Andrews v Reading Borough Council (No 1)

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeMr Justice Collins
Judgment Date29 April 2004
CourtQueen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)
Docket NumberCase No:CO/0712/2004
Date29 April 2004

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

QUEENS BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand,

London, WC2A 2LL

Before:

THE Hon. Mr Justice Collins

Case No:CO/0712/2004

Between
Geoffrey Wallace Andrews
and
Reading Borough Council

Mr Adrian Jack (instructed by Barrett & Co. Solicitors) for the Claimant

Ms Gillian Carrington (instructed by Clarks, Solicitors) for the Defendants

Mr Justice Collins
1

The claimant, then acting in person, issued these proceedings in the Reading County Court on 22 October 200His claim was for £4,206.53, the cost of noise insulation carried out to his house at 50A London Road, Reading, in order to mitigate the excessive traffic noise which had been created by a traffic regulation order made by the defendants in 2000. The order was made under powers conferred by Section 1 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 and was entitled the Borough of Reading (A319 Kings Road Area)(Bus Lanes, Waiting Restrictions and Movement Control) Order 2000.

2

The claimant served Particulars of Claim on 5 November 2001 which described how the increase in traffic had seriously interfered with his and his family's sleep. In the course of the particulars, the claimant stated:-

“I believe that to impose this increased level of road traffic noise and disturbance on my house, myself and my family without any assistance or attempt at mitigation contravenes our rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 and E.C.H.R.”

On 21 November 2001, the defendants served a defence together with an application to strike out the claim on the ground that it disclosed no cause of action. It was alleged in the alternative that the claim was premature because no proper application had been made by the claimant under the Noise Insulation Regulations, 1975. This allegation was surprising since, as the defendants certainly ought to have known, those regulations could not apply in the circumstances. That is because there was no alteration to the location, width or level of the highway: see Paragraphs 2(1) and 4(1) and (2) of those regulations. If the Regulations had applied, there would have been a discretion to make a grant for noise insulation provided that the increase caused by the relevant highway alteration made an effective contribution to the existing noise level of at least 1dB(A) and that that level was at least 68dB(A) averaged over a period between 6am and midnight on a normal working day taken at a spot one metre from the most exposed of any window or door of the property affected. The claimant, who is a retired engineer, has carried out, he says, the necessary measurements and these show an average increase of 3.17dB(A) over the 6am to midnight period and that the relevant level was 71.78dB(A), thus well over the 68dB(A) level specified in the Regulations. The claimant's figures show that even at night between 9pm and 10pm the levels reached 69dB(A).

3

The claimant was ordered to amend his Particulars of Claim and this he did on 4 February 2002. In them he referred specifically to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and it was thus clear that the claim was being made pursuant to Section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998. On 13 March 2002, the application to strike out was dismissed and directions were given. These included that the claim be “allocated to the multi-track (in the light of matters of public importance involved”), that there should be an agreed expert to report on noise levels at the claimant's property and that, at the adjourned pre-trial review, questions of possible transfer to the High Court should be reconsidered. Although the claimant was interested only in obtaining the £4,200 odd he has had to pay for noise insulation, for the defendants there was the prospect that, if this claim succeeded, the cost of traffic regulation orders would escalate. Thus for them the claim had to be regarded as of considerable importance and, as will become apparent, they have incurred very substantial costs in preparing to defend it.

4

Perhaps realising that he had stirred up a potential hornets’ nest and that there would be procedural problems, the claimant made an application for judicial review. That was rejected by Silber J on 2 August 2002 on the ground of delay but also because ‘the claimant has an alternative remedy in private law proceedings’. On 23 August 2002, it was ordered by consent that the action be stayed until 14 days after judgment was given on the Government's appeal to the Grand Chamber in Hatton v United Kingdom (the Heathrow aircraft noise claim before the ECtHR). That judgment was given on 8 July 2003. The defendants then on 18 August 2003 issued an application for summary judgment pursuant to CPR Part 24 on the ground that the claim had no real prospect of success. There was also an application in the alternative for security for coasts. Following a number of adjournments, the application eventually came before H.H. Judge Bishop sitting at Guildford County Court on 30 January 200He ordered that the application be adjourned to a date to be fixed allowing 1 1/2 days for the hearing and that the proceedings be “transferred to the High Court (Administrative Court)”.

