Bias and balance in civil war mediation
| Published date | 01 July 2024 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231156959 |
| Author | Elizabeth J Menninga |
| Date | 01 July 2024 |
https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231156959
Journal of Peace Research
2024, Vol. 61(4) 627 –642
© The Author(s) 2023
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DOI: 10.1177/00223433231156959
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1225162JPR0010.1177/00223433231156959Journal of Peace ResearchMenninga
research-article2023
Regular Article
Bias and balance in civil war mediation
Elizabeth J Menninga
Department of Political Science, University of Iowa
Abstract
This article identifies a mechanism through which multiparty mediation – mediation with multiple active third
parties – has positive effects on civil war resolution. Balanced mediation efforts – those providing third parties biased
toward both sides of the dispute – have unique advantages in generating peaceful outcomes. In particular, balanced
efforts alleviate the commitment concerns faced by both the rebel group and the government, improving the
prospects for peace. In this article, I develop a measure, Mediation balance, which aggregates the mediators’ biases
when multiple third parties are present. I also consider, both theoretically and empirically, how the number of
mediators interacts with mediation balance to shape outcomes. I test my theory on civil war mediation attempts
between 1989 and 2005, finding that balanced mediation efforts improve the probability of reaching an agreement.
Furthermore, the strength of this effect is influenced by the number of mediators involved. Mediation balance also
influences the probability the agreement halts the violence, albeit in unexpected ways.
Keywords
civil wars, conflict resolution, mediation
Introduction
As a popular conflict management tool, mediation
receives substantial attention from scholars and policy-
makers. Much of this prior work conceives of media-
tion’s effects in terms of how the mediator relates to
the disputants. Mediation, however, frequently involves
more than one mediator. Of the civil war mediation
efforts between 1989 and 2005, almost half involved
multiple mediators.
1
Understanding mediation, there-
fore, requires understanding the connections and inter-
actions among the mediators as well as between the
mediators and the disputants. I explore these connec-
tions by considering how mediator biases can balance
each other to improve (or hinder) mediation outcomes.
By considering the number of mediators as well as their
characteristics, I find that some combinations meaning-
fully improve the chances of mediation success while
others hinder conflict resolution efforts. Importantly,
this project goes beyond whether an agreement is
reached to consider whether these agreements halt vio-
lence, at least in the short term.
To the extent that the presence of multiple mediators
is considered in the resolution literature (see e.g. Beards-
ley, 2011), the conclusions are pessimistic: multiparty
mediation
2
decreases the chances of success. This pessi-
mism might seem intuitive as multiparty mediation faces
unique challenges, including forum-shopping, mixed
messages, and buck passing (Crocker, Hampson & Aall,
1999). Crowded mediation efforts in Burundi, for exam-
ple, illustrate the challenges created when mediators fail
to coordinate, sending different signals to the disputants
and undermining the peace process (Hara, 1999).
Despite these challenges, multiparty mediation does
sometimes succeed. In Angola, the Troika (the United
States, Russia, and Portugal) worked with the United
Corresponding author:
elizabeth-menninga@uiowa.edu
1
Using the cases identified by DeRouen, Bercovitch & Pospieszna
(2011).
2
Multiparty mediation here always refers to negotiations in which
multiple international actors (e.g. states, international organizations,
nongovernmental organizations) served as mediators.
628 journal of P R 61(4)
Nations (UN) to broker the Lusaka Protocol. Hare
(1999: 658) cites UN Special Representative Beye as
telling Troika representatives, ‘[i]t is not certain that the
mediators will be able to bring peace to the Angolans,
but it is perfectly clear that they will never achieve it
without our help’. I argue the mediation team’s compo-
sition has implications for whether an agreement is
reached and the expectation the agreement will last.
3
In this article, I focus on mediator bias, exploring how
bias aggregates in multiparty settings.
