Are stronger states more humane? A re-evaluation of ‘exemplary villains’

AuthorSeung Hoon Chae
DOI10.1177/0022343320913907
Published date01 July 2021
Date01 July 2021
Are stronger states more humane?
A re-evaluation of ‘exemplary villains’
Seung Hoon Chae
Humanities Division, Korea Military Academy
Abstract
In general, the human rights scholarship finds stronger states to be more humane. In particular, Englehart’s recent
book and article assert that ‘petty despots’, rather than ‘exemplary villains’, are the real culprits behind the abuse of
human rights. However, some exemplary villains are truly exemplary; providing them with greater powers will only
intensify human rights abuses. Indeed, the idea that even dictatorships would better protect rights when stronger
contradicts some of the most well-known cases of mass-murder that occurred in powerful authoritarian states. In an
attempt to resolve this puzzle, this article argues that, while state capacity does matter, it matters differently for
dictatorships and democracies. In both regimes, there are certain types of human rights violations that, from the
government’s perspective, happen unwittingly. These unauthorized human rights violations are perpetrated by petty
despots trying to benefit from the state’s principal–agent problems. Yet, unlike a democracy, a dictatorship can
authorize the violation of certain types of human rights to accomplish its objectives. Whereas state capacity can
reduce ‘unauthorized’ types of abuses, it would not necessarily diminish such abuses that are ‘authorized’ by the state.
The net effects of state capacity, therefore, will not be as positive for autocracies as they are for democracies. To
validate this argument, this article conducts 18 ordered logistic regressions with a time-series cross-sectional dataset
that encompasses no less than 142 countries from the period of 1981 to 2002. The empirical analysis provides solid
support for the theorized relationship among human rights, state capacity and regime type. As predicted, state
capacity improves human rights in democracies but not necessarily in autocracies.
Keywords
autocracy, democracy, human rights, state capacity
Introduction
In general, the human rights scholarship finds stronger
states to be more humane (Butler, Gluch & Mitchell,
2007; Acemoglu, Ticchi & Vindigni, 2010; Fearon &
Laitin, 2003; Sullivan, 2012; Englehart, 2009; Engle-
hart, 2017). In particular, Englehart’s (2017, 2009)
recent book and article assert that ‘petty despots’ (low-
ranking government agents), rather than ‘exemplary vil-
lains’ (dictators and their close allies), are the real culprits
behind the abuse of rights. However, some exemplary
villains are truly exemplary; providing them with greater
powers will only intensify human rights abuses. Indeed,
the idea that even dictatorships would better protect
rights when stronger contradicts some of the most
well-known cases of mass-murder that occurred in
powerful authoritarian states, which begs the question:
are stronger states invariably more humane?
For democracies, the answer is rather simple: ceteris
paribus, a stronger state would protect rights more effec-
tively than a weaker state, as its policing efforts can pre-
vent state agents from committing unauthorized acts of
abuse. In non-democracies, however, the problem is
more complex. More power to the state could, on one
hand, protect its citizens from any unauthorized abuse
perpetrated by ‘petty despots’; it could, on the other
hand, also increase a state’s ability to purposefully
oppress certain areas of rights by authorizing violations.
Corresponding author:
shchae92@mnd.go.kr
Journal of Peace Research
2021, Vol. 58(4) 702–718
ªThe Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0022343320913907
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As a result of these complications, increased state capac-
ity may not necessarily improve human rights when a
regime is non-democratic. Put differently, the literature’s
apparent discrepancy with common knowledge may
have arisen from the fact that existing studies do not test
for any interactions between state capacity and regime
type. While state capacity does matter, it may matter
differently for dictatorships and democracies.
This article will carefully assess the hypothesis that
state capacity may not yield as positive an effect on
human rights in autocracies as it does in democracies.
To validate this argument, this article will conduct 18
ordered logistic regressions with a time-series cross-
sectional dataset that encompasses no less than 142
countries from the period of 1981 to 2002. The empiri-
cal analysis provides solid support for the theorized rela-
tionship among human rights, state capacity and regime
type. As predicted, state capacity improves human rights
in democracies but not necessarily so in autocracies.
In short, ‘exemplary villains’ deserve another close
look. Depending on the circumstances, empowering dic-
tators may not be the answer, because ‘petty despots’ are
not always the main cause of human rights abuse.
Literature review
Why do states infringe human rights? Initial investiga-
tions into this topic found that a state’s tendency to
violate rights is largely shaped by economic, political,
and legal conditions. In more recent times, however,
scholars started to wonder whether some states are actu-
ally incapable of protecting human rights even if they
intended to. Enforcing human rights standards requires
concentrated law enforcement efforts that are unhin-
dered by information asymmetries; but research finds
that weak states have been simply unable to achieve those
ends without the proper means. This article seeks to take
one step further in this direction, exploring when state
capacity can improve rights and when it cannot. Specif-
ically, it aims to investigate whether state capacity
enhances human rights prospects regardless of regime
type. Although some scholars have already noted the
possibility that the effects of state capacity on human
rights are contingent on the type of regime, empirical
evidence in this area has been far from satisfactory.
Earlier studies of human rights tended to focus on
three structural variables: economic development,
regime type, and human rights legislation. For many
scholars, the economic well-being of a nation was con-
sidered necessary for the pursuit of human rights. McNa-
mara (1966), for instance, argued that poor countries are
more prone to human rights violations, since the viola-
tion of rights is an innately ‘backward’ behaviour. Hun-
tington (1968) suggested that the relationship between
development and human rights is a little more complex
than that. In his view, it was the modernization of states
that put human rights under risk, rather than poverty per
se. Thus, the very poor and the very rich nations are the
least susceptible to violations of rights, whereas those in
the middle – struggling to modernize – are more vulner-
able. In an altogether different approach, some scholars
found the variation to arise from external economic rela-
tionships among countries. For example, Chomsky &
Herman (1979) argued that economic ties between rich
and poor countries may end up creating more violence in
poor nations, as the less well-off seek to formulate con-
ditions receptive to foreign investment.
Another often explored structural element is the polit-
ical conditions of a nation. In particular, regime type was
considered a central variable. In autocracies, the rights of
citizens are often violated in the interests of the author-
itarian leadership (Escriba-Folch, 2013; Davenport,
1999, 2004; Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999). Different types
of non-democracies – military, totalitarian, and author-
itarian – have all been found to be prone to human rights
violations (Mitchell 2004: 15). Democratic govern-
ments, to the contrary, are more accountable to their
citizens; and the costs of violating human rights are
greater than they are in autocracies. Accordingly, scholars
have found democracies to be more protective of human
rights than dictatorships. For instance, Poe & Tate
(1994) and Poe, Tate & Keith (1999) point to a positive,
linear relationship between human rights and democ-
racy, whereas Davenport (1999, 2004, 2007) and
Davenport & Armstrong (2004) find the level of repres-
sion to be significantly lower in democracies than in
autocracies. Englehart’s (2009, 2017) quantitative stud-
ies also find that the Polity IV score has positive, linear
effects on human rights, specifically political and civil
rights.
A few scholars have suggested more complex relation-
ships between regime type and human rights. First, it has
been argued that specific dictatorships benefit from vio-
lating particular types of human rights. As an example,
Escriba-Folch (2013) argues that there exist two different
types of repression – restrictions on civil rights and vio-
lation of physical rights – and that the effectiveness of
each depends on the type of threat a dictatorship faces
(Escriba-Folch, 2013). Secondly, echoing Huntington’s
argument that ‘modernization’, rather than poverty
itself, is the cause of human rights violations, Fein
(1995) finds that more murder occurs ‘in the middle’,
Chae 703

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