Between a ‘flexible’ and ‘rigid’ interpretation of the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination under article 21(3) of the constitution of Uganda: Uganda Law Society and 12 others v Attorney General [2024] UGCC 2 (13 February 2024)
Published date | 01 June 2024 |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/13582291241245394 |
Author | Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi |
Date | 01 June 2024 |
Cases, Legislation and Policy Development
International Journal of
Discrimination and the Law
2024, Vol. 24(1-2) 33–47
© The Author(s) 2024
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DOI: 10.1177/13582291241245394
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Between a ‘flexible’and ‘rigid’
interpretation of the list of
prohibited grounds of
discrimination under article
21(3) of the constitution of
Uganda: Uganda Law Society and
12 others v Attorney General
[2024] UGCC 2 (13 February
2024)
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi
Abstract
Article 21 of the Constitution of Uganda (1995) provides for the right to freedom from
discrimination. Article 21(3) provides that for the purposes of Article 21, discrimination
‘means to give different treatment to different persons attributable only or mainly to their
respective descriptions by sex, race, colour, ethnic origin, tribe, birth, creed or religion,
or social or economic standing, political opinion or disability.’Article 45 of the Con-
stitution provides that ‘[t]he rights, duties, declarations and guarantees relating to the
fundamental and other human rights and freedoms specifically mentioned in this Chapter
shall not be regarded as excluding others not specifically mentioned.’In Uganda Law
Society and 12 others v Attorney General (13 February 2024), the Constitutional Court
invoked Article 45 and held that the list of prohibited grounds under Article 21(3) is not
exhaustive. In this article, the author relies on the drafting history of Article 21(3), the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court on Article 21(3) and the literal interpretation of
Article 21(3) to argue that the list of prohibited grounds in Article 21(3) is exhaustive and
that the Constitutional Court erred when it held to the contrary. The author argues
Department of Law, University of the Western Cape Faculty of Law, Bellville, South Africa
Corresponding author:
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi, Department of Criminal Justice and Procedure, Faculty of Law, University of the
Western Cape, Private Bax X17, Bellville 7535, South Africa.
Email: djmujuzi@gmail.com
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