Beech Hill Capital Ltd v Lucas Duplan (also known as Lucas Andrew Duplancic)

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
CourtCommercial Court
JudgeSharif Shivji
Judgment Date10 June 2026
Neutral Citation[2026] EWHC 1390 (Comm)
Year2026
Docket NumberCase No: LM-2025-000011
Between:
Beech Hill Capital Limited
Claimant
and
(1) Lucas Duplan (also known as Lucas Andrew Duplancic)
(2) Sea Marine Holding LLC
(3) Sea Marine Holding Ltd
Defendant
Before:

Sharif Shivji KC

(sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge)

Case No: LM-2025-000011

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES

LONDON CIRCUIT COMMERCIAL COURT (KBD)

Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building

Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL

Thomas Steward (instructed by Wikborg Rein LLP) for the Claimant

Sean Middleton (instructed by Joseph Chiffers Barrister At Law Limited t/as JSC Chambers) for the Defendant

Hearing dates: 5 March 2026

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 11.30am on 10 June 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

Sharif Shivji KC

Sharif Shivji KC:

Introduction

1

The present proceedings concern a dispute in relation to certain financing agreements entered between the Claimant and the Second Defendant (as borrower) with the First Defendant alleged to be a personal guarantor. The Claimant also brings a claim for damages / specific performance against the Third Defendant and a claim for conspiracy against all three Defendants.

2

The First Defendant is, according to his Affidavit dated 29 January 2025, the director of the Second and Third Defendants.

3

The following matters came before the court at the present hearing:

i) The Defendants' application of 30 October 2025 seeking (a) permission to amend the Defence; (b) strike out / summary judgment; (c) a declaration that the court lacks jurisdiction and that there is no cause of action against the Third Defendant; (d) variation of the order of HHJ Pelling KC dated 22 January 2025; and (e) a stay of the proceedings.

ii) The Claimant's application dated 13 November 2025 seeking an order debarring the Defendants from advancing applications before the court until they have rectified their breaches of previous court orders.

4

At the start of the hearing, there was a disagreement over whether the Claimant's application had been properly listed by the court for the hearing before me. I understand that the application had been listed for hearing on 23 January 2026 and the parties had filed skeleton arguments for that hearing but that the hearing was removed from the list shortly before the hearing because of the lack of availability of a Judge.

5

The parties differed over whether it was understood that the Claimant's application would come before the court at this hearing. Whilst the Defendants initially took the position that the application should be resolved at a separate hearing, the Defendants had addressed the Claimant's application in their skeleton argument and ultimately accepted that they were prepared to deal with the application at the hearing.

6

The parties also disagreed over which application should come first. The Claimant argued that its application was logically prior to the Defendants' application because it was intended to prevent the Defendants proceeding with applications until previous court orders have been complied with. The Defendants did not press the argument that their applications should be heard first and accepted that it was open to me to direct that the Claimant's application was heard first. That is what I ultimately directed.

7

The Claimant's application is based on the Defendants' failure to comply with the following orders of the court:

i) An order dated 22 January 2025 for costs against the Defendants in the amount of £74,579 made by HHJ Pelling KC;

ii) An order of David Quest KC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) dated 18 June 2025 for payment by the Second Defendant of £2,200,000 plus interest and costs of £65,000.

iii) An order for costs dated 17 November 2025 against the Defendants in the amount of £4,167 made by Rosalind Phelps KC (sitting as a Judge of the High Court).

8

It is common ground that these orders have not been paid in whole or in part. Mr Middleton, for the Defendants, did attempt to argue at one point during the hearing that it was unclear whether the Defendants were in breach of the orders because the costs orders did not specify a date for payment. His attention was drawn to CPR r.44.7, as a result of which it is not necessary for a costs order to specify a date for payment in the body of the order. He accepted this point and that, accordingly, the Defendants, having not made any payment in respect of the above orders, are in breach of them.

9

The Claimant's application dated 13 November 2025 was framed in the following terms in Part A of the Application Notice:

“ The Claimants (sic) seek an order preventing the Defendants from pursuing any applications unless and until they have purged their ongoing contempt. The Claimant relies on the authority of Hadkinson v. Hadkinson [1952] P. 285 at 298, and subsequent case law clarifying the Court's jurisdiction in this regard. The Claimant also seeks an extension of time for responding to the Defendants' application dated 30 October 2025”.

“ … because: The Defendants remain in continuing contempt of Court by failing to comply with existing Court orders and it would be unjust for the Claimant to be required to incur further costs in responding to applications from the Defendants while the Defendants remain in contempt”.

