Arms Limiting and Force Adjusting Arrangements in the Northern Cap Area

Date01 March 1972
Published date01 March 1972
AuthorJohan Jörgen Holst
DOI10.1177/001083677200700107
Subject MatterArticles
Arms
Limiting
and
Force
Adjusting
Arrangements
in
the
Northern
Cap
Area
JOHAN
JÖRGEN
HOLST
Norwegian
Institute
of
International
Affairs,
Oslo
Holst,
J.
J.
Arms
Limiting
and
Force
Adjusting
Arrangements
in
the
Northern
Cap
Area.
Cooperation
and
Conflict,
VII,
1972,
113-20.
The
author
starts
out
by
delineating
the
existing
system
of
unilateral
arms
control
measures
which
is
observed
by
Norway.
He
distinguishes
between
unilateral
formal
measures
on
the
one
hand
and
semi-formal
measures
on
the
other.
To
the
former
belong
the
policy
on
foreign
bases
and
nuclear
weapons
while
the
latter
include
the
restrictions
applying
to
allied
military
exercises
and
the
presence
of
allied
aircraft
in
Norwegian
air
space
and
naval
vessels
in
Norwegian
territorial
waters.
The
present
era
of
political
reconstruction
in
Europe
may
generate
force
reduction
and
force
ad-
justment
regulations
as
part
of
the
security
infrastructure
of
the
post-cold
war
Europe.
Thus
the
Norwegian
constraints
would
have
to
be
viewed
in
a
novel
context
and
their
possible
multilateralization
considered.
Against
the
background
of
a
delineation
of
the
relationship
of
forces
in
the
Northern
Cap
area
the
author
suggests
various
activity
regulation
measures
aimed
at
depoliticizing
military
force
in
the
area
(restric-
tions
on
manoeuvres,
new
stationing
of
forces,
notification
of
manoeuvres).
The
naval
situation
in the
Norwegian
Sea
illustrates
the
interrelationship
between
the
regional
security
situation
and
the
superpower
balance.
The
outcome
of
SALT
will
affect
the
situation,
but
the
author
also
suggests
various
arrangements
involving
ceilings
on
naval
activity
in
the
Norwegian
Sea.
Johan
Jörgen
Holst,
Norwegian
Institute
of
International
Affairs,
Oslo.
The
purpose
of
this
analysis
is
to
discuss
certain
arms
limitation
and
force
adjusting
measures
in
connection
with
Norwegian
and
European
security
policy.
I
wish
to
base
my
study
on
the
existing
arrange-
ments
and
then
outline
the
contours
of
potential
future
arrangements
and
the
contexts
these
might
be
associated
with.
It
would
seem
appropriate
to
distinguish
between
unilateral
measures
on
the
one
side
and
reciprocal
or
multilateral
ar-
rangements
on
the
other.
It
might
also
be
useful
to
make
a
distinction
between
f ormal
agreements
and
in f ormal
arrange-
ments
I.
UNILATERAL
AND
FORMAL
MEASURES
Since
1949
Norway
has
adopted
a
security
policy
aimed
at
combining
deterrence
and
reassurance
in
her
relations
with
the
So-
viet
Union.
The
allied
cooperation
in
NATO
has
been
the
basis
of
the
deter-
rence.
Unilateral
force
adjusting
measures
have
had
as
their
purpose
reduction
of
the
insecurity
felt
by
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
Scandinavian
countries
as
a
con-
sequence
of
the
Norwegian
security
mea-
sures.
The
Norwegian
base
reservation
was
the
first
and
most
important
of these
arrangements.
The
base
reservation
was
unilateral
in
the
sense
that
it
was
formed
as
a
declaration
from
the
Norwegian
gov-
ernment
and
was
not
part
of
any
binding
agreement
with
other
states.
It
was
formal
in
the
sense
that
it
was
prepared
in
the
form
of
a
note
from
the
Norwegian
gov-
ernment
to
the
Soviet
government.
The
terms
’base
reservation’
and
’base
policy’
are
in
fact
somewhat
misleading
as
the
reservation
is
related
to
the
stationing
of
combat
forces
of
foreign
powers
on
Nor-
wegian
soil.
The
reservation
is
conditional
in
the
sense
that
it
applies
only
’as
long
as
Nor-
way
is
not
attacked
or
subject
to
threats
of
attack’.
The
measures
taken
by
other
nations
which
might
be
considered
to
bring
about
a
change
in
the
Norwegian

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