2005).
We then obtain an estimated amount of marginal cost savings for the merger.
Finally, integrating the change in the structure of the industry induced by the
merger and the change in marginal cost for each product, we are able to assess
the total effect of the merger on consumer prices through simulation methods.
We apply this integrated approach to the French dairy dessert market. This
sector is composed of six main manufacturers (Danone, Nestle, Senoble-
Triballat, Yoplait, Andros, Sojasun and Mom), which sell national brand
products and some small- to medium-sized rms that sell private label
products. We estimate the synergy gains for all 78 possible bilateral mergers.
The derived synergy gains from the DEA focus on merger gains that arise
1In the considered market, we argue that technological and managerial transfers between the
merging parties are the main source of potential efciency gains and thus focus on marginal cost
reduction. Intuitively,x cost savings through product space adjustments should not play a big
role in the considered market, as products are relatively differentiated, which implies only weak
incentives to drop products post-merger.
2Also see Rosse (1970),Bresnahan (1989),Berry (1994),Goldberg (1995),Berry et al. (1995),
Slade (2004),Verboven (1996),Nevo (1998),Nevo (2000),Nevo (2001) and Ivaldi and
Verboven(2005).

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