B (Children)
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Judge | Lord Justice Wall,Lord Justice Thorpe,Lady Justice Arden |
| Judgment Date | 17 July 2008 |
| Neutral Citation | [2008] EWCA Civ 835 |
| Docket Number | Case No: B4/2008/0706/0854 |
| Date | 17 July 2008 |
Lord Justice Thorpe
Lady Justice Arden and
Lord Justice Wall
Case No: B4/2008/0706/0854
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM
MR RECORDER JONES
SWANSEA COUNTY COURT on 28th FEBRUARY 2008
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand,
London, WC2A 2LL
Stephen Cobb QC and Graham Jones (Solicitor Advocate) (instructed by Messsrs Smith Llewellyn and T. Llewellyn-Jones —Solicitors) for the Appellants
Ruth Henke QC and Matthew Rees (instructed by Local Authority) for the 1 st Respondent
Michael Keehan QC and David Prosser (Solicitor Advocate) (instructed by David Prosser – Solicitors) for the 2 nd Respondent
Hearing date : 12th June 2008
Introduction
This is the second occasion in the recent past in which this court has had to address the question of misconduct by a local authority acting as an adoption agency in proceedings relating to placement orders under the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (the 2002 Act). In the first case, Re F (a child) (placement order) [2008] EWCA Civ 439, [2008] 2 FCR 93 ( Re F)this court was unanimous in its condemnation of the adoption agency's conduct, but the majority was of the view that the local authority was acting within the law, albeit in defiance of good practice. A father's appeal against a circuit judge's refusal to entertain his application for permission to apply for the revocation of a placement order was, accordingly, dismissed and this court sought to set out its views by means of best practice guidance disseminated through the good offices of the President of the Family Division and the British Association for Adoption and Fostering (BAAF).
In the instant case (in which Mr. Stephen Cobb, QC once again appears for an appellant father —albeit that in this case he and the children's mother make common cause, and Mr. Cobb appears for both) it is conceded by the local authority, in a frank and welcome acknowledgement contained in the skeleton argument filed on its behalf by Miss Ruth Henke QC and Mr. Matthew Rees, that the local authority / adoption agency in question committed “a serious error” in the process of making its application for a placement order under section 22 of the 2002 Act in relation to the youngest of the three children with whom we are concerned, and whom I propose to identify only by the initial M.
As I see it, our task in this appeal is to assess whether or not the Recorder dealt properly with the agency's error – the nature and extent of which I shall, of course, identify and discuss in detail later in this judgment. Suffice it for present purposes to say that, speaking for myself, I have been persuaded by Mr. Cobb that the error made by the local authority in its capacity as an adoption agency was not only serious, but also material; and that the Recorder was, in all the circumstances of the case, wrong to proceed to judgment as he did.
It follows from this conclusion that, in conventional, adversarial civil proceedings, the appeal would almost certainly be allowed, and the Recorder's order set aside. Those, indeed, are the orders which Mr. Cobb invites us to make.
This is, however, a child case, and the Recorder was primarily hearing care proceedings under Part IV of the Children Act 1989 (the 1989 Act) in relation to all three children. Furthermore, events have occurred since 28 February 2008, the date on which the Recorder delivered the judgment which is the subject matter of this appeal. In particular, prospective adopters have been identified for M, who has now been matched with them. His immediate introduction to, and placement with, those prospective adopters is strongly supported by his guardian in both the care and placement order proceedings.
Speaking for myself, I would very much like to have been able to dismiss these appeals. I have, however, come to the conclusion that whilst this court can (and should) dismiss the appeals against the care orders, the placement order made by the Recorder under section 21 of the 2002 Act cannot stand, and must be set aside. The consequence, in my judgment, is that the local authority cannot place M for adoption with his prospective adopters. If it wishes to do so, it must take the course which the Recorder should have taken, namely; (1) to remit M's case to the Agency Adoption Panel (AAP) as a matter of urgency; (2) if the AAP recommends adoption for M it must issue a fresh application for a placement order; and (3) there must be a further hearing of that application before the Recorder.