I assert that a balanced mediation effort, one with a
mediator biased toward each side of the conflict, provides
the multiparty effort unique advantages unavailable in a
single-party context. When both the rebels and the gov-
ernment have an ally, the mediation effort benefits from
all the advantages of bias, while also mitigating the con-
cerns of and revealing information to both sides of the
conflict. I find balanced efforts increase the probability
an agreement is signed, but this effect only holds for
small multiparty efforts. The mediation’s balance also
influences the probability the agreement halts the vio-
lence, albeit in unexpected ways.
Mediation’s role and impact
Past work on mediation has explored a variety of ques-
tions regarding who offers to mediate, when belligerents
accept these offers, and how mediation influences settle-
ment or conflict recurrence. Mediators with historical
linkages to the disputants are more likely to offer their
services (Greig & Regan, 2008), and mediation is most
likely where a third party can more readily reshape the
dynamics between the disputants from conflict to coop-
eration (Terris & Maoz, 2005). Combatants are also
more willing to accept mediation when resolution
requires unpopular concessions, using mediation as
political cover (Beardsley, 2010).
Importantly, mediation does not occur randomly (Gart-
ner & Bercovitch, 2006; Beber, 2012). Rather, mediation
is used in the most difficult cases, those the disputants
cannot resolve bilaterally. Once present in these difficult
cases, mediators provide leverage and tools that encourage
resolution. Gartner and Bercovitch refer to this as media-
tion’s competing ‘selection’ and ‘process’ effects. Mediators
encourage resolution by helping disputants navigate two
key obstacles to peace: credible commitment and private
information (Fearon, 1995). Commitment problems occur
when one or both sides have incentives to renege on pro-
mises made during negotiations after the agreement is
signed. Disputants often feel particularly vulnerable post-
agreement as compliance leaves them weaker, making them
an easier target if the other side does renege (Walter, 2002).
Information asymmetries, on the other hand, complicate
finding a mutually acceptable agreement. Disputants have
private information regarding their strength and resolve as
well as incentives to misrepresent this information to secure
a better deal (Walter, 2006). This private information
obscures the range of agreements that would be acceptable
to all sides.
Effects of biased mediation
Savun (2008) defines bias as having preferences that
align more closely with one party than the other; Savun
distinguishes between absolute bias (bias toward one side
independent of the relationship with the other side) and
relative bias (bias that considers the mediator’s relation-
ship with both disputants), arguing relative bias is more
salient to mediation outcomes. Carnevale & Arad (1996)
assert that bias can be an important source of influence
and that bias provides an incentive for the actor to inter-
vene. While mediators with strong interests in the con-
flict are motivated to aid resolution, this sometimes
comes with mediator preferences that do not align with
the disputants’ interests (Maoz & Terris, 2006: 411).
Motive to intervene alone, therefore, is not sufficient
to improve mediation outcomes.
Kydd (2003) argues biased mediators alleviate infor-
mation problems by credibly revealing information when
they counsel caution to their preferred side. Touval
(1975) asserts bias influences how the combatants inter-
pret information shared by the mediator, also concluding
that this communication can be informative. That bias is
necessary for mediators to reveal information, however,
is not universally accepted. Rauchhaus (2006) argues
impartial mediators can, in some circumstances, reveal
information, and Beber (2012) concludes biased media-
tors should actually be less effective than their impartial
counterparts in revealing information.
Others consider the role of bias in overcoming com-
mitment problems. Svensson (2007) concludes media-
tors biased toward the government have a positive effect
on the probability disputants sign an agreement while
mediators biased toward the rebels have no effect on
reaching agreement. Svensson argues this is because
mediators biased toward the government can assuage
3
I use ‘mediation effort’ and ‘mediation team’ to refer to a group of
mediators involved in the same conflict at the same time. This does
not necessarily imply the mediators are actively coordinating their
efforts. See Menninga (2019) for further discussion of mediator
coordination.
2journal of PEACE RESEARCH XX(X)
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