Annetje Ottow, Market and Competition Authorities: Good Agency Principles
| DOI | 10.3366/elr.2016.0337 |
| Date | 01 January 2016 |
| Pages | 120-121 |
| Published date | 01 January 2016 |
Much writing in recent years has focused on the institutional framework within which competition law is enforced. In many ways, the clarion call for this was the publication of Daniel A Crane's influential book
Recent years have happily seen much greater lawyerly interest in the institutional question, and Annetje Ottow's book makes a very welcome contribution to this burgeoning literature. The book provides a detailed and thoughtful analysis of the principles by which competition authorities are designed, and the contribution that this institutional framework makes to optimal decision making. The author has extensive experience gained in national competition and regulatory authorities and is therefore very well placed to assess the ingredients required to make for successful regulatory structures, and to communicate this in a way that is accessible and relevant to a range of audiences, including, importantly, those making decisions on institutional design.
The book builds an elegant argument drawing on a general analysis of abstract institutional principles, before moving on to considering specific application using case studies, and finally drawing succinct and practical recommendations. This structure works well and makes for arguments that are highly accessible: no small virtue, considering that a substantial section of the target audience might include regulators who initially have limited competition-specific experience.
The first section of the book introduces the reader to the important trade-offs and tensions inherent in much regulatory design, highlighting in particular the trade-off between...
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