Beyond Primacy
| DOI | 10.1177/002070200305800204 |
| Author | Inor Sloan |
| Published date | 01 June 2003 |
| Date | 01 June 2003 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
INOR
SLOAN
Beyond
primacy
rican
grand
strategy
in
the
post-September
1]
era
IN
SEPTEMBER
2002,
THE
ADMINISTRATION
of
George
W.
Bush
released
its
National
Security
Strategy for
the
United
States.
Academics,
policy-makers,
and
members
of
the
media
around
the
world immediately
seized
upon
the
document's
notable
move
away
from
the
cold war
strategies
of
deterrence
and
containment
and
towards
the
option
of
conducting
pre-emptive
military operations
against
emerging threats.
While
this
is
indeed
a
momentous
change,
it
has
overshadowed
an
even
more
significant
development.
With
its
new strategy
document
the
United
States
indicated
its
decision to
go
beyond
its
traditional
grand
strategy
of
primacy,
which
it
had
been
pursuing
consistently
since
the
end
of
World
War
II,
to
create
a
'balance
of
power in
favor
of
freedom.'
This
new
strategy
captures
a
potentially
seismic
shift
in
emphasis
that
holds the
possibility
of
transforming
the
nature
of
great
power relations
and, with
it,
the
global
security
landscape.
CHOOSE
YOUR
GRAND
STRATEGY
A
grand
strategy
is
a
state's
theory
about
how,
in
an
anarchic
interna-
tional
security
environment,
it
can
most
assuredly
'cause'
security
for
itself.'
In
choosing
a
grand
strategy,
a
state
will
define
its
interests and
objectives,
identify
threats
to
its
interests
and
objectives,
and
decide
in
response
on
the
most
appropriate
political,
military, and
economic
Elinor
Sloan
is
Assistant
Professor
oflnternational
Security
Studies
in
the
Department
of
Political
Science,
Carleton
Universit)i
Ottawa.
i
Barry
R.
Posen,
The
Sources
of
Military
Doctrine
(Ithaca
NY:
Cornell
University
Press 1984),
13.
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL Spring
2003
Elinor
Sloan
strategies
to
protect
those
interests.
2
These
activities
collectively
make
up
the
state's
grand
strategy.
The
choices
of
policy-makers
will
depend
in
part
on
their
view
of
how
the
world
works.
In
the
United
States,
there
are
essentially
two
perspectives.
First,
a
balance-of-power
system
according to
which
America,
although
by
far
the
most
powerful
state in
the
world,
is
still
considered
one
nation
among
many
and
must
therefore adhere
to
the
historical
ground
rules
of
equilibrium.
Second,
a
unipolar
world
in
which
one
state
enjoys
hegemony.
This
is
the
world
of
empire.
Within
these
worlds
there
are
a
number
of
possible
grand strategy
choices:'
Isolationism
is
grounded
in
the
balance
of
power
perspective.
It
holds
that
in
most
cases
power
will
balance
naturally and
a
state
should
become
involved
only
insofar
as
events
directly
threaten
its
territory.
Security
is
achieved
by
avoiding
'entangling
alliances.'
Offihore
balancingis
grounded
in
a
balance-of-power
perspective.
The
primary
objective
is
to preserve
peace
among
the
great powers.
Security
is
achieved
through
action
to
redress
the
balance once
a
threat
is
apparent.
Selective
Engagement
is
also
grounded
in
the
balance-of-power
perspec-
tive.
Again,
the
primary
objective
is
to ensure
peace
among the
great
powers.
But
here
security
is
achieved
through
proactive
engagement
in
some
areas
of
the world
to
guard
against
or
prevent threats
to
the
bal-
ance
arising.
Preserving
primacy
is
grounded
in
the unipolar
perspective.
The
prima-
ry objective
for
the
hegemonic
state
is
to
preserve
pre-eminent
power.
Security
is
achieved
by
maintaining
a
preponderance
of
power,
princi-
pally
through
multilateral
measures.
Imperialism
is
also
grounded
in
the
unipolar
perspective
and
its
prima-
ry
objective
is
also
to
preserve
pre-eminent
power
on
the
part
of
the
hegemonic
state. Security
is
achieved
by
maintaining
a
preponderance
of
power,
principally
through
unilateral
measures.
2
Christopher
Layne,
'From
preponderance
to offshore
balancing,'
International
Security
22(summer
1997),
88.
3
For
a
detailed
discussion
of
the
grand
strategies
of
isolationism,
selective
engage-
ment,
and
primacy,
see
Barry
R.
Posen
and
Andrew
Ross,
'Competing
visions
for
u.s.
grand
strategy,'
International
Security
21(winter
1996/97),
5-53.
304
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Spring
2003
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