Apinder Singh Ghura and Others v Shokat Mohammed Dalal and Others

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeMr Justice Norris
Judgment Date07 August 2015
Neutral Citation[2015] EWHC 2385 (Ch)
Docket NumberCase No: 2LS30679
CourtChancery Division
Date07 August 2015

[2015] EWHC 2385 (Ch)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

CHANCERY DIVISION

Royal Courts of Justice

The Rolls Building

Fetter Lane

EC4A 1NL

Before:

Mr Justice Norris

Vice-Chancellor of The County Palatine

Case No: 2LS30679

Between:
(1) Apinder Singh Ghura
(2) Khushninder Singh Ghura
(3) Amarjit Singh
(4) Chan Casuals Limited
(5) Boi Trading Company Limited
Claimant
and
(1) Shokat Mohammed Dalal
(2) Khalid Dalal
(3) Blackburn Clothing Company Limited
Defendant

Mark Anderson QC and Charles Holland (instructed by Square One Law LLP) for the Claimants

Paul Chaisty QC (instructed by Napthens LLP) for the First Defendant

Mr Justice Norris
1

Regrettably the parties have been unable to agree the wording of the final order to be made at the conclusion of the trial of this case, although I have provided them with a suggested draft and in correspondence explained my intentions behind some of the wording used.

2

There remains one outstanding point. The Claimants seek the inclusion of the words:

"The time for seeking permission to appeal paragraphs 1(i) to (iv) above is extended generally pending the working out of the orders made herein or until further order".

These words are not in my suggested draft. Their inclusion is sought to address a circumstance that may arise in December 2015, which is not directly addressed in my suggested order, and about which (if it arises) the parties may differ as to the effect of my order. As the specific circumstance was not the subject of submission at trial, what might have to be done in 5 months' time will necessarily involve construing my present order.

3

I do not agree to the insertion of the proposed words. First, CPR 52.4 permits me to extend the time for filing an Appellants' Notice for "such period as may be directed". I do not consider that the rule permits me to extend time generally. Second, the power to extend time must be exercised having regard to the overriding objective and in implementation of the policy of achieving finality (as is demonstrated by the shortness of the standard default period of 21 days). Extending time generally does not promote finality. Thirdly, I do not consider that waiting to see what the consequences of the judgment are is sufficient ground for extending the time for appealing. On this I align myself with the views expressed by Turner J in Kagolovsky [2014] EWHC 108 (QB). Fourth, it will remain open to the Court...

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