Analytical Shortcuts in Eu Competition Enforcement: Proxies, Premises, and Presumptions

DOI10.1093/joclec/nhaa013
Date04 June 2020
Pages392-433
Year2020
Published ByOxford University Press
Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 16(3), 392–433
doi: 10.1093/joclec/nhaa013
Advance Access publication 04 June 2020
ANALYTICAL SHORTCUTS IN EU COMPETITION
ENFORCEMENT: PROXIES, PREMISES, AND
PRESUMPTIONS
Andriani Kalintiri∗
ABSTRACT
Analytical shortcuts lie at the heart of competition enforcement and have crucial
implications for both substance and procedure. Nevertheless, not all of them
are created equal. This point has been rather missed in competition scholarship
due to the tendency to use the term ‘presumption’ in an overly expansive and
ultimately inaccurate manner. Aspiring to inject some conceptual clarity in the
discussion, this work proposes a taxonomy for distinguishing common analytical
shortcuts in law enforcement comprising proxies, premises, and presumptions
in the technical sense. With this taxonomy in mind, it then takes a closer
look at their operation in EU competition enforcement in particular. As the
article demonstrates, proxies, premises, and presumptions play an intricate and
multilayered role in the interpretation and application of the EU antitrust and
merger rules that the generic use of the term ‘presumption’ fails to adequately
capture. Given their signicance for the effectiveness, efciency, and accuracy
of enforcement, competition authorities and courts should be conscious of their
function and of their substantive and procedural implications and should use
them appropriately and wisely.
JEL: K00; K21; K40; K41
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the core challenges the law is faced with is how to manage uncertainty,
difculty, and complexity. Indeed,polic ymakers and adjudicators are regularly
confronted with the exacting task of making sound and efcient choices about
the meaning of the legal rules and their application. Often, these choices not
only have far-reaching implications for economy and society, but they are also
made in the light of limited information and subject to time and resource
∗Lecturer in Competition Law at King’s College London. E-mail: andriani.kalintiri@kcl.ac.uk.
I am grateful to Pablo Ibáñez Colomo and Andrew Choo for our helpful conversations on many
of the issues discussed in this article. I am also indebted to the two anonymous reviewers for
their insightful and detailed comments. Any remaining errors are my own.
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permission@oup.com. •392
Analytical Shortcuts in EU Competition Enforcement 393
constraints. Against this backdrop, it is vital for the legal system to identify
ways to cope with these challenges. In this regard, shortcuts may be employed
to provide partial relief. A shortcut may be loosely dened as ‘an accelerated
way of doing or achieving something’.1Given its breadth, a diverse array
of procedures, tools, and mental processes may come within the scope of
the notion—from summary judgments to fast-track proceedings to heuristics
and so forth. Ir respective of their precise form, however, shortcuts generally
share a common feature: they have the capacity to simplify and rationalize law
enforcement. In this sense, they constitute an intrinsic feature of most, if not
all, legal systems.
Competition regimes are not an exception. The use of negotiated pro-
cedures in many jurisdictions, such as the cartel settlement procedure in
the European Union (EU), is an obvious example of a shortcut aimed at
maximizing administrative efciency.2Beyond such mechanisms, however,
the discipline is rife with shortcuts engaged—whether consciously or not—
in the construction and application of the competition rules, which one might
call ‘analytical’. For example, the wisdom that certain arrangements—such as
cartels—are inherently bad for competition and lack an efciency justication
underpins their prohibition as prima facie unlawful without it being necessary
to demonstrate actual or likely anticompetitive effects on an ad hoc basis. On
the other hand, practices that satisfy certain conditions and fall within pre-
identied ‘safe harbours’ are deemed to be lawful. Moreover, it is often said
that dominance may be inferred where the market share of the undertaking
in question exceeds 50% or that parent companies which wholly own a
subsidiary may be considered to have actually exercised decisive inuence over
its conduct and so forth.