5

The Administrative Court office was, not surprisingly, somewhat puzzled as to how the proceedings should be treated by the Court and it was listed before me as an application. The reason why Judge Bishop was persuaded to make the order he did was because of some observations of Lord Woolf, CJ in Anufrijeva v LB Southwark [2004] 1 All E.R. 833. However, for reasons which I shall explain, I am satisfied that the transfer should not have been made to the Administrative Court, which is not the appropriate forum, and that Lord Woolf's words did not require such a transfer. In the circumstances, I decided that the application should continue in the Queen's Bench Division. Since I did not want the parties to incur further costs, it seemed to me that it would not be appropriate to send the proceedings back to the County Court and so I agreed to hear the application in my capacity as a judge of the Queen's Bench Division.

6

Anufrijeva and the two other cases heard with it were appeals in claims for judicial review and damages based on alleged maladministration by the defendants which had resulted in breaches of the claimants’ human rights. The Court of Appeal was most concerned that the costs incurred in pursuing the claims far exceeded any amount of damages which might have been awarded. In Paragraph 79 on page 860j; Lord Woolf said this:-

“What is important is that in each case the combined costs of both sides were many times greater than damages that could reasonably have been anticipated. The costs at first instance of each party were totally disproportionate to the amount involved. When the total costs of both sides are looked at including the appeal, the figures are truly horrendous …”

In Paragraph 80 on p.861b he continued thus:-

“The reality is that a claim for damages under the 1998 Act in respect of maladministration, whether brought as a free-standing claim or ancillary to a claim for other substantive relief, if pursued in court by adversarial proceedings, is likely to cost substantially more to try then the amount of any damages that are likely to be awarded. Furthermore, as we have made plain, there will often be no certainty that an entitlement to damages will be established at all”.

7

In the following paragraph, Lord Woolf set out a number of suggestions which might avoid a repetition of the situation in future. I should set it out in full;

“What can be done to avoid a repetition of this situation in future proceedings? Based on the experience available at present we suggest as follows in relation to proceedings which include a claim for damages for maladministration under the 1998 Act. (i) The courts should look critically at any attempt to recover damages under the 1998 Act for maladministration by any procedure other than judicial review in the Administrative Court. (ii) A claim for damages alone cannot be brought by judicial review ( CPR 54.3(2) but in this case the proceedings should still be brought in the Administrative Court by an ordinary claim. (iii) before giving permission to apply for judicial review, the Administrative Court judge should require the claimant to explain why it would not be more appropriate to use any available internal complaint procedure or proceed by making a claim to the Police Complaints Authority (PCA) or LGO at least in the first instance. The complaint procedures at the PCA and the LGO are designed to deal economically (the claimant pays no costs and does not require a lawyer) and expeditiously with claims for compensation for maladministration. (From inquiries the court has made it is apparent that the time scale for resolving complaints compares favourably with that of litigation). (iv) If there is a legitimate claim for other relief, permission should if appropriate be limited to that relief and consideration iven to deferring permission for the damages claim, adjourning or staying that claim until use has been made of ADR, whether by a reference to a mediator or an ombudsman or otherwise, or remitting that claim to a district judge or master if it cannot be dismissed summarily on grounds that in any event an award of damages is not required to achieve just satisfaction. (v) It is hoped that with the assistance of this judgment, in future claims that have to be determined by the courts can be determined by the appropriate level of judge in a summary manner by the judge reading the relevant evidence. The citing of more than three authorities should be justified an the hearing should be limited to...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases
  • ID and Others v Home Office and Another
    • United Kingdom
    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 4 Marzo 2005
    ... ... from the speech of Lord Atkinson, giving the opinion of the Privy Council in the third of these cases: "One of the rights possessed by the ... county court in any event (compare the decision of Collins J in Andrews v Reading BC [2004] EWHC 970 (QB)) ... 109 Mr Catchpole ... ...

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT