Bargaining Structure, Pay Settlements and Perceived Pressures in Manufacturing 1979–84: Further Analysis from the CBI Databank
| Author | Mary Gregory,Peter Lobban,Andrew Thomson |
| Published date | 01 July 1986 |
| Date | 01 July 1986 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.1986.tb00683.x |
British Journal
of
Industrial Relations
24:2
July
1986
0007-1080
$3.00
Bargaining Structure, Pay Settlements
and
Perceived Pressures
in
Manufacturing
1979-84:
Further
Analysis
from
the CBI Databank
Mary Gregory*, Peter Lobban**,
and Andrew Thornson***
The highly complex structure
of
collective bargaining in Britain has generated
interest in two categories of issue: the configurations of bargaining itself and
the impact,
if
any,
of
structure on the process and outcome of bargaining. This
latter question, which has considerable policy implications, has been
examined for Britain utilising the New Earnings Survey by two
of
the authors
(Thomson, Mulvey and Farbman 1977, Gregory and Thomson 1981), and at
an international
level
in
work by authors such as Ulman (1971), who
compared American and European models in terms of efficiency, and
Jackman (1984) who argued that the leapfrogging and parity claims endemic
in a decentralised system of bargaining would be recognised as self-defeating
in a more centralised system. The former issue has recently been more
comprehensively surveyed by the Warwick survey
of
1978 (Brown, 1981) and
especially by the DE/PSI/SSRC Workplace Industrial Relations Survey
of
1980, (Daniel and Millward 1983, ACAS 1983). Deaton (1983) in particular
has developed an analysis
of
the WIRS data which provides a means
of
examining levels
of
decision-making in a way which brings together both pay
and non-pay items. In addition, there has been a grcwth
of
interest in the
structure and nature
of
industrial relations policy-making which bears on this
issue (Marsh, 1982, Purcell and Gray, 1983).
The CBI Databank provides a quite different basis for analysing both the
configurations and the impact
of
bargaining, at least within manufacturing,
and the main purpose
of
this article, which should be read as complementary
to its predecessor in an earlier issue (Gregory, Lobban and Thomson 1985),
is
to
extend the discussion of pay settlements given there to the structure
of
bargaining and its relationship to the settlement outcome. The Databank,
which was described fully in the previous article, consists
of
a series
of
*
St.
Hilda’s College, Oxford.
**
Head
of
Employee Relations, Shell UK, formerly Deputy Director Employment Affairs,
***
Department
of
Management Studies, Glasgow University.
Confederation
of
British Industry.
216
British Journal
of
Industrial Relations
annual surveys
of
pay settlements and the pressures perceived as influencing
these. In addition, in 1979180 a complementary ‘structures’ survey was
carried out, at much the same time as the Workplace Industrial Relations
Survey, to establish the collective bargaining context
of
the pay settlement
(Moynagh and Moulding, 1982). The Databank survey
is
less comprehen-
sive than
WIRS
or
the Warwick survey in its coverage
of
the nature
of
procedures and practices in the conduct
of
industrial relations, but
comprises a larger number of establishments and settlement groups in
manufacturing than either of them. More importantly, the linking
of
the
collective bargaining context with consecutive settlement outcomes through
time and with perceptions of pressures is a feature unique to the Databank.
A further interesting feature is that although we have used the term
bargaining structure, in fact in a considerable number of instances there is
no
pay bargaining as such but rather an award by management, giving the
opportunity
for
comparisons between bargaining and non-bargaining
situations. In view
of
this, the article uses the term ‘settlement group’ rather
than the conventional ‘bargaining group’. But although the management
award relates to situations where there is no bargaining, it would not be
correct on this account to suppose that there is complete management
discretion; there is likely to be some degree
of
sensitivity to employee
reactions as well as market factors.
The first part
of
the article examines the structure
of
industrial relations
decision-making in manufacturing as revealed through the Databank.
Defining the structural context
of
the settlement group requires a classifica-
tion system which identifies the level
or
location at which the settlement is
reached; not only can bargaining take place at more than one level on any
single issue, but for the individual group these levels can vary substantially
across issues. The second part takes up the linkage between structure and
the settlement outcome, seeking to identify how much and in what ways,
structure appears to influence the settlement outcome. Finally, we conclude
by examining the implications
of
our findings
for
the present debate on wage
determination.
THE DATABANK SURVEY
OF
BARGAINING STRUCTURE
The Databank sample is designed as a survey
of
establishments and the
majority
of
replies to the questionnaire on bargaining structure were
received in 1979-80. 1319 establishments responded
of
which 70 per cent
gave an affirmative reply to the question ‘are any
of
you employees covered
by a collective agreement with trade union(s) negotiated either within your
establishment
or
elsewhere?’, and
30
per cent gave a negative reply. Since
respondents were then directed to different parts of the questionnaire on the
basis
of
their reply to this question this division between establishments with
bargaining and those with no bargaining is
of
central importance through-
out.
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