Auditing as a tool of government accountability? Exploring divergent causal mechanisms through three Honduran cases
| Published date | 01 October 2020 |
| Author | Daniel M. Sabet |
| Date | 01 October 2020 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1002/pad.1895 |
Received: 8 July 2020
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Revised: 4 October 2020
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Accepted: 9 October 2020
DOI: 10.1002/pad.1895
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Auditing as a tool of government accountability? Exploring
divergent causal mechanisms through three Honduran cases
Daniel M. Sabet
Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, District
of Columbia, USA
Correspondence
Daniel M. Sabet, Woodrow Wilson Center,
Washington, DC, USA.
Email: dmsabet@gmail.com
Funding information
Millennium Challenge Corporation, Grant/
Award Number: 95332418F0339
Abstract
Audits of government entities offer a potential tool to hold public officials to ac-
count and to improve the functioning of public administration; however, empirical
studies of audit impacts show mixed results. This is largely due to the diversity of
audit regimes with different goals and accountability mechanisms, which yield
different causal chains. In this study, I compare three distinct audit regimes with
distinct casual mechanisms in Honduras. I find that backward‐looking audits, which
aim to hold officials accountable for past behavior or performance, require effective
horizontal accountability mechanisms to investigate and prosecute cases. Forward‐
looking audits, which aim to hold officials accountable for future behavior or per-
formance, require independent accountability mechanisms, a systematic follow‐up
methodology, public dissemination, and pressure from the media and civil society.
Complementary initiatives that build on audit recommended reforms are found to
strengthen these weaknesses in the causal mechanism linking audits to outcomes.
KEYWORDS
assessment, audit, civil society, Honduras, performance, procurement
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INTRODUCTION
Audits of government entities offer a potential tool to hold public
officials to account and to improve the functioning of public admin-
istration. In the title of their article, Avis, Ferraz, and Finan (2018) ask
if government audits reduce corruption, and they find evidence from
Brazil that suggests the answer is “yes.” Other studies have also found
that audits reduce corruption or have other positive outcomes
(Björkman & Svensson, 2009; Di Tella & Schargrodsky, 2003; Duflo,
Hanna, & Ryan, 2012; Ferraz & Finan, 2008; Olken, 2007; Zamboni &
Litschig, 2013). However, several studies find only mixed results (Van
Loocke & Put, 2011; Wibbels, Huntington, Gall, & Denny, 2018) or
changes that evaporate with time (Banerjee, Duflo, & Glennerster,
2008; Bobonis, Cámara Fuertes, & Schwabe, 2016). Still other
research finds no influence (R. Andrews et al., 2007; Raudla, Taro, Agu,
& Douglas, 2015) and even potential negative impacts (Behn, 2001;
Dubnick, 2005; Gerardino et al., 2017; Lichand & Fernandes, 2019;
Power, 1994,2003). Much of the divergence among these studies can
be explained by the diversity of auditing or monitoring under exami-
nation. These include divergences in the goals, causal chains, and
country contexts. In this article, I argue that the question is not so
much if audits work, but what types of audits and under what condi-
tions do they work. Much like other tools of democratic account-
ability, auditing offers tools that can produce accountability; however,
these are frequently insufficient on their own.
In this study, I examine the experiences and outcomes of three
audit‐style initiatives in Honduras. Honduras presents a challenging
country context for accountability and accountability‐oriented in-
terventions, as it scores poorly on governance, accountability, and
corruption‐related indices (Martini, 2013; Pérez & Zechmeister,
2015; Transparency International, 2019). All three initiatives were
supported by the Millennium Challenge Corporation's Threshold
Program in Honduras, and data for the study were collected by Social
Impact as an independent evaluator contracted by MCC. Foreign
donor support allowed for adequate financial and human resources
to test the proof of concept.
Public Admin Dev. 2020;40:209–219. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pad © 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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