Banker as victim: an approach to money laundering prosecutions

Date02 January 2009
Published date02 January 2009
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1108/13685200910922642
Pages50-58
AuthorTerrence F. Williams
Subject MatterAccounting & finance
Banker as victim: an approach
to money laundering
prosecutions
Terrence F. Williams
Office of the DPP, Tortola, British Virgin Islands
Abstract
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to discuss a novel approach to money laundering
prosecutions that focuses on the deception of bankers as opposed to the original provenance of the
funds.
Design/methodology/approach – Considers decided cases and the theoretical bases for “Know
Your Customer” (KYC) and Customer Due Diligence (CDD).
Findings – No examples were found of the approach outside of cases in the British Virgin Islands but
firmly grounded in law.
Practical implications – Provides an alternative basis for money laundering prosecutions.
Originality/value – Prosecutors and investigators may find the approach useful and discussion on
its use in other jurisdictions would be appreciated.
Keywords Money laundering,Banking, Criminal justice
Paper type Viewpoint
A case may present all the telltale signs of money laundering but yet rigorously engage
investigators and prosecutors in pursuit of a vital element: proving the predicate crime.
As launderers misuse bank services, prosecutors and investigators should consider
how deception of officers in these well-regulated sectors to transfer tainted assets
might itself be the offence’s factual foundation rather than the earlier crimes that
initially produced the assets that were held or transferred by the banks. In this
construct, the acts of laundering may constitute the offence without direct evidence of
the original tainted source of the funds.
Corporations remain attractive to launderers who enjoy having multiple juridical
personalities under their largely anonymous control to create a network of artificial
trading as a justification for the wire transfers between the entities. When examined,
the transactions will reveal that the type of trading is inconsistent with the nature of the
previously declared expected business of the company, or significantly greater in
volume, and that the information given to the institutions was difficult to verify. In the
most sophisticated examples, funds from seemingly unconnected bodies are
coincidentally moved – as if by an invisible hand – to meet the specific needs of
the principals in a network that at first, diagrammatically resembles a cobweb but, in
the final picture, mimics a funnel.
The current anti-money laundering regime aims to regulate banks and officers
in the corporate service sector to ensure that they make sure that the use, source
and destination of funds do not involve money laundering[1] thus forcing the
launderer, motivated by his desire to have use of his tainted funds, to mislead
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/1368-5201.htm
JMLC
12,1
50
Journal of Money Laundering Control
Vol. 12 No. 1, 2009
pp. 50-58
qEmerald Group Publishing Limited
1368-5201
DOI 10.1108/13685200910922642

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