Are Excessive Prices Really Self-correcting?

DOI10.1093/joclec/nhn033
Date21 October 2008
Pages249-268
Year2008
Published ByOxford University Press
ARE EXCESSIVE PRICES REALLY
SELF-CORRECTING?
Ariel Ezrachi& David Gilo
ABSTRACT
Excessive pricing by a dominant firm is considered as one of the most blatant
forms of abuse. Despite this, competition authorities frequently refrain from
intervening against excessive prices. The non-interventionist approach is based,
among others, on the premise that high prices encourage new entr y and
thereby should be feared less. According to this view, in many cases, excessive
prices are likely to be competed away and make intervention redundant. This
paper questions this conventional view and reconsiders whether excessive
prices are indeed self-correcting. It illustrates how, in the majority of cases,
excessive prices will not attract new entry of viable competitors, whether entry
barriers are high or low. Furthermore, it shows how, at times, the prohibition
of excessive prices may encourage, rather than discourage, entry. By doing so,
this paper narrows and focuses the arguments against intervention.
Accordingly, it concludes that if excessive pricing is not to be prohibited, it
should not be because it is thought to be “self-correcting,” but rather for
reasons such as the need to stimulate investment or difficulties of implemen-
tation, which should be assessed on a case by case basis.
JEL: K21; L4
I. INTRODUCTION
In the consumers’ eyes, excessive pricing by a dominant firm is one of the
most noticeable and blatant forms of abuse. In many ways, it is regarded as
a classic economic evil, a clear exploitation that transfers wealth from consu-
mers to powerful undertakings and directly causes the inefficiencies that
competition laws are meant to prevent.
Despite this, competition authorities are frequently reluctant to intervene
against alleged excessive prices. Such a non-interventionist approach is often
based on the premise that the “invisible hand” of the competitive process
Slaughter and May Lecturer in Competition Law, The University of Oxford. E-mail: ariel.
ezrachi@law.ox.ac.uk.

Associate Professor, Buchmann Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University, Israel. E-mail: gilod@
post.tau.ac.il. We wish to thank Yossi Spiegel, Patrick Rey, Yaron Yehezkel, John Vickers,
participants at the 2007 American Law and Economics Association annual meeting, and
participants at the Tel Aviv University Industrial Organization Workshop, for helpful
discussions and comments. Views expressed in the article are the authors’ own.
Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 5(2), 249–268
doi:10.1093/joclec/nhn033
Advance Access publication 21 October 2008
#The Author (2008). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org
will bring about lower prices and better products. Competition law is there-
fore regarded as an ill-suited vehicle for price regulation, a task more suitable
for specific regulators of problematic markets, in which competition does
not “work.”
1
More specifically, one can identify three main grounds that stand at the
heart of this non-interventionist approach. First, it is often argued that the
prohibition of excessive prices might chill down firms’ incentive to innovate
or invest ex ante.
2
Second, practical difficulties in measuring the competitive
price and identifying excessiveness make the prohibition of excessive prices
difficult to implement in practice.
3
Lastly, it is argued that regulation of
excessive pricing is often redundant because excessive prices would be com-
peted away by new entry, invited by the high price.
4
Even more, it is at
1
See,e.g.,Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 294 (2d Cir. 1979)
(“Judicial oversight of pricing policies would place the courts in a role akin to that of a public
regulatory commission.”)
2
See,e.g., M. Motta & A. de Streel, Exploitative and Exclusionary Excessive Prices in EU Law
(available online), p. 15 (2006); ROBERT O’DONOGHUE &JORGE ATILANO PADILLA,THE
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ARTICLE 82 EC (Hart Publishing, 2006), p. 626; Ve r i z o n
Communications, Inc. v. Trinko LLP, 157 L. Ed. 2d 823, 836 (2004).
3
See,e.g., O’DONOGHUE &PADILLA, Id, p. 627.
4
See AREEDA &HOVENKAMP,ANTITRUST LAW (Aspen Publishers, 2nd ed. 2001) at para.
720b: “[W]hile permitting the monopolist to charge its profit-maximizing price encourages
new competition, forcing it to price at a judicially administered ‘competitive’ level would
discourage entry and thus prolong the period of such pricing.” This argumentation is also
adopted by U.S. case law. See,e.g.,Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263,
294 (2nd. Cir., 1979) (“Indeed, although a monopolist may be expected to charge a
somewhat higher price than would prevail in a competitive market, there is probably no better
way for it to guarantee that its dominance will be challenged than by greedily extracting the
highest price it can”); See also RICHARD WHISH,COMPETITION LAW (LexisNexis, 5th ed.
2003) pp. 688–689 (“if nor mal market forces have their way, the fact that a monopolist is
able to earn large profits should inevitably, in the absence of barriers to entry, attract new
entrants to the market. In this case the extraction of monopoly profits will be self-deterring in
the long run and can act as an important economic indicator to potential entrants to enter
the market. If one accepts this view of the way that markets operate, one should accept with
equanimity periods during which a firm earns monopoly profit: the market will in due course
correct itself and intervention by the competition authorities will have the effect of
undesirably distorting this process.”); V
ALENTINE KORAH,ECCOMPETITION LAW AND
PRACTICE (Hart Publishing, 6th ed. 1997) p. 113 (“The cost price approach ignores the
function of pricing as a signal encouraging new entrants. If prices and profits are high, new
firms may be attracted into the market over, at least, modest entry barriers.”); ROBERT
O’DONOGHUE &JORGE ATILANO PADILLA,THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ARTICLE 82 EC
(Hart Publishing, 2006) pp. 635– 636 (“The key consideration is to limit intervention to
cases in which entry barriers are very high and, therefore, where there is a reasonable prospect
that consumers could be exploited. The need for a strict enforcement policy is less obvious in
circumstances where the market is contestable, since high prices would ordinarily attract new
entrants that would compete away the excessive margins.”); M. Motta & A. de Streel,
Exploitative and Exclusionary Excessive Prices in EU Law (available online), p. 15 (2006)
(“exploitative practices are self-correcting because excessive prices will attract newentrants.”);
Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy, An Economic Approachto Ar ticle 82, Report
for the DG Competition, p.11 (July 2005) (“...Such a policy intervention [against
250 Journal of Competition Law & Economics

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