Basic Income and the Social Investment State: Towards Mutual Reinforcement?
| Published date | 01 March 2022 |
| DOI | 10.1177/13882627221085019 |
| Author | Luke Martinelli,Yannick Vanderborght |
| Date | 01 March 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Basic Income and the Social
Investment State: Towards
Mutual Reinforcement?
Luke Martinelli
University of Bath, Bath, UK
Yannick Vanderborght
Université Saint-Louis –Bruxelles & UCLouvain, Brussels & Louvain-la-Neuve,
Belgium
Abstract
Is a social investment strategy compatible with the provision of an unconditional basic income?
Prima facie, these two scenarios look like incongruent policy alternatives. While social investment
–an influential policy paradigm at the level of the European Union –aims at promoting public ser-
vices and maximum labour market participation, basic income is paid in cash and has sometimes
been presented as the key component of a post-work future. In this article, we explore this appar-
ent incongruence and show that these two visions for welfare reform are not necessarily incom-
patible. We argue that they may share a number of substantial points of agreement, and indeed
may reinforce one another according to a logic of institutional complementarity. In particular,
we claim that a partial basic income (i.e., a modest unconditional income guarantee, whose
amount would be insufficient if one lives alone) could enhance or complement the key functions
of a social-democratic version of the social investment strategy. By doing so, we conclude that the
integration of a basic income into a social investment package could contribute to overcoming cri-
ticisms of the social investment agenda. At the same time, it could rescue basic income from the
numerous critics who see it as an unrealistic policy proposal.
1. Introduction
In academic as well as in political circles, two alternative scenarios for the future of social protection
have gained increasing visibility in the last decade or so. On the one hand, proponents of a “social
investment”(SI) strategy argue that the emergence of “new social risks”–due to the shift towards a
knowledge-based economy and societal shifts, such as population ageing, a rise in female
Corresponding author:
Yannick Vanderborght, Université Saint-Louis –Bruxelles & UCLouvain, Brussels & Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.
E-mail: yannick.vanderborght@usaintlouis.be
Article
European Journal of Social Security
2022, Vol. 24(1) 40–57
© The Author(s) 2022
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/13882627221085019
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employment, a decline in fertility rates, growing family instability, and the emergence of a crisis of
care –requires a new policy mix that involves the expansion of “capacitating”services, investment
in human capital, support for life-course transitions, and the empowerment of individuals to partici-
pate fruitfully in the labour market (Hemerijck, 2017; Morel et al., 2012a, 2012b). On the other
hand, proponents of a “basic income”(BI) insist on the importance of preserving and enhancing
individuals’“real freedom”, even when they choose to stay outside the la bourmarket, by providing
an income floor to all regardless of prior contribution and absent behavioural conditions (Van
Parijs, 1995; Van Paris and Vanderborght, 2017).
SI has had significant influence over policy development, especially in the context of the
European Union (EU). It can be considered a welfare policy paradigm in terms of infusing policy-
makers’worldviews with a set of rules about what works and what does not (Hemerijck, 2015,
2017, 2018). Crucially, it is not prescriptive of a specific set of policies per se, and has the attributes
of a container concept.Similarly, although BI has clear definitional attributes, it comes in several
versions, coheres with a number of contrasting ideological perspectives, and may be integrated into
existing welfare systems in a variety of ways. Thus, both SI and BI are nebulous concepts in terms
of their implications for the welfare state. BI has been growing in popularity for a number of years
and now attracts serious attention as a solution to labour market dualization, automation, and the
impact of the COVID-19 crisis (Nettle et al., 2021). However, it has had relatively little influence
over policy development, with investment of political capital limited to commitments to experimen-
tal trials.
Until now, discourses around SI and BI have proceeded largely in isolation from one another;
and, when the ideas do collide - however briefly - this frequently results in distrust and scepticism.
From the perspective of BI scholarship, SI is rarely mentioned; for example, it is not discussed at all
in Standing (2017, 2020), Van Parijs and Vanderborght (2017), Torry (2018), or Haagh (2019). For
their part, the most influential proponents of the SI paradigm are rather scathing about BI (e.g.,
Palier, 2016, 2017, 2019).
Prima facie, their contrasting features create an impression that the two scenarios are highly
incongruent policy alternatives. The main aims of this article are to explore this apparent incongru-
ence between BI and SI and to ask: can a version of BI be fruitfully integrated into a broader SI
strategy? We advance the argument that BI and SI are not fundamentally incompatible. Indeed,
they may share a number of substantial points of agreement and may even reinforce one another
in certain respects according to a logic of institutional complementarity. In a nutshell, we argue
that implicit claims that the BI and SI agendas are necessarily oppositional rely on certain ways
of understanding each scenario –even though other understandings are equally valid –and over-
look their overlapping and mutually reinforcing principles, goals, and policy logics.
The article is structured as follows. In Section 2, we briefly outline the historical context and key
conceptual features of the SI paradigm. We employ Hemerijck’s (2015) framework –distinguishing
between “buffer”,“stock”, and “flow”functions and acknowledging the crucial notions of institu-
tional complementarities and cumulative life-course synergies –which we find to be both parsimo-
nious and sufficiently faithful to the intentions of most SI scholars. We also clarify the mid- to
long-term objectives of the SI agenda. In Section 3, we then outline the prima facie view that BI
and SI are incompatible and highlight the positions of advocates that support this view. Next, in
Section 4, we claim that this seeming incompatibility between BI and SI is in fact partly assisted
by a mischaracterisation of BI as implying a neo-liberal assault on existing welfare provisions.
We stress the importance of considering a more attractive and realistic BI scenario, which takes
the form of a “partial”cash guarantee. In Section 5, we go further than suggesting that the two
Martinelli and Vanderborght 41
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