Given the view which I have formed of the case, I would greatly have liked to short-circuit the process, as the local authority and M's guardian both urge us to do. However, I have come to the conclusion that such an outcome would be unprincipled. The burden of this judgment is that Parliament has laid down a careful regime for the making of placement orders in Chapter 3 of the 2002 Act. That regime was not followed in the instant case. Unlike Re F where what the adoption agency / local authority did was lawful, albeit in defiance of good practice, what the adoption agency / local authority has done in the instant case breaches the 2002 Act and the Regulations, and in my judgment it is simply not open to this court to take any other course than to allow the appeal against the placement order in relation to M and to set it aside.
I very much regret the further delay which will result. My understanding of the law, however, is that, pursuant to section 18(1) of the 2002 Act, an adoption agency may only place a child for adoption with parental consent (section 19) or under a placement order. M's parents plainly do not consent to him being placed for adoption, and for the reasons which I will explain in this judgment, the placement order made by the Recorder must be set aside. I accept, therefore, that M will remain in limbo until the matter is resolved. I very much regret that fact. It is, however, in my judgment, the inevitable consequence of the statutory provisions I shall set out.
As in Re F, and having heard full argument, I am very clear that what occurred in this case should not have occurred, and that were it to happen again in a future case, the court at first instance should take a different course from that taken by the Recorder in the instant case. It is thus of the utmost importance that our judgments in this appeal should be widely circulated amongst practitioners both lay and professional working in the field of adoption.
As the contributions to the argument made by both CAFASS Cymru and BAAF (set out at paragraphs 77 to 79 below) demonstrate, this appeal has served to highlight, once again, the supreme importance and sensitivity both of adoption itself as a concept, and of placement order proceedings under the 2002 Act. It has also served to highlight the critical importance of good practice in the legal processes leading to the institution and hearing of such proceedings, and the necessity of ensuring that the integrity of the process is respected. To put the matter in a slightly different way: Parliament, in the 2002 Act and the consequential Regulations has laid down a careful process which has to be followed before placement and adoption orders can be made. That process must be respected and scrupulously implemented. In the instant case, it was not.
Widespread dissemination of this court's analysis of what occurred in this case should be sufficient to prevent repetition. As in Re F, therefore, I unashamedly propose that our judgments should be provided to the President of the Family Division and to BAAF with an invitation to both to ensure proper circulation of the good practice which we set out in paragraphs 81 to 86 below, and which, as I understand it, is supported by all the parties to this appeal. The President has seen this judgment in draft, and has been good enough to say that he endorses the good practice there set out.
Having now heard full argument, I am in no doubt at all that the parents' applications cross the permission threshold. I would unhesitatingly grant permission to appeal. In addition, I would allow the appeal to the limited extent of setting aside the placement order.
One point made by Mr Cobb in oral argument struck me with particular force, and has undoubtedly influenced my decision in this appeal. What, he asked rhetorically, would be the public perception if this court were to condone what was, on the local authority's own case, an admitted and serious breach of the adoption process?
There is, in my judgment, a public perception, which is also identified in the Email from BAAF's legal advisor set out in paragraph 79 below, that local authorities / adoption agencies are target driven, and are seeking adoption orders simply to meet their quotas, without any reference either to the well-being of the children concerned or to the ECHR rights of their parents. For my part, I think that perception is inaccurate, but that it exists I have no doubt. I would therefore like to make it as clear as I can that in my judgment, the local authority did indeed make a serious error in the instant case; and one, moreover, which must not be repeated. Having said that, however, I unhesitatingly acquit the local authority in this case of acting in any way in bad faith – indeed, that was not alleged. Indeed, there is a particular irony in the fact that in Re F this court dismissed the father's appeal, despite the fact that it was unanimous in the serious...
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