Book Review: Injustice in Person: The Right to Self-Representation
| Published date | 01 October 2016 |
| Date | 01 October 2016 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0964663916660920c |
| Subject Matter | Book Reviews |
McChesney R (2007) Communication Revolution: Critical Junctures and the Future of Media.
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mation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
RABEEA ASSY, Injustice in Person: The Right to Self-Representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2015, p. 272, ISBN 9780199687442, £70 (hbk).
Rabeea Assy’s book provides an original argument on the right to self-representation.
The very existence of a right to self-representation, let alone an unfettered one, has only
scarcely been discussed in modern academic literature. However, self-representation is
one of the main issues that occupy the legal community today. The civil justice system is
experiencing what some would refer to as a crisis, as litigation in courts is becoming too
costly and too discomforting for normal citizens. Many people in common law jurisdic-
tions are no longer in a position to secure legal representation. One of the results of this
difficulty in litigation funding is likely to be an increase in self-representat ion. The
response of the civil justice system so far has focused on exploring ways to assist
litigants in person to make the most of their self-representation (p. 1).
Assy argues that adjusting the legal system to accommodate the needs of litigants in
person is not the right solution (p. 4). Instead, he suggests another look at the right to self-
representation. As Assy explains, the theoretical significance of self-representation in
civil proceedings has hardly been examined (p. 1). Following a close analysis of the
history of the right to self-representation and its rationales, Assy contends that the value
of the right to self-representation is insufficient to outweigh its consequences. In partic-
ular, Assy convincingly shows that while there may be a rationale for the right to
self-representation in criminal proceedings, it is difficult to justify a fundamental right
to self-representation in civil proceedings. Assy presents the only court decision in which
there was a substantial discussion of self-representation – the US Supreme Court decision
in the Faretta case (Faretta v. California 422 US 806 (1975)) – to show that, historically,
the right to self-representation was justified on the grounds of respect for autonomy, with
reference to considerations that are specific to the criminal context (Chapter 2). These
considerationsinclude the state’s power over theindividual and the gravity of the interests
at stake (pp. 36 ff.). In Assy’s words, ‘The unique risk to physical liberty posed by the
criminal process gives rise to the liberal concern over abuse of state power’ (p. 37).
Assy rejects the assumption that every litigant should be free to choose whether to
represent herself in person or through counsel, concluding that self-representation is
ineffective and inefficient (Chapters 1 and 4). He argues that self-representation does
not promote the administration of justice since, not only is self-representation not ben-
eficial for the litigants in person themselves (especially in complex cases), it also leads to
a waste of public resources and thus negatively affect other litigants (pp. 22 ff.).
In addition, Assy maintains that respect for personal autonomy does not require a
right to self-representation under all circumstances (Chapter 7). He explains that
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