Book Review: Military and Scientific Affairs: The Diary of the Sinai Campaign

DOI10.1177/002070206702200225
Published date01 June 1967
AuthorH. Paul Simon
Date01 June 1967
Subject MatterBook Review
BOOK
REVIEWS
329
elements
of
caution
in
Chinese
policy
into
treaties.
A
major
assump-
tion
in
thls
study,
write
Halperin
and
Perkins,
"is
that
it
is
extremely
unlikely
that
the
Chinese
Communist
regime
will sign any
formal arms
control agreements within
the
next
five
or
ten
years.
This
conclusion,
they
explain,
is
based
largely
on
the
belief
that
the
Chinese will
probably
be
too
interested
during
that
period
in
building
their
own
military
capability,
to
sacrifice
anything
for
agreements
that
will
stabilize
the
international military
balance.
Hudson
Institute
MICHAEL
E.
SHERMAN
THE
DIARY
OF
THE
SINAI
CAMPAIGN.
By
Major-General
Moshe
Dayan.
1966.
(London:
Weidenfeld
&
Nicolson.
Toronto: Ryerson
Press.
23
6pp.
$9.50)
This
is
not
a
history,
but
one
general's personal
account,
almost
ten
years
later,
based only
in
part
on
a
diary.
The
tale
leaves
out
vital
political aspects
of
"developments preceding"
the
Sinai campaign.
As
such,
it is
of
value
primarily
to
students
of
military
tactics
and
history
not
to
historians
and
political
scientists.
The Sinai campaign
was
an
Israeli
version
of
"Blitzkreig"
The
original
military
and political
objectives
were to
lift
the
Gulf of
Aqaba
blockade
and
to
pre-empt
the
threat
from
the
Gaza
strip's
terrorist-raids.
General
Dayan
states
flatly
that
Israel
launched
her
campaign
because
of
the
Anglo-French
operation. This
implies
either
collusion
or
a
spasm-reaction
by
a
political-military
apparatus
poised
for
such
action.
Early
in
1955,
the
Israeli's
had
"decided"
that
the
Government
of Egypt
was
responsible
for
initiating
and organizing
an
anti-Israel
wave
of
terrorism.
Rather
than
take
its
case
to
the
U.N.
Security
Council,
the Israeli
Government
adopted
a
policy
of
reprisal
by
military
action,
and
waited
until the
Fall
of
1956
to
take
sudden
advantage
of
the
Anglo-French
expedition
plans
to
violate
the
Armistice
Agreements
of
1949.
The
planmng
for
Sinai
started
in
late
October,
1955,
but
at
that
time
Ben-Gunon
could
not
get
his
Cabinet to
agree
to
the
action.
In
December
1955,
Ben-Gurion
turned
to
Canada's
General
Burns:
"We
have
reliable
information
that
the
Government
of
Egypt
is
responsible
for
the
feda-
yuns"
Burns
and
Hammarskjold
worked
together
to
get
a
cease-fire
on
April
18,
1956.
When
incidents
flared
up
again,
Ben-Gunon
did
not
go
back
to
Burns
or the
U.N.
Here
is
the
gap
in
Dayan's
tale:
on
the
events
from
May
to September
1956
he
is
silent.
Ben-Guron
acted
alone
in
giving
his
military
the
green
light
on
October
25;
only
later,
on
the
28th,
did
he
go
back
to
the
Cabinet
and
get
their
agreement.
By
then,
it
looked
like
another
reprisal
action
after
a
summer-series. The
Israeli
army
in
fact
regarded "the
numerous
reprisal
actions"
as
a
means
of
attaining
his
proper
"fighting
levels"
So
battle
commenced.
The
main
factors
in
Blitzkrieg
are
well known
since
1939:
secrecy
r-ruling
out
advance mobilization), sudden
surpr-se
(no
prior
air-attacks
alerting
the
enemy)
speed
(forcing
a
short
cam-

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