Behind the technocratic challenge: Old and new alternatives to party government in Italy

Published date01 January 2025
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/01925121231216438
AuthorAntonino Castaldo,Luca Verzichelli
Date01 January 2025
https://doi.org/10.1177/01925121231216438
International Political Science Review
2025, Vol. 46(1) 74 –90
© The Author(s) 2023
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DOI: 10.1177/01925121231216438
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Behind the technocratic challenge:
Old and new alternatives to party
government in Italy
Antonino Castaldo
Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal
Luca Verzichelli
Department of Social, Political and Cognitive Sciences, University of Siena, Italy
Abstract
The growing presence of technocrats in contemporary governments has emerged as a relevant phenomenon
worldwide. Italy, once known as a paradigmatic case of party government and now identified as the promised
land of technocracy, constitutes a crucial case to test the major short-term (critical junctures) and long-term
(complexity of policy-making; party decline) factors identified to explain this phenomenon. Our analysis
is based on two innovative tools: a new dataset updated to the current back-to-politics Meloni Italian
government, including all the cases of the ‘technocratic decade’ (2010s); and a new typology combining
partisanship and expertise, which allows us to overcome dichotomous categorizations equating technocrats
and non-partisans. This more accurate and updated picture of minister profiles in Italy unveils unexpected
dynamics and allows us to reassess both previous findings on the Italian case and the explanatory power of
the tested theories on the growing diffusion of technocrats in contemporary governments.
Keywords
Italy, technocracy, party government, critical junctures, party decline
Introduction
The growing relevance of technocratic ministers and the corresponding reduction in the partyness
of governments have recently emerged as a broad tendency in several regional settings, identifying
technocracy as a form of ruling alternative to the party government model. As Table 1 shows, the
technocratic challenge is particularly relevant in Italy, where the proportion of technocrats has
Corresponding author:
Antonino Castaldo, Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa, Av. Professor Aníbal de Bettencourt 9,
Lisboa, 1600-189, Portugal.
Email: antonino.castaldo@gmail.com
1216438IPS0010.1177/01925121231216438International Political Science ReviewCastaldo and Verzichelli
research-article2023
Original Research Article
Castaldo and Verzichelli 75
increased exponentially, making it possible to label the 2010s as the ‘technocratic decade’, in Italy
more than in any other European democracy. Hence, selecting as a case study a country that was a
paradigmatic example of party government and now represents the promised land of technocracy
allows us to contribute in several relevant ways to the consolidating literature on the diffusion and
growing relevance of technocrats in contemporary governments.
In this article we raise two research questions. First (RQ 1), what are the patterns of technocrats’
recruitment in Italy during the last two decades? Here, a fresh dataset and a new typology allow us
to provide a more accurate picture of Italian minister profiles in general, and technocrats in particu-
lar. Second (RQ 2), what explains the recruitment of technocratic ministers in Italy during the last
two decades? Here, technocrats represent the dependent variable: two groups of non-alternative
explanations of the increasing selection of technocrats (short-term factors – that is, critical junc-
tures; and long-term non-conjunctural factors – that is, party decline, policy-making complexity)
will be tested on the Italian case and reassessed according to our findings.
To deal with our RQs we rely on two innovative tools. First, a new dataset about the 12 Italian
governments established since 2001 (252 ministers), which represents a crucial update since it cov-
ers the entire technocratic decade, unlike previous datasets. A new typology of ministers profiles
integrating both partisanship and expertise dimensions represents our second critical tool, since it
Table 1. Governments and technocratic ministers in Italy since 1992.
Government Begin–end Parliamentary
majority
N
portfolios
Cabinet
ministers (N)a
Technocratic
ministersb
Amato I 1992–1993 Centrist 21 25 1 (4%)
Ciampi (tech) 1993–1994 Centrist 20 29 11 (37.9%)
Berlusconi I 1994–1995 CR 20 26 2 (7.7%)
Dini (tech) 1995–1996 Oversized coalition 20 19 19 (100%)
Prodi 1996–1998 CL 20 20 2 (10%)
D’Alema I 1998–1999 CL 20 25 1 (4%)
D’Alema II 1999–2000 CL 20 25 0 (0%)
Amato II 2000–2001 CL 20 24 2 (8.3%)
Berlusconi II 2001–2005 CR 15 23 4 (17.4%)
Berlusconi III 2005–2006 CR 15 24 2 (8.3%)
Prodi II 2006–2008 CL 18 25 3 (12%)
Berlusconi IV 2008–2011 CR 12 21 0 (0%)
Monti (tech) 2011–2013 Oversized coal. 13 18 16 (88.9%)
Letta 2013–2014 CL+CRe14 21 4 (19%)
Renzi 2014–2016 CL+Centre 14 16 3 (18.8%)
Gentiloni 2016–2018 CL+Centre 14 18 2 (11.1%)
Conte I 2018–2019 Hybrid coalitionc14 18 6 (33.3%)
Conte II 2019–2021 Hybrid coalitiond14 21 5 (23.8%)
Draghi (tech) 2021–2022 Oversized coalition 14 23 7 (30.4%)
Meloni 2022– CR 15 24 6 (25%)
Source: from Berlusconi II to Meloni governments, authors’ own dataset; from Amato I to Amato II governments, Selec-
tion and De-selection of Political Elites (SeDePE) dataset.
aMembers of the cabinet at the beginning of the mandate. Prime ministers are excluded.
bThe percentage is calculated from the number of cabinet ministers appointed.
cThe hybrid coalition supporting the Conte I government was formed by the Five Star Movement (5SM) and the League.
dThe hybrid coalition supporting the Conte II government was formed by 5SM and the Democratic Party.
eCL stands for Centre-Left; CR stands for Centre-Right.

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