Are Restrictions of Competition by Sports Associations Horizontal or Vertical in Nature?

DOI10.1093/joclec/nhv010
Date16 April 2015
Pages409-429
Year2015
Published ByOxford University Press
ARE RESTRICTIONS OF COMPETITION
BY SPORTS ASSOCIATIONS HORIZONTAL
OR VERTICAL IN NATURE?
Oliver Budzinski& Stefan Szymanski
†
ABSTRACT
In this article, we discuss, from an economic perspective, two alternative views of
restrictions of competition by sports associations. The horizontal approach views
such restrictions as an agreement among the participants of a sports league with
the sports association merely representing an organizationexecuting the horizon-
tal cooperation. In contrast, the vertical approach views the sports association as
being a dominant upstream firm enjoying a monopoly position on the market
stage for competition organizing services, an important input for the actual
product—the sports game. Taking the recent Financial Fair Play (FFP) initiative
by UEFA (the Union of European Football Associations) as an example, we
demonstrate that the different views lead to different assessments of restrictive
effects and, thus, matter for competition policy decisions. The economic story of
the potential restrictive effect of FFP on players’and player agents’income may
fit more plausibly to the horizontal approach, whereas the potentially anticompe-
titive foreclosure and deterrence effects of FFP may be economically more
soundly reasoned by taking the vertical approach.
JEL: K21; L41; L42; L44; L83
I. INTRODUCTION
Professional team sports organizations in the U.S. operate under economic
restraints that are horizontal in character. For example, Major League Baseball
(MLB) is an American sports league consisting of 30 teams whose owners fix
the rules of the game and agree among themselves a number of restraints, in-
cluding rules that limit economic competition, either by means of revenue
sharing, collective selling or (in the context of collective bargaining with a
players’union) restrictions on the ability to recruit and retain players. The
clubs appoint a Commissioner with extensive powers to regulate the clubs, but
the Commissioner can also be dismissed by a vote of the owners. Under
Professor of Economic Theory, Institute of Economics, Ilmenau University of Technology,
Ehrenbergstr, Germany.Email: oliver.budzinski@tu-ilmenau.de.
†
Professor of Sport Management, School of Kinesiology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,
MI. Email: stefansz@umich.edu. The authors thank Stephen F. Ross and Arne Feddersen for
helpful comments.
Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 11(2), 409–429
doi:10.1093/joclec/nhv010
Advance Access publication 16 April 2015
© The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
competition law, the restraints employed in MLB are clearly horizontal—they
are agreements entered into by the owners of the competing teams.
1
The same
can be said of the other American major league sports as well as of the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).
2
Moreover, the autonomy of the pro-
fessional major league sports is enshrined in statute. The Ted Stevens Amateur
Sports Act of 1998 specifies that the U.S. Olympic Committee can organize
governing bodies for individual sports, but only with jurisdiction over amateur
sports.
3
In Europe, the situation is very different. Sports governing bodies that claim
jurisdiction over both amateur and professional competition have existed at the
national level since the 19th century. These national associations have exten-
sive powers to set the rules of competition at all levels and there is typically a
complex process by which leadership figures are elected. Unlike the American
major leagues, the professional league clubs in Europe do not have complete
discretion to set their own rules (even if they are capable of exerting influence).
It is questionable whether restraints imposed by the official rules of the nation-
al associations should be treated as horizontal in nature—they are not merely
agreements entered into by owners of the teams that have to follow these rules.
They are, at least in part, vertical agreements: they are agreements between
undertakings at different points in the production chain, in a sense that we
will make clear. Due to the nature of the organization of sports, these vertical
agreements typically involve an entity in a dominant position.
If correct, this analysis has important consequences, because hitherto
restraints imposed on sporting competition have predominantly been treated
as horizontal agreements and vertical aspects have usually not been considered
systematically.
4
We will demonstrate in this article that it matters for the com-
petitive assessment of restrictions imposed by sports associations whether the
focus is horizontal or vertical. Our analysis was prompted by the financial regu-
latory constraints known as Financial Fair Play (FFP), which was designed by
UEFA (the European governing body of football) and entered into full force in
the summer of 2014. However, the fundamental point we are making here also
1
See National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85
(1984).
2
The majors consist of the National Football League (NFL), The National Basketball
Association (NBA), the National Hockey League (NHL), Major League Baseball (MLB), and
Major League Soccer (MLS). In practice, most restraintsin the major leagues are not subject to
antitrust scrutiny because they are embedded on a collective bargaining agreement.
3
36 U.S.C. § 220501 et seq.
4
Nonetheless, there are some notable exceptions to this rule in sports associations outside of
European football. For example, the antitrust case against the Fédération International
d’Automobiles (FIA) involved some vertical considerationseven though the case predominantly
focused on horizontal issues (deterrence in the market of promoters of motor racingseries). For
a recent discussion on this case, see Oliver Budzinski, The Institutional Framework for Doing
Sports Business: Principles of EU Competition Policy in Sports Markets,11I
NT’LJ. SPORT MGMT.&
MARKETING 44, 55–58 (2012).
410 Journal of Competition Law & Economics

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