In competition scholarship, these analytical shortcuts are often indistinctly
referred to as ‘presumptions’.3This tendency is certainly understandable to
some extent. Generally,to presume means ‘to accept something in the absence
of the further relevant information that would ordinarily be deemed necessary
to establish it’.4Contrary to pure assumptions, such acceptance is not without
foundation. Rather, presumptions are predicated on a preliminary issue and
1The denition is retrieved from Oxford Dictionary (<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
denition/shortcut>).
2Commission Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures in view of the adoption of
Decisions pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in cartel
cases [2008] OJ C 167/1. See also Case T-456/10 Timab Industries and CFPR v Commission,
ECLI:EU:T:2015:296, paras 59–60.
3See, for instance, Andreas Heinemann, Access to Evidence and Presumptions—Communicating
Vessels in Procedural Law in Public and Private Enforcementof Competition Law in Europe
(Kai Hüschelrath & Heike Schweitzer eds., Springer 2014); David Bailey, Presumptions in EU
Competition Law,31(9) European Competition Law Review 362 (2010);OECD, Safe Harbours
and Legal Presumptions in CompetitionLaw, DAF/COMP(2017)9; Cyril Ritter, Presumptions
in EU Competition Law, 6(2) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 189–212 (2018).
4Nicholas Rescher,Presumptions and the Practices of TentativeCogn ition 1 (Cambridge
University Press 2014).
394 Journal of Competition Law & Economics
invariably take the for m of a statement that ‘if A, then B’. However, the
‘if A, then B’ format is typical of logical reasoning in general and of legal
reasoning in particular. Therefore, relying on it as a compass for the detection
of presumptions may lead to the inaccurate classication of different tools
and processes as such. The issue is not purely terminological though. While
their precise function has been vigorously contested in evidence literature,5
there is consensus that presumptions have a specic procedural consequence:
they automatically shift the burden of proof onto the party against whom they
operate with respect to the presumed issue. The same, however, is not tr ue of
other analytical shortcuts, such as proxies and premises. Although the latter
may also be described in a ‘if A, then B’ manner, as will be explained shortly,
their operation in the enforcement system differs.
In this light, the aim of this article is to examine the role of analytical
shortcuts—specically of proxies, premises, and presumptions—in compe-
tition enforcement with a focus on the regime of the EU, as well as their
substantive and procedural implications. This inquir y is signicant, if anything,
for two reasons. First, the indiscriminate use of the term ‘presumptions’ in
competition scholarship has created considerable confusion about the actual
role and implications of proxies, premises, and presumptions in antitrust and
merger enforcement. Their systematic exploration will not only introduce
much-needed conceptual clarity, but it will also allow for the debunking of
some common misconceptions. Second, many of the debates, which resurf ace
every now and then in the discipline—for instance, about the goals of compe-
tition law or the role of economics—trigger the same fundamental question,
that is, how new thinking and knowledge may become embedded in the
enforcement system. Recognizing the existence of different analytical shortcuts
and understanding their function is crucial to answering this question, insofar
as it may enable us, on the one hand, to better frame the various discussions
and, on the other hand,to cr itically evaluatethe mer its of the different ‘options’
for accommodating new ideas and insights in the application of the antitrust
and merger provisions.
The main contribution of this article consists in the development of a taxon-
omy of analytical shortcuts in competition enforcement, comprising proxies,
premises, and presumptions. With this conceptual framework as its starting
point, the analysis demonstrates that proxies, premises, and presumptions play
an intricate and multilayered role in the interpretation and application of the
EU antitrust and merger rules that the generic use of the term ‘presumption’
fails to adequately capture. In discussing the function of these shortcuts in
EU competition enforcement, the article addresses, among other s, two highly
important issues. First, it consider s the proper use of presumptions, advancing
the view that, from a fairness perspective, presumptions should only shift
the evidential burden—that is, the burden of producing evidence—on the
party against whom they operate. Second, it contemplates whether economic
5See in particular the literature cited infra in notes 105 and 106.

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