Beyond Russophobia
| DOI | 10.1177/0010836710396776 |
| Date | 01 March 2011 |
| Author | Anni Kangas |
| Published date | 01 March 2011 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Cooperation and Conflict
46(1) 40–59
Beyond Russophobia:
© The Author(s) 2011
Reprints and permission: sagepub.
A practice-based
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DOI: 10.1177/0010836710396776
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interpretation of
Finnish–Russian/Soviet
relations
Anni Kangas
Abstract
The article offers a practice-based analysis of Finland’s relationships with Russia. It works on the
basis of ideas that have been presented in conjunction with the so-cal ed practice and pragmatist
turns in international relations. After identifying three key schools of thought in previous research
on Finnish–Russian relations – primordialist, instrumentalist and identity-based – the article moves
on to give a practice turn inspired account of the ways in which the proximity of Russia was dealt
with in Finland during the inter-war period. Combining insights from the work of Pierre Bourdieu
and Charles S. Peirce, it introduces a research design built with the help of such analytical tools as
the doubt-belief model of social action, relational properties and fields. These tools are then applied
on research materials that comprise Finnish parliamentary documents and political cartoons. The
materials are argued to be particularly wel suited for attempts to apply practice insights in actual
research, as they simultaneously function as embodiments of meaningful patterns of social and
political activity and actively correlate with the urgencies of the contexts in which they appear.
Keywords
Finnish–Russian relations, political cartoons, practice theory
Introduction
Finnish ways of making sense of Russia seem to display fundamentally contradictory
characteristics. The position of Finns vis-à-vis their eastern neighbour is frequently des-
ignated as a form of Russophobia or archenmity. This interpretation is almost as fre-
quently contrasted with evaluations according to which Finland, in her external relations,
has often not only chosen a geopolitical bias in favour of Russia but, unlike most Western
countries, also portrayed the East as a potential friend.
Corresponding author:
Anni Kangas, School of Management, University of Tampere, FIN-33014 Tampere, Finland.
[email: anni.kangas@uta.fi]
Kangas
41
Recently, the sense of ambiguity pertaining to Finland’s relationship with its eastern
neighbour surfaced as a result of a speech given by Minister of Defence Kari Häkämies
in Washington, DC. He argued that ‘given our geographical location, the three main
security challenges for Finland today are Russia, Russia, Russia’ (Häkämies, 2007). The
speech prompted intense debate as to whether Häkämies actually meant that Russia was
a threat to Finland and whether an interpretation of Russia’s proximity as something
negative would mean a change to the official Eastern policy of the country. President
Tarja Halonen responded to the commotion by arguing that nothing had changed in
Finnish policy vis-à-vis Russia, and that the proximity of Russia was ‘a positive chal-
lenge for Finland’ (YLE News, 2007).
The article attempts to overcome this ambiguity which, on the surface, seems to char-
acterize Finnish ways of coming to terms with the proximity of Russia. In this task, it
focuses upon the ‘practice turn’ literature in social sciences and international relations
(IR) and provides an articulation of the logic of practicality of Finland’s relations with
Russia.1 The focus of the article is on the inter-war period (1918–39) which, as a forma-
tive moment in Finnish–Russian relations, provides a particularly fruitful setting for the
type of inquiry attempted here. New ways of dealing with the proximity of Russia had to
be formed in a situation in which Finland emerged as an independent state from the mul-
tinational Russian Empire and in which the previous metropolitan country was undergo-
ing massive political transformation.
Before moving on with the practice-based interpretation of Finnish ways of coming to
terms with Russia’s proximity, a snapshot of the ways in which the issue has been treated
previously in research is provided. In order to refine the vocabulary that is applied later
in this article, three key schools of interpretation, labelled as primordialist, instrumental-
ist and identity-based approaches, are considered.
