Biding time versus timely retreat: Asymmetric dependence, issue salience, and conflict duration
Author | Yuleng Zeng |
DOI | 10.1177/0022343320918917 |
Published date | 01 July 2021 |
Date | 01 July 2021 |
Biding time versus timely retreat:
Asymmetric dependence, issue salience,
and conflict duration
Yuleng Zeng
Department of Political Science, University of South Carolina
Abstract
Trade-conflict studies focus on whether and how economic interdependence suppresses interstate conflict initiation.
Meanwhile, formal theories of war show that conflict initiation is inherently tied to its termination. In this article, I
seek to bridge the two literature by utilizing a war of attrition model to formalize the relationship between economic
dependence and conflict duration. I theorize that the strategic calculation ultimately comes down to a trade-off
between biding one’s time and retreating in a timely manner. In the context of economic attrition, states weigh the
relative costs of suffering an additional round of economic disruption against the potential benefits of winning the
disputed good. As such, economic dependence can have both coercive and informational effects and these effects are
contingent upon issue salience. When the issue salience is low, the coercive effect dominates; states are more likely to
quit conflicts as they suffer proportionally larger economic costs. When the issue salience is high enough, the
informational effect can kick in; states are less likely to quit conflicts with increasing economic costs. I test these
implications on the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) and the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data, finding
strong support for the informational effect and suggestive evidence for the coercive one.
Keywords
conflict duration, economic interdependence, issue salience, war of attrition
Trade-conflict studies show that economic (inter)depen-
dence
1
can suppress interstate conflict initiation (Oneal
& Russet, 1997; Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001; cf. Bar-
bieri, 1996). It is less clear whether and how trade can
affect conflict duration/termination. On the one hand,
economic dependence may have little impact – a conflict
broken out means the failure of the restraining effect of
trade. Alas, conflict outbreak can also be an exercise of
economic statecraft. States opt to enter conflicts believ-
ing in their power to coerce or to endure coercion, which
may suggest either shorter or longer conflict duration.
These contradictory predictions are puzzling and call for
further investigation. Addressing states’ calculation
beyond the conflict onset stage is also critical to the
development of a coherent theory, as conflict initiation
is intimately tied to its termination (Wagner, 2000;
Ramsay, 2008). To further the current studies of com-
mercial peace, we need to explain whether and how
economic dependence affects states’ decisions over con-
flict termination, which feeds back to their calculation
over conflict initiation in the first place.
One simple explanation is states that suffer asymme-
trically higher economic costs have lower bargaining
leverage; as this asymmetry increases, the disadvantaged
states will have to quit conflicts faster. However, this
theory appears to miss important parts of states’
Corresponding author:
zengyuleng@gmail.com
1
A state is economically dependent upon another if conflicts with the
latter result in substantial economic losses for the former. I refer to
economic interdependence as both states being economically
dependent on each other. I use conflict and crisis interchangeably,
which can run the gamut from low-level tensions that reduce some
(prospective) trade and investment to armed conflicts that result in
bloodshed.
Journal of Peace Research
2021, Vol. 58(4) 719–733
ªThe Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343320918917
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