Anatomy of an informal institution: The ‘Gentlemen’s Pact’ and judicial selection in Mexico, 1917–1994
| Published date | 01 November 2018 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0192512118773414 |
| Author | Andrea Pozas-Loyo,Julio Ríos-Figueroa |
| Date | 01 November 2018 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512118773414
International Political Science Review
2018, Vol. 39(5) 647 –661
© The Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/0192512118773414
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Anatomy of an informal institution:
The ‘Gentlemen’s Pact’ and judicial
selection in Mexico, 1917–1994
Andrea Pozas-Loyo
Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, UNAM, Mexico
Julio Ríos-Figueroa
División de Estudios Políticos, CIDE, Mexico
Abstract
The Mexican Constitution of 1917 granted the Supreme Court the power to handpick lower court judges
and oversee their careers. For almost eight decades this capacity was not regulated. To fill this void, the
justices began to take turns filling vacancies which developed into an informal institution – the so-called
‘Gentlemen’s Pact’. Using original archival data, we document and describe the birth and development of
this practice and argue that it consolidated into an informal institution as the judiciary increased in size.
We uncover the workings of this social norm that established a patronage model of judicial selection. Our
analysis period ends in 1994, when a constitutional reform created a judicial council with the explicit aim of
ending patronage and corruption within the judiciary.
Keywords
Judicial selection, patronage networks, Mexico, informal institutions, judicial independence, supreme court,
judicial politics
Introduction
The selection, promotion and discipline of judges are critical determinants of their independence
and performance. The consensus, as reflected in Principle 10 of the United Nations’ Basic Principles
on the Independence of the Judiciary, requires judges to be chosen from among ‘individuals of
integrity and ability with appropriate training or qualifications in law’ suggesting that merit-based
selection will most likely recruit judges who will display actual independence, neutrality
and proficiency in their decisions. Judicial councils, appointment commissions and other similar
Corresponding author:
Julio Ríos-Figueroa, División de Estudios Políticos CIDE, Carretera México-Toluca 3655, Lomas de Santa Fe,
Ciudad de México CP 01210, Mexico.
Email: julio.rios@cide.edu
773414IPS0010.1177/0192512118773414International Political Science ReviewPozas-Loyo and Ríos-Figueroa
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