Arbitration
| Jurisdiction | United Kingdom |
| Pages | 834-874 |
| Author | Adrian Briggs |
12
ARBITRATION
A INTRODUCTION
is book is concerned with issues of private international law as they arise and are liable to
be dealt with before the English courts. As a result, its treatment of arbitration is in some re-
spects incomplete.1 It does not examine in detail how arbitral tribunals go about their busi-
ness; how tribunals decide which law, if any, to apply to the issues which come before them;
or what procedural powers they are given, whether by the parties or by the law of the seat
of the arbitration. Arbitral tribunals are not courts; confusion results from treating them as
though it were otherwise. e purpose of the parties in agreeing to arbitration is to prepare
the ground for the removal of the resolution of disputes from the public (and in some cases,
inexpert and unreliable) forum oered by a national court; such is the signicance of this
consequence that a degree of formality is required to establish that it was agreed to. If the
parties have agreed to have a process for the resolution of dierences which is consensual,
private, and liable to be tailor- made, as distinct from one which is compulsory, public, and
oered on a take- it- or- leave- it basis, then only the periphery of the subject, represented
by its interface with the law as applied by courts, is of legitimate concern to the science of
private international law. However, those who practise commercial dispute resolution by
arbitration sometimes appear to suspect that laws are proposed or promulgated to interfere
with a process which was designed to be free of such interference: the rules of the Brussels/
Lugano regime were a particularly acute example of this; indeed, the recent treatment of
arbitration by the European Court2 suggests that one would be foolish to agree to arbitrate
anywhere within its territorial jurisdiction.
As ever, the view depends on the vantage point. If one starts from the position that there
is no part of England in which the law of England does not apply, that there is no Alsatia in
which the King’s writ does not run,3 then it follows that arbitrators may exercise the powers
which the parties may wish them to exercise if, and only to the extent that, the law provides
that they may. e separateness of arbitration from legal process may be intended, and that
separateness may be commercially important, but it is neither natural nor inherent. It may
be acknowledged, given eect, and even encouraged, but it depends, in England at least, on
1 For the specic issues examined in this chapter, see Dicey, Morris, and Collins, e Conict of Laws (Sweet &
Maxwell, 16th edn, 2022); Joseph, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Clauses and eir Enforcement (Sweet & Maxwell,
3rd edn, 2015). For a more comprehensive, but now rather dated, account of arbitration, see Mustill and Boyd,
Commercial Arbitration (Butterworths, 2nd edn, 1989), and Companion Volume (2001). See also Redfern and
Hunter, International Commercial Arbitration (6th edn, 2015); Born, International Commercial Arbitration
(Wolters Kluwer, 3rd edn, 2021).
2 See Case C- 700/ 20 London Steam- Ship Owners Mutual Assistance Association v Spain EU:C:2022:488, [2023] 1
WLR 1 (on which, Briggs [2022] LMCLQ 543) (holding that a Spanish judgment was required to be enforced
under the Brussels I Regulation notwithstanding its radical irreconcilability with the award of a London arbitral
tribunal which had been declared by the English courts to be enforceable as a judgment).
3 Czarnikow v Roth [1922] 2 KB 478, 488.
835
the authorisation given by the law. It is almost inevitable, therefore, that there are a number
of points of friction between the practice and expectation of arbitration and the law as ap-
plied by the courts. ough this mainly raises issues of domestic law as to the separation of
responsibility as between court and tribunal, there will be other respects in which issues of
private international law will arise. is Chapter will endeavour to conne its attention to
these; it seeks to state the rules of private international law which courts apply, even when
they are raised in connection with arbitrations. As said, it does not aim to examine in great
detail the manner in which a tribunal goes about its internal, private, business.
It will be seen that, despite the evident complexity of some of the authorities, the essence
of the law of arbitration is beguilingly simple: there is no basis for arbitration unless there is
an agreement to provide for it, but if there is such an agreement there it should be respected
and enforced to the extent permitted by law. If there is a dispute about the threshold ques-
tion whether those between whom a dispute has arisen are bound by such an agreement in
respect of the dispute which has arisen, a preliminary assessment must be made of its ex-
istence, validity, and applicability, to determine its scope and eect. If it is found to be valid
and applicable, the agreement of the parties4 will be understood as an agreement to proceed
to, and to accept and abide by the outcome of, the arbitration which they have specied. As
a result, the law on recognition and enforcement or arbitral awards is largely concerned, in
the rst instance at least, with working out the detail of what exactly the parties did agree to
and to accept, or whether the award of the tribunal has gone beyond what was agreed to. In
the second instance it may have to deal with challenging questions about the eect of court
judgments given in relation to arbitral awards.
