Book Review: Military and Scientific Affairs: The Military Technical Revolution
| Date | 01 March 1967 |
| Published date | 01 March 1967 |
| Author | John Gellner |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070206702200122 |
| Subject Matter | Book Review |
108
INTERNATIONAL
JouRpNAL
they
whose
disposition will
preoccupy
national
leaders
How-
ever few
the
nuclears
used,
and
however
selectively
they
are
used,
their
purpose
should
not
be
tactical
because
their
consequences
will
not
be
tactical.
With
nuclears,
it
has
become
more
than
ever
a
war
of
risks
and
threats
at
the
highest
strategic
level.
It
is
a
war
of
nuclear bargaining.
(pp.
110-11)
A
further
chapter
discusses
the popular
topic of
deterrence
strategy
at
the
showdown,
what
Schelling calls
the
"diplomacy
of
ultimate
survival. But
it
is in
his
analysis
of
the
psychology
of
situations
rather
than
of
the
ramifications
of
bi-polar
counterforce
strategy
that
he
is
at
his
best.
"The Idiom
of
Military
Action"
discusses
the
restraints
consciously
and
sub-consciously
imposed
by
a
battle
situation:
the
psychology
of
battle
communications,
hostages, and
the
technique
of
surrender.
Again,
in
discussing
the
significance of
boundaries
and
other
such
Rubicons
he
turns
to
nuclear
weapons:
"President
Johnson
said,
W'ake
no
mistake.
There
is
no
such
thing as
a
conventional
nuclear
weapon.
He
was
absolutely
right;
it
is by
convention-by
an
understanding,
a
tradition,
a
consensus,
a
shared
willingness
to
see
them
as
different-that
they
are
different.
(p.
134)
In
the
concluding
chapters
Schelling
examines
the
psychological
consequences of
what
would
have
been
regarded
in
the
good
old
days
of
normal
warfare
as
warning
signs
but
hardly
emergencies.
The
danger
is
that
civil
defence
preparations,
conscription,
mobilization
and
other
prewar
steps may
set
in
motion
a
train
of
events
on
the
other
side
that
may
be
difficult
to control.
It
is
the
nature
of
nuclear
conflict
that
it
is
in
the
stage
of
preparations
rather
than
the war
that
a
com-
promise
may most
easily
be
effected.
The
war,
if it
should
ever
come,
has
the
potential
to
be
immediate,
irrational
and
mechanical.
The
conduct of such
a
war
is
inevitably centralized,
the
responsibility
for
its
pursuit
devolves
no
longer
on
consensus
and
common
judgment
but
on
a
few
fallible
individuals.
Mr.
Schelling
concludes
his
book
with
remarks
on
the
problem
of
the
communication
of
intentions,
motives,
and
strengths
to opponents
and ends
with
these
thoughtful
words:
"This
strange,
momentous
dialogue
may
illustrate
two
principles
for
the
kind
of
noncommittal
bargaining
we
are
forever
engaged
in
with
the potential
enemy
First,
don't
speak directly
at
him,
but
speak
seriously
to
some serious
audience
and
let
him
overhear.
Second,
to get
his
ear,
listen.
(p.
286)
Ottawa
B•AN
CRANE-
THE
MILITARYTECHNICAL
RIvoLUTION.
Its
Impact
on
Strategy
and
Foreign
Policy
Edited
by
John
Erickson.
1966.
(New
York:
Frederick
A.
Praeger.
Toronto:
Burns
&
MacEachern.
284pp.
$9.00)
'The
prolonged Byzantine
debate
in
the
West on atomic
strategy
has
not
only
become
tedious,
but
the
incredible
amount
of
nonsense
that
has
been
expressed
in
reference
to
this
subject
is
highly
alarming.
People
think
they have
been
constantly
making
new
discoveries when
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