Three schools of interpretation
The first strand of interpretation in previous analyses of Finnish–Russian relations is the
primordial school of thought (e.g. Tarkiainen, 1986; Wunsch, 2004). Finnish ways of com-
ing to terms with the proximity of Russia are explained on the basis of a set of properties
which have inhered in Finns if not since time immemorial then at least since the Russian
invasion in 1700–24 into what is today known as Finland (see also Vilkuna, 2006). Most
commonly, these interpretations operate on the basis of the theory of traditional enmity or
archenmity. They identify signs of contempt or superiority toward Russians in Finnish
materials and maintain that these signs are symptomatic of something continuous and fun-
damental (see also Harle, 2000: 163 f.). Furthermore, primordialist interpretations charac-
teristically cut out or declare inauthentic visions that allow too much room for various
interpretations or contradict the basic model of enmity between Finland and Russia.
Primordialist interpretations have been challenged by scholars who have examined
Finnish–Russian relations in general and anti-Russianism in particular as an instrumental
political construction projected in the past because it suited particular purposes and cir-
cumstances. The instrumentalists suggest that negative images of Russia and Russians
were fabricated in order to further specific political goals or to legitimate one’s own
aggressiveness. In contrast to the primordialists’ interpretations, possible signs of enmity
42
CooperationandConflict46(1)
are not treated as cross-temporal intrinsic properties of Finns and Finnishness, but as
convenient rationalizations.
Most famously, Matti Klinge (1972) has sought to demonstrate that signs of the Finns’
hostility and aversion vis-à-vis Russia and Russianness between 1918 and 1944 was not
primordial or long standing, but a construction which was instrumental for furthering
certain ideological or political interests (see also Kirby, 1979; Immonen, 1987;
Luostarinen, 1989; Karemaa, 1998). In the words of David Kirby, Russophobia ‘was
used to replace class antagonism by a sense of national solidarity’ (1979: 52). Similarly,
Kari Immonen (1987) has suggested that the circumstances following the Finnish civil
war formed the basis for the emergence of a form of anti-Russianism in the newly inde-
pendent Finland. It was convenient to argue that the war – an ‘abortive revolution’ – was
caused by ‘foreign contamination’ rather than the problematic social conditions.
Furthermore, national integration and the rehabilitation of the Finnish labour movement
necessitated projecting the blame for the war to the outside.
The third, identity-based strand of research has not only rejected any primordial or
essentialist claims but also challenged the aspect of calculativeness which forms part of
the instrumentalist argumentation. Especially since the 1990s, it has been quite fashion-
able to scrutinize Finland’s relationship with its eastern neighbour analogously to the
logic whereby identity and difference are constituted (Paasi, 1997; Medvedev, 1998;
Moisio, 1998; Harle, 2000; Browning, 2002, 2008). Here, the attribution of meaning to
the social world by way of emplotments that differentiate the self from others takes on
ontological primacy.
Some scholars argue that the logic whereby Russia has provided an other, often but
not necessarily always a negative one,2 for the construction of Finnish self is something
timeless or at least long standing (e.g. Medvedev, 1998; Harle, 2000: 165). Others main-
tain that this logic is particularly applicable to the inter-war period (e.g. Paasi, 1997: 46).
In this interpretation, there occurred a radical transformation in the Finnish image of
Russia in the early twentieth century as the newly independent nation-state sought to
demarcate itself from the outside world. The previously predominantly favourable image
of Russia changed radically as the Soviet Union became treated as an other, the represen-
tations of which in the most extreme form took the shape of an ‘enemy image’ (Paasi,
1997, 1999; see also Karemaa, 1998).
The primary intention of this article is not to engage in any ‘gladiator style’ argumen-
tation where ‘one perspective goes forth and slays all others’ (Checkel, cited by Friedrichs
and Kratochwil, 2009: 721). While the interpretation which emphasizes the logic of
practicality is in many ways complementary to the other schools of interpretation, it
differs from them in the sense that ontological priority is given to attempts to achieve a
satisfactory relation between different parts of experience so as to be able to act in and
on the world. In the following sections, some features in the three above characterized
schools of interpretation of Finnish approaches vis-à-vis Russia and Russianness are
identified that appear problematic from this practice point of view.
Primordialist analyses of Finnish–Russian relations are problematic from the per-
spective of the practice accounts which perceive intrinsic properties of some groups (e.g.
Finns) as unsatisfactory explanatory devices (Bourdieu, 1998: 4–6). Primordialism is a
form of the substantialist...
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