10

Although the application itself referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Hadkinson and “ subsequent case law”, in the Claimant's Skeleton Argument dated 22 January 2026, it explained that there was a “ related, but separate, line of authorities addressing the principles applicable when a party fails to pay a prior interim costs order”. The cases cited pursuant to this line of authority included Crystal Decisions (UK) Ltd v. Vedatech Corp [2006] EWHC 3500 (Ch); Michael Wilson and Partners Ltd v. Sinclair and others [2017] EWHC 2424 (Comm) (“ Michael Wilson v Sinclair”); Aramco Trading Fujairah FZE v Gulf Petrochem FZC [2021] EWHC 2650 (Comm).

11

There was some debate at the hearing before me as to (a) the source of the court's jurisdiction to make orders of the nature sought and (b) the extent to which there were two different lines of authority or whether these cases were all manifestations of the exercise of the same jurisdiction.

An order under Hadkinson v Hadkinson [1952] P. 285

12

In the family courts, these types of order appear to be referred to simply as a “ Hadkinson order”. Although in general terms, the Hadkinson line of authorities and the Michael Wilson v Sinclair line of cases are illustrations of the court's power to impose conditions or sanctions in the event that a party fails to comply with the court's prior orders, in my view they ought to be viewed distinctly.

13

This is apparent from both the principles applicable as to when an order should be made (which are considered below) and also from the derivation of each line of authority. The exercise of the power in Michael Wilson v Sinclair derives from the court's case management powers, including its powers under the CPR. In contrast, the Hadkinson jurisdiction is of much greater antiquity, being originally a rule of the canon law, which was adopted by the ecclesiastical courts and the Chancery court; see Denning LJ in Hadkinson at p295.

14

In L v O (Stay of order; Hadkinson order; Security for costs) [2024] EWFC 6, Cobb J (as he then was) provided a brief summary of the Hadkinson jurisdiction explaining that “ the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against or in respect of whom an order is made by a court of competent jurisdiction, to obey it, unless and until that order is discharged” and that “ [w]here a party has not obeyed an order, then they may face a restriction on their access to the court…” [21].

15

The courts have described a Hadkinson order as “ draconian”, see L v O at [21], C v C (Appeal: Hadkinson Order) [2010] EWHC 1656 (Fam), [2011] 1 FLR 434, and Assoun v Assoun (No 1) [2017] EWCA Civ 21, [2017] 2 FLR 1137 at [3]. In C v C, Eleanor King J (as she then was) said that the jurisdiction should be exercised “ judicially, sparingly and proportionately”. In both Assoun and L v O, it was said that it was an order of “ last resort”.

16

In terms of when the jurisdiction should be exercised, in L v O, Cobb J said at [22] that:

“It seems reasonably clear that a Hadkinson order will only be made if the following conditions are satisfied:

i) The respondent is in contempt;

ii) The contempt is deliberate and continuing;

iii) As a result, there is an impediment to the course of justice;

iv) There is no other realistic and effective remedy;

v) The order is proportionate to the problem and goes no further than necessary to remedy it.

See Peter Jackson LJ in De Gafforj v De Gafforj [2018] EWCA Civ 2070, at [11]”

17

Although the jurisdiction was once thought to be a rule, with certain defined exceptions, that a person in contempt would not be heard, in Hadkinson itself, Denning LJ said at p298:

“It is a strong thing for a court to refuse to hear a party to a cause and it is only to be justified by grave considerations of public policy. It is a step which a court will only take when the contempt itself impedes the course of justice and there is no other effective means of securing his compliance … I am of [the] opinion that the fact that a party to a cause has disobeyed an order of the court is not of itself a bar to his being heard, but if his disobedience is such that, so long as it continues, it impedes the course of justice in the cause, by making it more difficult for the court to ascertain the truth or to enforce the orders which it may make, then the court may in its discretion refuse to hear him until the impediment is removed or good reason is shown why it should not be removed.”

18

This more flexible approach was recognised by the House of...

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1 cases
  • H M Luqman Al Hakim Ang and another v Wonderz Pty Ltd and others
    • Singapore
    • District Court (Singapore)
    • 9 September 2026
    ...were also directed by this court to consider the English High Court authority of Beech Hill Capital Limited v Lucas Duplan & Ors [2026] EWHC 1390 (Comm) (“Beech Hill”), which directly dealt with the situation where a defendant (as opposed to an appellant on appeal) had failed to pay outstan......