Antonio Sidoli v Dante Sidoli

Hearing dates: 16 May 2025

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on [date] by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

In this claim the Claimants seek to register under the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 (“ the 1933 Act”), and the Defendants (for the procedural reasons set out below) seek to set aside the registration of, a judgment made by the Italian Court of Piacenza ordering the Defendants to pay a sum of €381,796.31 plus interest.

The applications raise the question of whether the 1933 Act can be used to register judgments arising out of claims in foreign courts regarding succession. In my judgment, it cannot, or at least it cannot usually. For that reason, and as expanded upon in more detail below, I refuse registration, alternatively set such registration aside.

The Italian Judgment

The proceedings in Italy concern the estate of Davide Sidoli. Davide died on 14 September 2006. He left an English Will, dated 22 August 2006, which states his residence to be St Joseph's Hospice in London and on the face of it applies to his worldwide estate. The executors of the Will were the partners of a firm called Whiskers. There has never been a grant of probate of Davide's Will.

Davide was pre-deceased by his father, Quintilio Francesco Giovanni Sidoli, who died on 14 May 2004. Quintilio left a Will dated 12 October 2000, describing his residence as 3 Broadfield Avenue in London and which applied to his estate outside of the Republic of Italy. That Will appointed Davide as executor. Amongst other things, it gave the property at 3 Broadfield Avenue to be held on a trust which permitted Quintilio's sister-in-law, Inez, to live in the property and, at the time when the property was sold, gave the sum of £100,000 to Davide. It also left the residue of the estate to Davide so, in the event, Davide was solely entitled to 3 Broadfield Avenue subject to Inez's interest. From the Italian judgment referred to below it can be seen that Quintilio also left an Italian Will in Italy leaving his whole estate to Davide.

Davide's Will left his estate to the Defendants, who are his brother and his brother's wife (i.e. Davide's sister-in-law). It contains the following statement:

“For the avoidance of doubt I take this opportunity to confirm that it is my wish that neither of my former wife's sons namely Andrea Sidoli and Antonio Sidoli shall receive any part of my estate as BOTH sons were born to my then wife … during our marriage but I was not their natural father and I consequently take the view that I have no moral obligation to make any financial provision for them from my estate and I FIRMLY TAKE THE VIEW that my said brother and sister-in-law are my closest living relatives.”

Andrea and Antonio are the Claimants in this matter. They began proceedings in Italy in 2012. There were various hearings in Italy culminating, eventually, in a judgment of the Ordinary Court of Piacenza on 21 February 2020 (“ the Judgment”). The bundle contains a translation of the Judgment and reading that, albeit reliant on the translation and without any expertise in Italian law and procedure, it can be seen that the court found that the Claimants were the children of Davide and set the Will aside on the grounds that Davide was mistaken in holding the belief that the Claimants were not his children. It then assessed, with reference to a report provided by a valuation expert who seems to have consulted both sides, the value of Andrea and Antonio's share of the whole estate including his right over the 3 Broadfield Avenue.

The Judgment concludes with the following (according to the translation):

“The Court, definitively pronouncing, any different and contrary instance rejected or absorbed, so disposes:

1. Ascertains the invalidity pursuant to art. 624, co.2, of the Italian Civil Code, of the testamentary dispositions contained in points 3 and 5 of the testaments dated 18 and 22 August 2006 by Davide Sidoli for the effect,

2. Cancels the same provisions;

3. Declares Andrea and Antonio Sidoli legitimate heirs of Davide Sidoli for the share of ¹/₂ each;

4. Condemns Davide Sidoli and Anna Moruzzi to the delivery and release, in favour of the plaintiffs, of their share of the properties located in the Municipality of Morass (PC);

5. Condemns the defendants to pay, in favour of the plaintiffs, the total amount of €381,796.31, plus legal interest from the date of this sentence to the balance.

6. Fully compensates litigation costs.

7. Definitively places the Technical Advice's costs jointly and severally on the parties.

The Defendants appealed that decision. By a judgment made on 28 December 2022, the appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal of Bologna (“ the Appeal Judgment”). The Appeal Judgment did not replace the earlier judgment but instead dismissed the appeal against it. It follows (and it was not disputed) that the Defendants remain liable under Italian Law to pay to the Claimants the sum set out in paragraph 5 of the above quote.

The English Process

By an application notice dated 8 November 2023, the Claimants applied to register the Appeal Judgment “ as a judgment of the High Court of Justice Business and Property Courts of England and Wales pursuant to ss. 1(1) and 2(1) of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933”. On 15 December 2023 Master Stevens Ordered that it be so registered, and gave the Defendants the right to set her order aside provided they do so within two months of the order.

By an application notice dated 25 April 2024 (following delays in service of the order) the Defendants applied to set the Order aside. On 9 May 2024, that application was dismissed on paper, Master Stevens deciding that the application identified no reasonable grounds to set the order aside. The Defendants then asked, by letter, for that dismissal to be set aside. That led to an Order of Master Stevens dated 24 May 2024, where she set aside the earlier Order of 19 December 2023, and ordered that the application notice and other documents of the Defendants be served on the Claimants.

It seems to me that the Order of 24 May 2024 was probably a mistake, and that Master Stevens had meant to set aside her Order of 9 May 2024. However, the effect is that the original registration was cancelled.

The matter was subsequently transferred to the Chancery Division, at the request of the Defendants who asked for a specialist judge. The matter was assigned to the Chief Master but, having once had to adjourn the hearing for unavailability, I was asked to hear the matter.

There have been no directions or other hearings in the matter. The directions given so far, which were for the filing and service of evidence, were agreed by the parties and made on paper. That has, in my judgment, created problems in hearing this case. It is clear to me that the Court would have been considerably assisted by expert evidence as to the nature of the Italian proceedings and judgments and that the parties would have been assisted by the Court asking them to spell out the grounds on which the registration was disputed. The grounds on which the Defendants objected to registration at the hearing were materially different to those set out in their witness statements and even to those in their counsel's skeleton argument.

As it is, by the end of the hearing I was satisfied that the Court had sufficient material to determine the matter. Insofar as relevant to the Court's decision, the nature and effect of the Judgment seemed to be common ground and both parties were content to make submissions with reference to a translation of the Judgment and did not seek expert evidence as to its meaning.

I was also satisfied that the Claimants did have sufficient notice of the points being made by the Defendants to properly respond to them. In particular, Ms Egan for the Claimants asked for a short period of time before commencing her Reply submissions, which I granted and she then dealt ably with the Defendants' case.

Del-Curto v Del-Curto

Before finally turning to the substance of my decision, I should mention the decision in Del-Curto v Del-Curto [2023] EWHC 2106 (KB). In that case, Master Cook dismissed an application to set aside registration of a judgment in very similar circumstances to this case. I must pay close attention to his reasons for doing so when deciding this case. Coincidentally, I was counsel in that case for the losing side. At the start of the hearing, I asked both counsel in this case whether they wished to make any application arising out of that (making it clear that the case has been finally concluded) and both firmly declined. I must, therefore, consider the correctness of that decision. As will be seen below, I do disagree with some of the conclusions in that judgment. To the extent that I do disagree, I am sure that this arises from my own failures in arguing the case.

The Grounds

Registration

As the original registration order was set aside by Master Stevens' Order of 24 May 2024 it was necessary for the Claimants to satisfy me that the initial grounds for registering a judgment under the 1933 Act were made out.

Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act provides that a person, being a judgment creditor under a judgment to which Part I of the Act applies may apply...