AUTONOMY AND REREGULATION: EXPLAINING DYNAMICS IN THE FLEMISH SOCIAL HOUSING SECTOR
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12181 |
| Published date | 01 December 2015 |
| Date | 01 December 2015 |
doi : 10. 1111/p adm .12181
AUTONOMY AND REREGULATION: EXPLAINING
DYNAMICS IN THE FLEMISH SOCIAL HOUSING
SECTOR
WOUTER VAN DOOREN, JORIS VOETS AND SIEN WINTERS
The autonomy of implementing agencies often seems to trigger reregulationof those agencies. Rereg-
ulation has two dimensions: the layering of different controlmechanisms and the growth of the rules
within those layers. Using a case study of social housing in Belgium, we explain the tendency to
reregulate once autonomy is provided. We attribute the layering of rules to a conict regarding over-
sight between the established legal profession and an ascending management profession. Crozier’s
vicious circle of bureaucratization helps to explain the growth of regulation within layers. The legal
culture of the Rechtsstaat is a catalyst for both professional competition and bureaucratization.
INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, we have seen a tendency to move policy implementation away from
the centre and towards agencies, local authorities, and civil society (Braithwaite 2000). At
the same time, many observers assert that the increased autonomy has been offset by new
forms of arm’s-length regulation of those actors. In the end, real autonomy may be reduced
and a substantial overhead cost may be added to the overall system of public governance
(Pires 2011). An excess of oversight and oversight bodies often defeats the purposes of
giving autonomy, essentially reregulating the system. In practice, this reregulation is not
just a return to the previous state of affairs, but a more complex regulatory architecture
with more layers and more rules (Radaelli and Meuwese 2009). The existence of reregula-
tion is well documented in the regulation literature (see below), but the social mechanisms
that cause deregulation to recoil receive less attention. However, a good understanding of
these mechanisms is vital for successful regulatory reform.
This article explores the social mechanisms behind reregulation, addressingthe research
question: Which mechanisms explain why increased autonomy seems to coincide with a seem-
ingly disproportionate increase in regulation and control? Based on a case study in the Belgian
(Flanders) social housing sector, we dene two plausible mechanisms. The rst is the
professionalization thesis. Autonomy requires a differentkind of oversight. Law and man-
agement professionals compete to address this need. This professional conict over the
oversight jurisdiction leads to a layering of rules. A second mechanism is a cycle of regu-
lation, a self-supporting dynamic in which regulation and control triggers more regulation
and control. This mechanism explains why the volume of rules within the layers grows,
as illustrated prominently in Crozier’s (1971) ‘bureaucratic phenomenon’.
First, we rene our problem statement by reviewing the literatureon reregulation, before
exploring the two social mechanisms that may provide explanations for our case analy-
sis. The methodology is discussed next. We then report our case and conclude with some
implications and limitations of the study.
Wouter Van Dooren is in the Department of Political Science, University of Antwerp, Belgium. Joris Voets is in the
Department of Public Governance, Management and Finance, Ghent University,Belgium. Sien Winters is at HIVA, KU
Leuven, Belgium.
Public Administration Vol.93, No. 4, 2015 (1068–1083)
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
AUTONOMY AND REREGULATION 1069
REREGULATION: AUTONOMY OFFSET BY LAYERING AND REGULATORY
GROWTH
The managerial movement led many countries to reform central bureaucracies. Two lines
of reform stand out (Maggetti and Verhoest 2014; O’Toole and Meier 2015). First, mono-
lithic bureaucracies were dismantled through processes of decentralization, privatization,
and devolution – the main rationale being specialization. Autonomous actors are expected
to focus on fewer tasks and hence to build specic expertise and economies of scale, while
performance contracts should ensure that autonomy is used in line with expectations. Sec-
ond, the politics–administration split was reinforced. Politicians, supported by a small
nexus of policy professionals, should be responsible for dening and evaluating policies.
Implementation, which in this view is a mere matter of routine, should be carried out by
agencies, local authorities, and the private sector.
This combination of autonomy and a focus on results implied a promise of deregula-
tion. The public entrepreneur would nally be liberated from the rules and regulations
that chained his or her hands. Based on clear performance targets, managers would – at
last – be free to manage. Yet several observers now doubt whether this is really happen-
ing, discerning a dynamic of giving and taking autonomy at the same time. Frissen (2004)
described this as the ‘daughters in dorms syndrome’. Parents are proud that their children
go to college and gain some autonomy in their life. Yet, at the same time, they check daily
whether everything is ne.
Reregulation has two dimensions: layering and growth within the layers of regu-
lation. Layering occurs when regulatory practices are attached to existing institutions
without replacing them (Shpaizman 2014, p. 1039). Various bodies of literature report
the emergence of new regulatory layers following the provision of autonomy (Van Den
Bovenkamp et al. 2013; Levi-Faur 2014). A rst discussion can be found in the accountabil-
ity literature (Willems and Van Dooren 2011). The shift from government to governance
undermined traditional mechanisms of accountability and therefore new accountability
mechanisms were implemented. Yet, politicians and decision-makers need to maintain
some governing capacity, which they risk losing when every decision can be subject to
forensic analysis (Flinders 2011). The accumulation of accountability mechanisms then
hampers decision-making (Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996; Koppell 2005). Other authors
see less harm in redundancy of accountability. For instance, Schillemans and Bovens
(2011) argue that redundancy mitigates the information asymmetry between agents and
principals. Moreover, it provides the opportunity to incorporate different values into
accountability processes (Scott 2000; Braithwaite 2008). In this respect, some authors
also indicate a base dynamic that increases accountability, namely self-imposed forms or
‘voluntary accountability’, such as codes of conduct (Koop 2014).
A second discussion occurs in literature concerning regulation inside government
(Hood et al. 1999), essentially arguing that the proclaimed rise of the regulatory state
has led to over-regulation (Hood et al. 1998; Downe and Martin 2007). A key factor is
the growing population of actors with a regulatory role, including inspectorates (Mar-
tin 2010), auditors (Power 2003), issuers of quality certicates (Norreklit 2000), rating
agencies (Kerwer 2005), and integrity bureaus (Pope 2000). The regulatory effects of
central guidance are also documented, adding another layer of regulation and bringing
public advisers and private consultants within the realm of the regulators (Bowerman
2002; Brandsen et al. 2006). Here, the main regulatory force is isomorphism rather than
enforcement. The distribution of ‘best practices’ and central guidelines works as a device
Public Administration Vol.93, No. 4, 2015 (1068–1083)
© 2015 John Wiley& Sons Ltd.
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