e analysis is largely contractual, and the contribution of private international law is
to point to the law which governs, and answers questions concerning, the agreement to
arbitrate. But questions of how to proceed when the litigants are at odds on whether they
are bound by an agreement to arbitrate are as dicult here as they are elsewhere in the
private international law of contract, for the danger of assuming the conclusion is always
found lurking close to the path. It is therefore important for the law to avoid taking prema-
ture sides on an issue which is in dispute between the parties, but is equally important that
an agreement to arbitrate is not allowed to be undermined by spurious and unmeritorious
objections.
Most people will accept that a law has to support and supervise the arbitral process. is
will usually be the law of the seat of the arbitration, which may allow the parties some, sub-
stantial, or even total, freedom to write the rules which govern their arbitration; the idea
that there can be an arbitration which is wholly anational, or delocalized, has not taken root
in English law. But as the seat, and hence the law of the seat, will usually be chosen by the
parties, as they are free to determine it, even this aspect of the law is essentially contractual
in nature.
When it comes to recognition and enforcement there is a proper opportunity for a law
other than that which originates in the parties’ agreement to play a part: the law of the state
in which enforcement is sought may, perhaps must, apply its own law to the question of rec-
ognition and enforcement on its territory. Here, however, international agreement has been
remarkably eective in limiting the power of a court called upon to recognize or enforce an
4 e extent, if any, to which this proposition needs to be qualied in the case of agreements to which sovereign
states are party is not considered here.
award to apply the rules taken from its own substantive law. e widespread adoption, in
a very large number of states5— in many of which the enforcement of foreign judgments is
comparatively restrictive— of the 1958 New York Convention6 means that the grounds on
which an award may be refused recognition or enforcement are the subject of international
agreement, and are narrow. A national court has a limited, but necessary, power to admit
contentions which seek to show that the award fell outside the terms of any agreement to
arbitrate, and has an inevitable power to give eect to the public policy of its own law, but
that is, pretty much, all. e result is that a commercial party who foresees that there may be
a dispute which needs resolution, and that a favourable outcome may need to be enforced in
a state which would not freely recognize foreign judgments, will see sense in providing for
arbitration. e commercial reality of this is, no doubt, a signicant part of the reason for
the courts to be so assiduous in giving eect to agreements to arbitrate, and in drawing the
conclusions which appear to follow from that.
By contrast, the private international law of foreign judgments oers nothing which
comes close to the exportability of arbitral awards: nothing remotely compares to the
New York Convention. Even if a national law provides for the recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments, every national law is dierent. Even if the judgment is issued by a
court to whose jurisdiction the parties agreed or submitted, the question whether it may be
enforced in any particular foreign country depends entirely on the law of that foreign state.
e idea that this fractured position might be improved by multilateral treaty on a scale
comparable to the New York Convention is not wholly fanciful,7 but is very remote.
B THE LAW
ere are many points at which the law of arbitration rubs against the rules of private inter-
national law as this is applied by the courts. e issues with which we are concerned may be
divided up or broken down as follows:
(1) e general structure of the Arbitration Act 1996
(2) e validity and scope of agreements to arbitrate
(3) Enforcing the agreement to arbitrate: proceedings brought before the English court
(4) Enforcing the agreement to arbitrate: proceedings brought before foreign court
(5) e law which is applied by the tribunal to deal with the substance of the dispute
(6) e arbitral proceedings and the auxiliary participation of courts
(7) Enforcing arbitral awards in England: general
(8) Enforcing foreign arbitral awards
(9) Foreign judgments concerning arbitration and arbitral awards
(10) International Commercial Mediation
5 170- odd states are party to the Convention at the date of writing, and counting. e Convention has not been
adopted by Chad, Congo- Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea- Bissau, Kosovo, North Korea, Somalia,
Taiwan (because China will not allow it to), Timor- Leste, Vanuatu, and Yemen.
6 UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, New York, 10 June 1958.
7 Hague Conventions on Choice of Court Agreements (2005) and on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments (2019), while better than nothing, do not come close.
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