Antecedents of union member retention in Right-to-Work environments
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/PR-08-2018-0281 |
| Pages | 1281-1298 |
| Date | 02 August 2019 |
| Published date | 02 August 2019 |
| Author | James E. Martin,Lyonel Laulié,Ariel M. Lelchook |
| Subject Matter | Hr & organizational behaviour,Global hrm |
Antecedents of union member
retention in Right-to-
Work environments
James E. Martin
Mike Ilitch School of Business, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, USA
Lyonel Laulié
Departamento de Administración, Facultad de Economía y Negocios,
Universidad de Chile, Santiago, Chile, and
Ariel M. Lelchook
Talent Advantage Partner LLC, Oakton, Virginia, USA
Abstract
Purpose –States with Right-to-Work (RTW) law coverage have increased since 2012, with union
membership decreasing. In such states, employees in union-represented positions cannot be required to be
union members and/or pay dues, even though the union must still legally represent them. While union
member retention in RTW states provides new challenges for unions, it has not been extensively studied. The
purpose of this paper is to extend the literature by testing a model of intent to remain a union member in an
RTW context using union loyalty as a mediator.
Design/methodology/approach –The model is based on how different types of exchanges shape
intentions to remain a union member. To test the hypotheses, a sample of 475 members was used where an
RTW law was about to be implemented in a Midwestern American state.
Findings –Union loyalty mediated the relationships between social and ideological exchanges with the
union and employee intent to remain a union member and similarly mediated the organization–employee
exchanges. Economic exchanges with the union were not a significant predictor in the full model.
Research limitations/implications –This study extends the employment-relations literature by helping
us better understand member intent triggered by RTW laws. Insights are provided for both unions and
organizations to better manage their relationships with employees.
Originality/value –This study advanced the employee-relations literature by providing a more holistic
theoretically based understanding of how unions may retain members by using multiple forms of exchange,
often studied separately in previous literature of member–union relationships.
Keywords Unions, Exchange theory, Member quitting, Right-to-Work, Union loyalty
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
There are currently 28 states in the US with Right-to-Work (RTW) laws, five of which have
passed since 2012 (Bott, 2017; Scheiber, 2018). RTW laws have had a major negative impact on
union membership because they enable workers to quit the union and not pay dues or fees.
They can still remain in union-represented jobs, with the union legally required to represent the
worker. Thus, RTW laws have made member r etentiona challenge for unions. Gall (1996, p. 41)
argued that unions perceive RTW laws “rightly or wrongly, [as] a fight for their institutional
existence.”Individual-level member retention or intent to remain a union member in an RTW
context has not been extensively researched. Most studies of RTW laws have consisted of
macro-level studies (e.g. Moore, 1998; Sobel, 1995), showing how RTW laws have affected
state-level union membership. Since these studies do not address individual employees in a
bargaining unit, they cannot provide advice to unions on how to retain members.
Researchers have argued that after an RTW law is passed the member commitment
bonds to the union may change (Thacker, 2015), and thus their perceptions of exchanges
with the union and the employer may also change. We build on and apply exchange theory
(Blau, 1964) to explain why individuals might intend to remain dues-paying union members
Personnel Review
Vol. 48 No. 5, 2019
pp. 1281-1298
© Emerald PublishingLimited
0048-3486
DOI 10.1108/PR-08-2018-0281
Received 2 August 2018
Revised 16 January 2019
Accepted 21 February 2019
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
www.emeraldinsight.com/0048-3486.htm
1281
Right-to-Work
environments
in an RTW setting. Other research has applied exchange theory in the face of changes in the
legal environment (Chawla et al., 2018; Thacker, 2015). Within our theoretical framework,
and similar to Chawla et al. (2018), we examine multiple exchange approaches of union
members with both unions and employers together in an inclusive model.
Theory and hypotheses
We define intent to remain a union member in an RTW context as “an individual’s deliberate
plan to continue paying union dues or fees after the implementation of an RTW law
applicable to their bargaining unit.”Intent to remain a union member is a specific behavioral
intention. RTW laws and court decisions outlawing “fair share provisions”permitting fee
payers to become “free-riders”(as in the Supreme Court decision, Janus v. American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, 2018) remove the legal reasons for
retaining membership and paying union fees. In such situations, union membership may be
more directly influenced by perceptions of exchanges based on psychological rationale.
Over time, members develop attitudes and behavioral intentions toward unions built on
integrating evaluations of past, current and anticipated future exchanges in a work
situation. As members perceive benefits vs costs with the union, they tend to develop
feelings of obligation and mutual reciprocity that affect their decision to engage in future
exchanges, driving individual choices to remain union members.
We based our model (Figure 1) on exchange theory, and use the literature on member–
union relationsmodels to predict intent to remain a union memberunder RTW. This research
focuses on settings where unions alreadyexist and therefore employeeshave familiarity with
union representation and may determine whether or not they want to continue being dues
paying members(Devinatz and Rich, 1996). We willexamine to what extent differenttypes of
exchanges lead to intent to remain a member and propose that the effects of theseconstructs
will be mediated by union loyalty, a general attitude toward unions.
Economic exchanges with the union
Economic exchanges are based on an instrumental cost–benefit view of member–union
relations and are individualistic or private exchanges (e.g. Cregan, 2013; Snape and Redman,
2004). Members calculate the net economic benefit of being a member, taking into account
Economic
Exchanges
with the Union
Social
Exchanges
with the Union
Ideological
Exchanges
with the Union
Union Loyalty
Intent to
Remain a
Union Member
H1
H2
H3
H4
Organization–
Employee
Exchanges
H5
Figure 1.
Conceptual framework
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